Part I also demonstrated the extent to which grand strategy has evolved through different historical eras, notably the Modern, the Revolutionary, and the Nuclear. Grand strategy in each era was the product of the central role played by nation-states, the existence of opposing political ideologies, and the military technologies available. In a study of grand strategy that is conducted across millennia, an inquiry that examines different societies, regions, political ideologies, and systems will reveal distinct patterns and principles, all of which offer important and relevant principles to contemporary scholars and policymakers.

These attributes, of course, emerged in the early chapters of this study as it examined the influences from ancient to modern times that shaped the evolution of grand strategy. In the Ancient Era of grand strategy, such ancient strategists such as Sun Tzu and Thucydides, who made significant contributions to thinking about the conduct of war and diplomacy, provide early glimpses of intentional and systematic efforts to articulate grand strategy as an instrument for balancing the state’s aspirations with its means and ends. We should note, however, that many of these ideas and principles were largely, if not entirely, derived from the study of military strategy. Although we can extrapolate many lessons from the wisdom of Thucydides and Sun Tzu, their emphasis on strategy as a product of the nature and conduct of war clearly only scratches the surface of grand strategy.

The non-military dimensions of grand strategy emerged in the Modern Era, beginning with the Renaissance and later with the Enlightenment. Following in the wake of Machiavelli’s insights, political philosophers rapidly developed ideas that contributed to the formation of grand strategy as a distinct and separate field, which exists in conjunction with the disciplines of philosophy, military strategy, economics, and social science. A number of seminal thinkers brought about a renewed focus on using a coordinated political, military, and economic strategy to enhance and preserve the state’s interests. Clausewitz significantly advanced the state of the art with his study of strategy because his ideas expanded its definition to establish, along with contributions by many other thinkers, the foundations of what we now know as grand strategy. The role of political objectives in military strategy was the product of his famous maxim, “War is a continuation of policy by other means.” These developments, when combined with later contributions on the economic foundations of strategy that derive from the deliberations of Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton, defined the Modern Era of grand strategy. Together, these ideas help to develop an integrated military, political, and economic approach to achieving the state’s objectives.

Thus, the Modern Era of grand strategy was defined in terms of a bureaucratized state, which is based on a nationalist identity that relied primarily on conventional military means to provide internal and external security and pursue the ends of its grand strategy. These ends typically involved territorial expansion and internal political consolidation. In this Modern Era, systematic thinking about grand strategy continued to develop, but it changed with the advent of the Revolutionary Era. The hallmarks of this era in the late 19th century and early 20th century were the decline of European empires, the emergence of violent international groups which proclaimed adherence to the counter-nationalist ideologies of anarchism, and the ideologies of communism and nationalism that often took on the mantle of anti-imperialism and fascism. Military technology in this era, which included handguns, rifles, and explosives, proliferated dramatically, while the era of assassinations and the first manifestations of modern terrorism began to emerge. Finally, the Nuclear Era, which began with the end of the Second World War, was defined by global superpowers that created a worldwide bipolar system based on opposing ideologies of capitalism and communism. The grand strategies of these states were stabilized by the concept of mutual deterrence that emerged from the threat of nuclear war.

Part II in the study shifted the focus to the evolution of American grand strategy, which shared both similarities and differences from the traditional development of grand strategy. It was similar in the sense that American grand strategy continued to evolve during these three eras of grand strategy. During the course of the Modern Era, the United States became a modern, industrialized nation-state that had to deal with the fall of the European empires and the emergence of revolutionaries in the Revolutionary Era. But it was different in the sense that grand strategy during the Nuclear Era was dominated by two superpowers whose concepts of politics were based on radically opposing ideological systems of thought. During these periods, the evolution and content of American grand strategy was marked by the formation of three core traditions that dominated American foreign policy.

Three Unique Traditions of American Foreign Policy

First, a unique tradition of American foreign policy stems from the fact that the United States benefits from distance to other significant powers. It never faced the constant threat of naval or land invasion since its continental neighbors were generally too weak to mount a land invasion. And the distance across two oceans made it a nearly impossible target for a naval assault or amphibious invasion. In short, the United States had the luxury of time to develop the domestic foundations of its power. This first tradition rests on the ability to stand aloof from world politics to strengthen the American economy, achieve enduring prosperity and growth, and maintain internal political stability. Rooted in the American ethos of self-reliance and entrepreneurship, it shuns activist foreign policy agendas and prioritizes economic and trade policy. At its’ worst, this tradition can evolve into isolationism, while at its best it can produce a tradition of humility but not ignorance when it comes to engagement in world politics.

What makes this stage in the evolution of grand strategy unique to the United States is that most states did not have the luxury of pursuing this option. European states, by contrast, could not afford to remain disengaged from their nearby competitors who were too close and often ambitious. This reality was evident in their foreign policies. To paraphrase John Quincy Adams, Europeans lacked the option of not going abroad in search of monsters to destroy because the monsters came to them.

The second tradition also has a uniquely American character. For this tradition, the United States is a gradualist power that seeks democratic change but not at the expense of systemic disorder. Most European states have had either a status quo or revolutionary tradition. Britain, for example, has generally had a strong preference for a stable status quo based on a balance of power on the Continent. Napoleonic France, however, was a revolutionary power whose policies sought to transform the European state system. This was true of Nazi Germany and, to a lesser extent, Soviet Russia. But the United States does not fit neatly into these categories. This second tradition is best described as a gradualism that highlights the principle of restraining, while rarely totally eliminating the sources of disorder and encouraging gradual change towards democracy and capitalism. This tradition is a reflection of America’s own revolutionary tradition, which was based on a largely conservative revolution, which did not seek to destroy the old ways so much as to reform and tailor them to suit a new set of political and economic imperatives. American revolutionaries were not fanatical or ideological, but some of the Founders did have a deep suspicion of democracy.

Finally, the third tradition of American foreign policy arose during the Nuclear Era. This tradition, as examined in Chapter 9, reflects the reinforcing value of using alliances and partnerships—both old and new—to confront global challenges with a sense of shared responsibility across states and societies. Containment is often held in high regard as an ideal grand strategy because it was clear, global in scale, operated on a long-term time horizon, and marshaled all the instruments of national power across the private and public sectors. What is rarely underscored is the fact that containment worked not only because of American leadership and power but also more importantly because of close diplomatic ties between U.S. allies and partners.

What also was unique about the evolution of American grand strategy in the Nuclear Era was the extent to which these weapons altered the logic by which states conducted foreign policy. Critically, the United States did not use its nuclear monopoly in the late 1940’s to coerce its enemies and prevent them from acquiring similar technology. The U.S. never sought to use its hegemony to radically and rapidly alter the system and its constituent states during the interval when it alone possessed atomic weapons.[5]

The last chapter of Part II (Chapter 10) concerned the evolution of post-Cold War grand strategy or what might more accurately be termed a regressive de-evolution of grand strategy. This recent history reveals two critical factors. First, the United States has become unmoored from the traditions in its grand strategy, and thus is struggling to define core principles to guide its foreign and domestic policies. Second, the absence of guiding principles has led to policies that lurch from one priority to another, often based primarily upon urgent, short-term concerns rather than on a coherent, long-term strategy of what best serves the nation’s overall interests. The absence of guiding principles in the face of current challenges provides the ingredients for a series of risky moments.