Tempering Hysteria Over Taiwan
Worries about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan should not trick the United States into further overextension.
The top U.S. diplomat in Taiwan, Sandra Oudkirk, opined last month that “Taiwan and its partners needed to find a steady path, avoiding both complacency and hysteria.” Because of her experience in both Taiwan and China, Oudkirk’s candid and reasonable conclusion should be a refreshing and credible alternative to more strident voices in and out of the Biden administration about a possible imminent threat to the island nation from China.
Instead of anxious hand-wringing, what is needed is a dispassionate examination of the facts. Beijing has been blustering about Taiwan for decades. The island, about 100 miles off China’s coast, has not been part of China for much of the last hundred years, and its population certainly does not want to give up democracy for Chinese autocratic control. Even though Chinese penetrations into Taiwan’s airspace and nearby military exercises have recently accelerated, most Taiwanese do not pay that much heed. That complacency results from the widely-held belief that the United States would come to their rescue if China were poised for an imminent invasion.
After the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, the United States, by statute, pledged to help Taiwan defend itself. The United States might even use military action if China attempted to take the island by force. Although the Biden administration has walked back President Biden’s comments each time, claiming that no change had been made to this policy, the president has pledged on four occasions to send American forces if China attacked it. Biden’s off-the-cuff promise is a change in the ambiguous policy, whether the administration admits it or not. This alteration can only tend to exacerbate Taiwan’s complacency.
If the countries of Asia are so worried about a rising China (which has exhibited a lot of internal problems lately), the wealthy nations of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India can lead the rest (Vietnam, the Philippines, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) in cooperating to form the first line of defense against China. Thus, at minimum, President Biden should reverse course and reiterate the stated policy of ambiguity about direct U.S. military action in any war over Taiwan, at least until a more robust regional security partnership is in place.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has raised fears in Taiwan that it might face a similar fate. The United States should take advantage of this newfound worry to push Taiwan to buy more weapons that could nix a Chinese invasion or naval blockade of the island. In reality, Russia’s failure to quickly subdue a weaker foe should cause more worry in Beijing than in Taipei. By sacking several high-ranking generals in December 2023, Xi Jinping implicitly admitted that he feared corruption in the PLA. This could be as bad as that which stymied Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine. And a land invasion is easier than the complex amphibious assault that would be needed to conquer Taiwan.
Furthermore, with the advent of satellite reconnaissance that makes achieving surprise difficult, the potency of mines at sea and on the beach, advances in diesel submarines, modern long-range anti-ship missiles, and demonstrated surface ship vulnerability since World War II, amphibious assaults (and naval blockades) have become even more dangerous, and thus rarer, than they were in the days of World War II and the Korean conflict. In fact, the U.S. Marine Corps has modified its tactics to deemphasize “hitting the beach.”
Thus, Taiwan needs to buy more of the aforementioned weapons rather than expensive high-tech weapons that will prove less effective against the actual threat. By continuing to sell the Taiwanese long-range, mobile, offensive missiles that can strike China if an amphibious attack on or naval blockade of the island is initiated, Washington can deter China through a porcupine strategy. This strategy entails arming Taiwan with the capabilities to inflict enough damage on the Chinese mainland to dissuade aggression in the first place.
Such changes in warfare and weaponry and the creation of regional alliances or partnerships to contain and deter China from an imperial jaunt in Asia should allow the heavily indebted United States to end its global overextension and prolong its life as a great power.
Ivan R. Eland is a Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty. He is the author of War and the Rogue Presidency. Follow him on X @Ivan_Eland.
Image:
Shutterstock.com.