North Korea’s dispatch of 1,500 special forces to Russia, as the vanguard of an estimated 12,000 troops to join Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, marks a significant evolution of Pyongyang’s evolving strategic partnership with Moscow.

North Korea’s action will prolong the conflict and could lead to greater Russian willingness to supply more sophisticated military technology to Pyongyang. South Korea will face greater pressure to respond, potentially by abandoning its reluctance to provide lethal aid directly to Ukraine.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) disclosed satellite imagery of North Korea transporting special forces to the Russian Far East via a Russian naval ship. It also obtained a video showing North Korean troops being issued Russian uniforms, equipment, and fake identification cards to disguise themselves as Russian units from Siberia.

North Korean forces fighting in Ukraine marks a major escalation of Pyongyang’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and the first time it has deployed large-scale ground forces overseas. Previously, North Korea had limited its role to sending fighter pilots to participate in the Vietnam War, to fly for Egypt in the Yom Kippur War, and small units of military advisers and troops to Syria’s 2016 civil war.

During the past year, Pyongyang bolstered Russia’s war by sending an estimated 8 million artillery shells and dozens of modern short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Western intelligence sources suggest that North Korean ammunition accounted for half of that used by Russia in Ukraine though with extensive failures of the decades-old shells and even half of recently produced SRBMs malfunctioning.

The North Korean units will augment Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian military and civilian targets but are unlikely to be a game changer. North Korean ground forces lack combat experience, sophisticated weaponry, and specialized training. The North Korean military has not trained with Russian units in combined-arms operations, nor does it have integrated command, control, and communication systems with Russian forces.

However, North Korean units in Ukraine will now gain exposure to new weapons, tactics, operations, and technologies of modern warfare, which can be utilized to modernize and improve the military capabilities of the country, which are arrayed against allied forces on the Korean Peninsula.

It remains unclear what Russia has given in return for North Korea’s military largesse. Financial compensation, certainly, as well as food and fuel shipments. More worrisome, however, would be transfer of Russian military technology to North Korea. Some experts speculate that Russia might provide the crown jewels of cutting-edge military technology, such as designs for nuclear warheads, reentry vehicles, or assistance on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

However, it is more likely that Russia would instead contribute technology for military reconnaissance satellites, advanced conventional weapon designs such as aircraft and submarines, or assistance in improving aircraft or naval weapons production. That said, Moscow may now be willing to pay a higher price following North Korea’s troop deployment.

In response to the NIS reports, President Yoon Suk Yeol convened an emergency security meeting. Afterwards, Seoul declared that North Korea’s action was “a significant security threat” to South Korea and the international community and vowed to “use every tool at our disposal to respond to the situation.”

To date, South Korea has refrained from providing lethal aid directly to Ukraine, instead limiting support to non-lethal assistance and exporting 500,000 artillery shells to the U.S. and major arms sales to Poland to offset their contributions to Kyiv.

The Yoon administration has repeatedly declared it might consider lifting its ban against providing lethal aid directly to Kyiv but has yet to do so largely due to concern of Russian retaliation. President Yoon first deliberated loosening Seoul’s constraints prior to attending a June 2022 summit with NATO nations. In April 2023, he stated South Korea would provide direct lethal aid if Russia conducted a “large-scale attack on civilians, a massacre or a serious violation of the laws of war,” which Moscow has since repeatedly done.

In June 2024, Seoul declared that Russia providing sophisticated precision weapons to North Korea after the signing of their bilateral defense treaty could trigger South Korean to transfer lethal weapons to Ukraine without restrictions.

Growing evidence of North Korea’s direct involvement in combat operations in Ukraine will increase pressure on Seoul to overcome its reluctance to aggravating Moscow and adopt stronger policies. After initial reports that the Yoon administration might provide lethal aid to Ukraine, however, it now appears Seoul will instead adopt a more constrained approach by first sending experts in the North's military tactics, doctrine, and operations and intelligence officers to interrogate captured North Korean soldiers. The government promised to maintain “an open attitude” towards possible future supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine.

A senior South Korean official commented that Seoul will adopt a phased approach in which “providing defensive weapons could be considered and, if North Korea “surpasses a limit, offensive [weapons] could also be considered in the end.”

Seoul’s reticence to become more involved in the Ukraine conflict may be partly due to growing tensions along the inter-Korean border. Kim Jong-un has increased threatening rhetoric against South Korea, blown up road and rail lines connecting the Koreas, and unveiled expansions to his missile force and nuclear weapon production capabilities.

Responding to rising Indo-Pacific and European security threats will require greater security contributions by partners, enhanced multilateral security coordination, and enduring U.S. commitment to its allies to deter opponents and defend common strategic interests.

About the Author: 

Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Klingner’s analysis and writing about North Korea, South Korea and Japan, as well as related issues, are informed by his 20 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Klingner, who joined Heritage in 2007, has testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

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