Understanding the disconnect between the national history told by Japanese revisionists and the one told by Japan’s neighbors, and appreciating the uses to which each side’s narratives are put, are fundamental to understanding regional security and the prospects for instability in Asia. It is, at the end of the day, central to figuring out which Japan should be welcomed “back.” Prime Minister Abe may have revived the Japanese economy for a brief moment and may have sustained popularity longer than most expected, but the larger question is whether or not a tilt toward revisionism would capture mainstream Japanese opinion and redefine Japanese national identity—its history, morality, national pride, and military. In “taking Japan back” would he be taking Japan back to the future and creating problems for Japan and its allies, or would he be leading it in a more positive direction? Does his repositioning of national identity portend a Japan that will become increasingly problematic for its neighbors in Northeast Asia (and perhaps the United States as well)? Or will it ultimately be reined in by a more pragmatic and moderate mainstream in the nation’s “identity politics” most of which is now comfortable with the postwar Japanese military?

There have been shifts in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies during the current Abe period—not the least of which have been deteriorating relations with Seoul and Beijing, friction with Washington, and (of all things) reconnection with Pyongyang. We should now expect more vis-à-vis India, whose new leader Narendra Modi shares Abe’s determination to restore national pride and dynamism, as well as his concerns about China. But if we focus narrowly on the issue of Japan’s enhanced muscularity, it is worth noting that Tokyo has been engaged for decades in a process of carefully engineered, realist salami slices—all directed toward normalcy, not militarism: In the 1980s, the first tentative steps were defense of sea lanes to 1,000 nautical miles and transfer of dual use technology to the United States. In the 1990s, Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, passed a PKO Law and shifted from homeland to regional security. By the 2000s, when it dispatched destroyers to Diego Garcia, put boots on Iraqi Ground, and jumped feet first into BMD cooperation with Washington, Tokyo was engaged in de facto collective self-defense. The slicing away at Japan’s self-imposed constraints continued into the current decade in the form of participation in the multinational, anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, establishment of a naval base in Djibouti, relaxation of the arms export ban, creation of an amphibious force, a shift to Southern defense, the rapid buildup of the Japanese Coast Guard, and a 50 percent increase in its submarine fleet. Throughout this process, Tokyo’s defense spending has been highly circumscribed. Even the increases in Mr. Abe’s defense budgets bring Japan back only to levels of a decade earlier. They pale in comparison to the sustained double digit increases in China’s defense spending.

So, Japan’s shift toward muscularity remains limited and, in any event, predates Prime Minister Abe’s “bringing Japan back.” More importantly, it neither has required nor benefited from revisionist identity politics. Indeed, it has had many parents across the conservative spectrum, most of whom are pragmatic realists seeking to hedge against U.S. decline and abandonment. It has been catalyzed by Chinese and North Korean provocations and abetted by U.S. exhortations. As noted, even Prime Minister Abe has found it helpful to label his focus on defense “proactive pacifism.”

The real issue is not the label. Japan can frame this security posture “actively pacifist,” but its effectiveness will depend on whether Tokyo’s strategy is actively realist and pragmatic rather than actively revisionist and ideological. Becoming normal—i.e., able to use force to defend one’s nation and one’s allies—is important for Japan and for regional stability. Building and maintaining a legitimate military, a long-term project that has largely succeeded, is difficult enough. It is not helped when accompanied by a strategy that is looking (even if not going) backwards. There is no reason why Japan must provide excuses for neighbors—especially those with shared democratic values and a shared ally, such as the Republic of Korea—to align with Chinese anti-Japanism and to undercut the alliance.

