In 1964, Shi Pei Pu, a Beijing opera singer and spy, started a perplexing liaison with French diplomat Bernard Boursicot. Their trysts always took place in the dark, which Boursicot attributed to Chinese modesty. In fact, Shi was a man posing as a woman. He even presented a child, whom he claimed was their offspring. This ruse was designed to coax Boursicot to continue to pass French embassy documents to officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for twenty years. The record does not indicate if this was the first time a Western official should have been less naive about the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but the tradition continues.

Although almost all nation-states spy and seek influence, the scope and intensity of the PRC’s activities, primarily guided by the United Front Work Department, are overwhelming both in the United States and in Europe. Belgium, where I live, hosts both NATO headquarters and most EU institutions, which makes it a prime PRC influence target. A recent case concerned a Chinese aide to Maximilian Krah, a German member of the European Parliament from the far-right AfD party. The aide was arrested on charges that he had been passing information about the European Parliament’s deliberations to China for years. He was also thought to be monitoring the Chinese diaspora community in Dresden. 

One of the main goals of Chinese influence operations in Europe is authoritarian co-option—persuading European public figures to have a positive regard for the CCP and speak favorably about its domestic and foreign policies. These like-minded surrogates are then invited to speak as proxies to promote the CCP’s positions. Captured elites can openly lobby political bodies, businesses, and decision-making institutions, creating a CCP echo chamber for both domestic and international audiences. 

Nationalist Belgian politician Frank Creyelman is a case in point. In December 2022, he was unmasked as a Chinese agent. Reportedly, he also operated in Poland and Romania. Creyelman’s handler worked for the Zhejiang branch of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS). The CCP’s primary goal, as texted by his spymaster, was to “divide the U.S.-European relationship.” 

One of the key goals of the CCP is to control people of Chinese descent inside as well as outside of the PRC. This includes pursuing, under “Operation Fox Hunt,” Chinese officials suspected of corruption who have fled abroad. To control the Chinese abroad, the CCP has created a global network of clandestine “police stations” in fifty-three countries worldwide. These clandestine stations are also used to monitor the behavior of the diaspora, especially minority groups such as Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Hongkongers, in order to prevent hostile activity. 

As the United States tightens export controls on advanced technologies, Beijing has increased its efforts in Europe to collect knowledge and information on such capabilities. The PRC seeks to obtain advanced technology in multiple ways: legally, through investments and research funding, and illegally through a combination of company insiders, cyber espionage, circumvention of export restrictions, acquisitions, and reverse engineering of technology. 

Recent espionage incidents in Europe have also shown the overlap of influence activities between China and Russia. The unfolding Creyelman and Krah cases provide some evidence in this regard. It seems that parliamentary assistants are a particularly good source of information and that ex-legislators are a soft target for both Chinese and Russian intelligence and influence operations.

Finally, there is evidence that Chinese organized crime groups in Europe cooperate with China’s undeclared police officers posted to Chinese diplomatic missions to monitor and intimidate overseas immigrants and dissidents. These groups are well-rooted in the host countries and can offer intelligence and support to the police. In exchange, Chinese authorities do not prosecute the gangsters who operate abroad and never extradite them if they seek refuge in China. Similar patterns of activity have also emerged in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Faced with this breadth and depth of Chinese influence operations, what should Europe do?

Europe should not continue down the path tread by Bernard Boursicot. Nor should the United States. Instead, to extend the metaphor, we must flip on the light switch, see the stubble on the Chinese opera singer’s face, and end our naivety about the PRC. This smokeless war requires not only a trans-Atlantic strategy designed for the long term but also needs to include NATO’s partners in the Indo-Pacific Four (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and learn from their best practices. Here are some possible measures that could be taken:

1) Investigate Chinese influence operations to understand how they work, as well as to raise awareness about them so that they can be better countered and defused. 

2) European countries that do not yet have anti-espionage laws should consider adopting one. 

3) Support independent Chinese-language media to counter the influence of Beijing-sponsored media on the overseas Chinese population. 

4) Build on the experience of countering Soviet intelligence operations during the Cold War to strengthen counter-intelligence capabilities.

5) Step up work to counter foreign information manipulation and interference.

6) Push for the “disinfectant of sunlight” and advocate for a foreign-influence transparency registry. 

7) Invest in Chinese language and culture education to increase policymakers’ knowledge about how the CCP operates and prepare the next generation of specialists. 

Policymakers and intelligence services must innovate, educate, and adapt to the changing threat landscape. A key challenge will be to ensure that the strategic response on both sides of the Atlantic will honor the ideals of freedom, openness, and lawfulness. A calibrated response to Beijing’s smokeless war, coupled with constant vigilance to avoid being “Boursicoted,” will help protect democratic institutions and build resilience to the growing threat from the CCP.

Theresa Fallon is a Brussels-based analyst, writer, and commentator on global energy and geopolitics with over twenty years of experience. A member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP-EU), in 2016, she established the Centre for Russia, Europe, Asia Studies (CREAS). Her current research focus is on EU–Asia relations, Sino-Russian relations, maritime security, global governance, and China’s Belt & Road Initiative.

A longer article by Theresa Fallon on this topic is forthcoming in Concordiam.

Image: Alessia Pierdomenico / Shutterstock.com.