As the North Korean case shows, it is easier to develop nuclear explosives than reliable long range missiles capable of delivering them. Whereas the North Koreans have conducted successful nuclear explosives tests (albeit with mixed results), they have not yet mastered an intercontinental missile capable of hitting the continental United States, nor the ability to deliver a nuclear warhead on any range missile. Iran likewise is still pursuing long range missile capabilities and has yet to develop missiles that can hit the United States or even Western Europe. A ban on any further Iranian development, testing, and production of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles would lengthen the timeline between an Iranian decision to renounce an agreement and its ability to deploy nuclear armed missiles, in particular any that could threaten the United States and its key allies outside of the Middle East.  

So Why Not Include Missiles?

In the coming days, we will learn if the Obama administration and its negotiating partners are able to close a nuclear deal with Iran on a framework for a comprehensive settlement and on which terms. If so, then the fundamental question to assess is whether this development reflects a strategic decision by the Islamic Republic to forswear nuclear weapons now and for the foreseeable future, or if instead it is nothing more than a tactical accommodation on the road to becoming a nuclear weapons power. If the Iranians are sincere in renouncing any past nuclear weapons ambitions, then they should have no reason to retain their formidable existing arsenal of missiles, and certainly even less so to pursue even longer range and more capable systems in the future. Thus, if it turns out that the Iranians have indeed not been required to restrict their missiles as part of a comprehensive deal, even while this arrangement purports to satisfy concerns about Iranian nuclear weapons development, then it begs the obvious question of why they would still have any need for such missiles? What a pity if they are not even asked to explain this paradox.        

David A. Cooper is the James V. Forrestal Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a former career senior executive at the Department of Defense who served as the Pentagon’s Director of Nonproliferation Policy and Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy and as the U.S. Representative to the 2nd United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles. Opinions expressed are solely his own.