This was recognized in late April during President Obama’s state visit to Asia, a trip designed in part to gloss over Washington’s open “disappointment” with Mr. Abe’s revisionism and to underscore its much-ballyhooed plans to shift naval and air force assets from a 50-50 balance in the Atlantic and Pacific to a 60-40 balance in favor of the Pacific by 2020—the so called “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia. Before the president arrived in Tokyo, U.S. diplomats pressed Abe to dispel rumors he would support official revision of the government’s position on the “comfort women” issue. When he did so, Washington declared victory and, after considerable arm-twisting, engineered an uncomfortable (and very short) trilateral meeting with ROK President Park Geun-hye on the sidelines of the nuclear disarmament summit in The Hague. Without having to make concessions on trade and without having to address some of the more incendiary elements of the revisionist agenda—indeed his Internal Affairs Minister and more than one hundred Diet members paid homage at the Yasukuni Shrine just days before President Obama arrived—Abe was rewarded with what, from Tokyo’s perspective, was a very successful state visit. Trying to thread the moral hazard needle by not giving Japan carte blanche in the East China Sea, President Obama reiterated the U.S. commitment under Article 5 of the Japanese-U.S. security treaty to defend the Japanese administered Senkaku Islands. He also “welcomed” Japanese acceptance of collective self-defense. Both statements were unprecedented at the presidential level.

Washington claimed to be satisfied with the summit and insisted it had improved relations with Tokyo. But doubts about how much was actually achieved appeared instantaneously in both countries. Correctly perceiving the difficulties President Obama is facing at home on the trade front in an election year without fast track authority, Japan provided little beyond discussion of its so-called “sanctuary products” in the TPP negotiations—beef, pork, dairy, wheat, rice and sugar. Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro was matter of fact about Japan’s stonewalling: “Obama doesn’t have the clout to form (a national) consensus (on trade) in his country… So it’s only natural they agreed to continue talks.” And so bilateral talks on trade concessions concluded without agreement, and Prime Minister Abe even defended his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine at a press conference with President Obama—who had dispatched his vice president and secretaries of state and defense to dissuade Abe from doing so—standing mutely by his side.

In a sense, the Japan that is “back” is the one from the 1980s-1990s that could use its sophisticated understanding of U.S. political dynamics to hold the line on trade liberalization while simultaneously gaining renewed assurances from Washington that the alliance is sound and enduring. Indeed, in response to open and sustained questioning of U.S. commitments and capabilities by many Japanese strategists and editorialists, Japan has acquired new tactical advantages vis-à-vis China and North Korea from Washington. In addition to a presidential clarification of its treaty commitments and an agreement to redefine and reinforce the U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines, Washington has deployed advanced surveillance aircraft, Global Hawk UAV's, F-22s, and V-22 Ospreys to Japan, as well as enhancing joint anti-missile capabilities. These are positive, if somewhat unrequited, developments.

But we have to step back from tactics and ask about the larger strategic environment in East Asia. The future of Japanese national-security strategy clearly depends above all on the relative power and postures of the United States and China in the region. Tokyo is asking big questions about both superpowers. Of a China that has unsettled its neighbors by expanding its navy and improving missile and surveillance capabilities, it asks: Will China’s rise be stable or disjunctive? Will it be democratic or authoritarian? Will Beijing be aggressive or accommodating? Of a United States that has been openly “leading from behind” and is cutting its budget to pre-WWII levels, it asks: Will the United States cut budgets and pivot, or will it cut budgets and run? Will Washington be “inward looking”? And, of course, Tokyo asks the two evergreen questions of any alliance partner: What of the U.S. capability and what of its commitment going forward? Doubts about both have intensified Japan’s strategic debate and sharpened its choice between hugging the United States and hedging against abandonment.

The nature of Japan’s “return” will depend on who is in power to ask and answer these questions. Having a realist Japan “back” could mean that the region will welcome Tokyo as a confident and prosperous leader. Or, if being “back” entails a nationalist identity shift, it could mean greater regional instability and mistrust. One must hope that Japan will not allow itself to be painted as a wolf in sheep’s clothing fueling nationalist competition across the region, but will instead be understood as a muscular, nonpredatory ram that is comfortable in its own skin.