WITH THE Cold War’s demise, the menacing Russia that long loomed over Europe seemed to vanish. The Russia of 1992 was just a fragment of its historic self in military punch and economic weight. Not even Russia’s still-formidable nuclear arsenal deflected perceptions of decline. It was inevitable, then, that Western policy makers would feel that this shrunken Russia was more to be ignored than feared. They were wrong.
Now, memories of the bad old days are storming back, especially of Moscow’s capacity to stir up trouble with its military power. While President Vladimir Putin’s “covert” war in Ukraine continues to inflame tensions, he also torments his Baltic neighbors and threatens Europe with provocative military flights and nuclear rhetoric. Western alarms are heightened by Putin’s seeming unpredictability and his apparently unlimited internal power. The West can’t reckon how far he will take his muscle flexing—or how to stop him.
NATO has no strategy to counter mounting Russian pressures. Economic sanctions, the West’s spear point, have seriously harmed the Russian economy, enough to squeeze from Putin some dubious cease-fire agreements on Ukraine, but not nearly enough to make him back down. Europeans are reluctant to expand sanctions for fear of prompting a Russian military response and for fear of further complicating their dependence on Russian oil and gas. On the military side, NATO has deployed mostly American fighter jets eastward and stepped up joint exercises and arms deliveries. Unsurprisingly, European NATO allies do the minimum militarily, and instead press ahead with a weak diplomatic hand. This diplomatic impotence is so pronounced that President Barack Obama has distanced himself from it, preferring to let the Germans take charge.
The reason for the West’s limp hand is painfully evident to all: Russia’s military superiority over NATO on its western borders. If NATO ups the military ante, Moscow can readily trump it. Moscow has significant advantages in conventional forces—backed by potent tactical nuclear weapons and a stated willingness to use them to sustain advantages or avoid defeat. The last thing NATO wants is to look weak or lose a confrontation.
NATO’s military and civilian officials have worried about this situation for several years now—without receiving much productive guidance from their capitals. Predictably, a growing chorus in America (and not just the usual hawks) is championing sending weapons to Ukraine. Just as predictably, these advocates say nothing about what they would do if Moscow’s response were to escalate.
Thus, NATO’s options have narrowed: more arms aid to beleaguered friends, but no answers to Russian escalatory responses; more sanctions that hurt but don’t humble Russia’s economy; calls for a major NATO military buildup in Eastern Europe with no prospect of realization; and more diplomacy without leverage.
What, then, can the West do that has some chance of success? The only sensible path is to develop a diplomatic strategy with real leverage. This strategy would retain the sanctions regime and credible prospects for a greater NATO presence until its benefits materialize. It is now quite evident, however, that these punitive and defensive measures alone won’t produce the requisite power over Russia, a conclusion shared by a number of former American ambassadors to Moscow, including Jack Matlock, Thomas Pickering and James Collins.
An effective diplomatic strategy has to be rooted in what matters most to Russian leaders—their historical sense of self and their passion to be treated as a great power. Moscow deserves no less, given the troubles it can cause and the problems it can help resolve. The West need not silence its complaints about the Kremlin’s brutality, nor concede vital interests. It is totally unrealistic, however, to think that the West can gain desired Russian restraint and cooperation without dealing with Moscow as a great power that possesses real and legitimate interests, especially in its border areas.
The strategy proposed here should be thought of as Détente Plus. It would pick up from the détente diplomacy of the past and go well beyond it. The old détente was about managing serious conflicts of interests and values with a mostly implacable foe. Détente Plus would not treat Russia as an enemy, but as a combination of adversary and partner. Détente Plus would exceed the arms-control focus of the past and address first-rank political matters in Europe and worldwide. It would recognize a wide range of common and overlapping interests, solving both Russian and American problems.
This cooperation has to be visible, filled with optics. Call it mountaintop diplomacy. The world would be watching as the two powers devised common solutions to common problems.
American and Western leverage would stem from the visibility and the results generated. Being seen at the mountaintop with the United States would go far toward satisfying Russia’s yearning for status. To maintain this status, Kremlin leaders would understand their need to bend, but status is not enough. Moscow would have to benefit tangibly as well, mainly in improved economic prospects and assuaged political concerns.