Much of the commentary coming out of think tanks and news outlets over the last week has been limited in scope and vision, often focusing on public attitudes in Israel, the prospects for reviving a two-state solution, and the potential for yet more escalation. The limited horizon of expectations derives in part from the fact that fighting is ongoing and outside observers are still caught up in the ever-changing battlefield dynamics. That is logical. 

Another reason for the narrow lens of analysis is that Israeli prime minister Netanyahu has consistently caught everyone else off-guard in terms of his risk tolerance and advance planning, leaving the experts to play catch-up in their assessments at every stage. That, too, is understandable. A third reason for the tunnel vision is that the war has had rather little impact on domestic politics and economics in most of the region. 

Algeria and Tunisia held presidential elections and returned Presidents Tebboune and Saied, respectively, to office. The opposition in both cases was largely excluded from the polls by the countries’ electoral commissions, ending in court cases in Tunisia for over a dozen candidates brought up on spurious charges of falsifying endorsement signatures. 

The emir of Kuwait dissolved Parliament and revoked the citizenship of hundreds of individuals, largely on the grounds that they had used false records to obtain citizenship in the first place. After almost two decades of parliamentary corruption scandals and court intrigue, many Kuwaitis were surprisingly pleased to see the politicians sidelined. 

The Egyptians are in the midst of a National Dialogue, with technical experts and average people from across the country weighing in with their ideas for reform. The most recent topics have been revising the parameters for pre-trial detention and considering alternatives to the expensive and sometimes misdirected system of ration cards for subsidized goods. 

The Iraqi media is preoccupied with a “theft of the century” investigation into the embezzlement of $2.5 billion in tax revenue and accusations of a massive wire-tapping scandal in the prime minister’s office. Prime Minister Soudani has quite consciously sought to keep Iraq far removed from the regional conflict.

The Abraham Accords are alive and well, tentative GCC outreach to both Syria and Iran continues apace, and everyone is happy to pontificate about “day after” planning in Gaza as long as it remains largely an affair for the Israelis and Palestinians. The Arab states would probably prefer not to make any commitments to contributing boots on the ground or billions in reconstruction funds at this early stage when so much is still uncertain. 

The real changes in the region after one year of war all come from the Axis of Resistance, and only their barest outlines are perceptible. Hamas’ position is in some respects more entrenched than before and yet, at the same time, more precarious. Hamas will probably have its way and rule Gaza for the foreseeable future, if only because there is no likely alternative. But the remnants of the group that emerges from their tunnels will encounter a decimated landscape and an infuriated public, who are increasingly angry at both the Israelis and Hamas leadership. Fatah has no incentive to undertake any meaningful reconciliation with Hamas beyond the token gesture of including technocrats in a future unity government for the purpose of justifying Palestinian Authority control over Gaza. 

Hezbollah will no doubt recuperate, but it will take time. And what results will not be the same as before, considering the loss of much senior leadership, the destruction of stockpiles, and the blinding of thousands of fighters? Hezbollah has been repeatedly and publicly humiliated and shamed by Israel, its networks infiltrated and communications hacked, to such an extent that it will struggle to restore its image as the vanguard of a sophisticated and modernized resistance. Hezbollah will have to find a new way forward. Its only saving grace will be that the other Sunni, Christian, and Druze factions in Lebanon are too internally divided and disorganized to mount an effective opposition. 

The Houthis have survived multiple rounds of airstrikes, targeted sanctions, and international isolation. From the outset of the war, the United States and its partners imposed a weakly enforced policy of containment. Nobody would touch the port of Hodeidah for fear that a loss of aid access and the collapse of that economic lifeline would result in a humanitarian disaster. The Israeli strikes on the port and its critical infrastructure have now broken that taboo. 

As for Iran itself, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh should have sent a signal about the depth and accuracy of Israel’s intelligence collection in Iran, its penetration of security in the capital, and its willingness to act decisively and ruthlessly. And yet, the Iranian regime appears to have been caught off-guard and unprepared for the escalation of the conflict. That leaves us with years and years of empty rhetoric about Israel’s eventual encirclement and inevitable demise of Khamenei. Last Friday, the Supreme Leader showed himself to be a frail, old man, representing a set of policies largely out of step with the majority of Iran’s youthful population. He mumbled through a Friday sermon for the entire community that he is unqualified to deliver while holding a gun he will never fire. The optics for the Iranian regime were less than assuring. 

It might be too early to assess fully the implications of a year of war, but some scenarios seem quite possible as we mark the first anniversary.

A Power Transition in Iran

The IRGC of today can claim a degree of success through tangible military gains in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that were just out of reach for their parents’ generation in the 1980s. It would only be natural for the current ranks of the IRGC to ascribe the failure of an effective response to Gaza as a failure of an older generation that still clings to power in their twilight years. A comparison with Egypt in the 1950s may be apt. The Free Officers, including future president General Abdel Nasser, believed that Egypt’s failure against Israel in 1948 was a direct result of incompetence and corruption among Old Guard leaders and politicians in Cairo. The need to replace them became one among several key factors driving them on to revolution. Similarly, it would be reasonable to think that at least some leaders within the IRGC right now are wary of Israeli infiltration within their ranks, disappointed by the regime’s response to the war, and fearful that public opinion will turn against them. When the war is over, they will have to decide what a post-Khamenei regime looks like and the extent of their involvement in shaping it.

The Proxy Blame-game

There will be a lot of finger-pointing when all is said and done. Hamas was sure that Hezbollah would join in the war from the outset and was disappointed by Hezbollah’s relative restraint. Hezbollah no doubt felt that Syria had an obligation to step into the fray. The reticence in Damascus must have felt like a betrayal after so many years of Hezbollah assistance in the civil war. All will look to Iran for answers, and really, the only answer is that Iran was either incapable of mounting an effective attack or unwilling to risk a counterattack that might destabilize the regime. Probably a bit of both. Iran is rapidly missing the chance to restore deterrence, and it may not have the ability to project strength through its proxies if those entities perceive it as unreliable. 

Resetting the U.S.-Israel Relationship

Regardless of who wins the U.S. elections in November, by the time we reach Inauguration Day in January, calls will sound from innumerable members of Congress, lobbyists, and pundits for a “reset” in the U.S.-Israel relationship. If the Trump campaign wins, a reset will be the easiest way to frame what is essentially a boost in bilateral ties, one in which Washington agrees to pursue some notional form of regional peace talks with the Abraham Accord countries in the lead while at the same time doubling down on security assistance. If the Harris campaign wins, a reset will be code for putting all of the student encampments, criticisms of arms sales, and uncommitted votes in Michigan in the rear-view mirror, with a strategic dialogue about human rights providing cover for a continuation of the same basic relationship that prevailed under Presidents Obama and Biden. 

Netanyahu has said that we are witnessing a change in the strategic reality of the region. He is wrong. The structural conditions have not changed sufficiently to force these parties to change their calculus and reassess their behavior. He may not have to be right, however. All he needs is enough temporary change, no matter how transient, in order to declare “total victory,” box out his political rivals, and survive to fight another day. It is entirely possible that, on Inauguration Day, the administration in the White House will be faced with a situation in which the most expedient solution will simply be to grit our teeth, put on a smile, and shake hands with Bibi. The more things change, the more they stay the same.