Yet the administration put on a cooperative face at the summit in pursuit of a common front against North Korea. After all, China does not benefit from a dangerous, nuclear-armed neighbor, and Beijing and Pyongyang have been estranged since Kim Jong-un’s accession. The summit went so well, in fact, that afterward Trump even professed his “great confidence” that “China will properly deal with North Korea.” In the ensuing weeks, it looked as though the administration was being passive in exchange for Chinese help on North Korea. Contrary to Trump’s campaign promises, they did not label China a currency manipulator, nor did they levy unilateral sanctions, order U.S. ships into the South China Sea, or greenlight an arms sale to Taiwan.

But more recently, observers have declared an end to the Trump-Xi “honeymoon” due to American dissatisfaction with the lack of progress and China’s differing priorities. The conventional wisdom in Washington holds that since Beijing provides 90 percent of North Korea’s trade and nearly all of its commodities, it should take the lead in halting the nuclear program. Beijing counters that they have little real leverage against this quasi-autarkic regime. China agreed to multilateral sanctions and stopped buying North Korean coal, and Xi himself has refused even to meet with Kim. Yet, Pyongyang’s nuclear program continues apace. The regime has conducted twelve missile tests since February, including ICBMs on July 4 and 28.

Thus far, the United States and its partners have not persuaded Beijing that North Korea’s ventures are more dangerous than the current path, even though Kim’s saber-rattling has fueled nationalistic, defensive responses in South Korea and Japan. Some voices within China have offered alternative perspectives, but Beijing has preferred multilateral sanctions (that is to say, the status quo) over the unforeseen consequences of a bold move against North Korea. China’s leaders fear that too much pressure on Pyongyang will spur a regime collapse, a violent civil struggle, a refugee crisis and ultimately the unification of the peninsula under U.S.-allied Seoul.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has taken a more insistent line of “official disappointment” over alleged Chinese inaction. On June 20, Trump was conciliatory but firm: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi and China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!” Two weeks later, he upbraided Beijing for the rise in exports to North Korea: “Trade between China and North Korea grew almost 40 percent in the first quarter. So much for China working with us.” At the end of June, the administration permitted a $1.42 billion arms delivery to Taiwan, and the United States announced secondary sanctions against the Bank of Dandong, a shipping company, and two individuals for doing business with North Korea. Beijing protested both the sanctions and the weapons, though neither was unexpected or unprecedented.

Following North Korea’s July 28 test, the earlier disappointment grew into an administration-wide, full-court press of frustration aimed at both North Korea and China. “I am very disappointed in China,” Trump tweeted. “They do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this to continue. China could easily solve this problem!” Vice-President Mike Pence stated somewhat more diplomatically that China “should do more,” while Secretary Tillerson insisted that China and Russia “bear unique and special responsibility” as “the principal economic enablers” of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley paired her official statement—that “China must decide whether it is finally willing” to challenge the North Korean regime—with a less-refined tweet: “Done talking about NKorea. China is aware they must act.”

Given this shift in public diplomacy, the administration is all but sure to continue levying secondary sanctions on Chinese entities doing business with Pyongyang (the acting assistant secretary of state has said as much to a congressional committee), though it remains to be seen whether they will use punitive sanctions against Beijing, as doing so would reduce Trump’s ability to work with China on other issues.

The administration has also begun to pursue somewhat tougher measures in Sino-American economic relations. Trump made many promises in this arena, but he has been cautious so far. He has initiated studies of the trade deficit and of steel and aluminum imports, and executive branch agencies and American companies continue to file antidumping and countervailing duty cases against Chinese manufacturers. By and large, these actions have been consistent with Obama’s approach, which included many cases against China in the WTO and elsewhere. The Trump administration has also inked a quid-pro-quo beef and poultry agreement that will bring American beef to China for the first time since 2003. Trump has touted the deal as a boon to American agriculture, though it has raised concerns over the quality of Chinese chicken that will appear in American stores.

Considering Trump’s longstanding fixation on the trade deficit, we can expect the administration to do more in the coming months. As recently as the July 19 U.S.-China economic dialogue, Commerce Secretary Ross reiterated the administration's position that “the fundamental asymmetry in our trade relationship and unequal market access must be addressed.” Steel, aluminum and automobiles are the most likely targets. Among Trump’s options, he can levy short-term tariffs across all imports or target a specific industry by deeming it a matter of national security or a “wartime” necessity. Of course, this firmer direction would not just help Trump fulfill campaign promises; it would also fit into the administration’s current stance on China and North Korea. In his July 29 tweet, he tied his disappointment with Beijing and Pyongyang to his oft-repeated line that China has made “hundreds of billions of dollars” in trade. Beijing, meanwhile, has rejected Trump’s not-so-casual linkage of bilateral trade to the North Korean issue, with one Chinese minister saying that these issues “are in two completely different domains. They aren’t related. They should not be discussed together.”

The administration has also been a bit more forceful in Southeast Asia. Disputes in the region center on the South China Sea (SCS), where multiple nations have competing claims to islands, reefs, the seabed, and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Beijing claims nearly the entire SCS—represented as a “nine-dash line” on Chinese maps—and its efforts to craft habitable islands from reefs has angered others in the region. The United States has no territorial or maritime claims, but asserts navigation rights to defend its Western Pacific interests. Long-term strategists fear that if China establishes a territorial dominion over the SCS, then Beijing could someday blackmail trading nations. Many American policymakers and naval tacticians see China’s actions as provocative and destabilizing, while Beijing counters that American naval actions have exacerbated tensions.

Both during the presidential campaign and after the election, Trump spoke of the “massive military complex” in the SCS, while Mattis similarly criticized Chinese maritime expansion. In February, the U.S. Navy deployed the San Diego-based USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to the Western Pacific (ostensibly due to concerns over North Korea), making it the second such American carrier group in the region. The administration laid off these themes after Mar-a-Lago, but have embraced them once again. Speaking to an international audience in Singapore in June, Mattis fell back on a surprisingly liberal, multilateral argument to challenge the island-building and island-militarizing operation: “We cannot accept Chinese actions that impinge on the interests of the international community, undermining the rules-based order that has benefited all countries represented here today. . . . We cannot and will not accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo.” A few weeks later, he and Tillerson reiterated this position with two top Chinese officials.

The United States has also boosted its naval presence through training exercises and freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPS). Late in May, the destroyer USS Dewey sailed a few miles from one of China’s artificial islands in the Spratlys—the first FONOP since October—and just over a month later the destroyer USS Stethem sailed close to Triton Island in the Paracels. In June, U.S. Air Force Lancer supersonic bombers and the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Sterett conducted an exercise over the SCS.

Finally, the administration has even made a few human rights statements, which is an area that President Trump has otherwise disregarded. The latest State Department Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, released at the end of June, downgrades China to the lowest level on the scale, a move which may justify future sanctions. Also late in June, Ambassador Branstad publicly petitioned Beijing to allow imprisoned dissident Liu Xiaobo to seek medical treatment overseas. After Liu’s death, Branstad paid him a public tribute and even called on China “to release all prisoners of conscience and to respect the fundamental freedoms of all.” These were quite provocative statements considering Beijing’s sensitivity in this case.

All of this hardly comprises a new grand strategy, but these recent moves signal a greater willingness to address the transpacific issues that Trump raised during the presidential campaign. If this administration is to succeed in such difficult areas as the trade deficit and Northeast Asian security, it will have to be willing to forgo short-term political victories and instead put in the work to seek out viable, long-term solutions.