In the 1950s, “Bearded” Celal, a little-known Turkish philosopher, quipped that Turkey “is a ship heading east. Those aboard think they are heading west, but they are just running west on a ship sailing east.” How right he was.

At that time, Turkey, a secular republic founded by the Turkish general Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk) in 1923, was known as a staunch Cold War ally and NATO member (in 1952). But that is no longer the case.   

Already in 1964, Turkey’s intention to invade Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority triggered an international crisis. U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson’s letter to Turkish premier Ismet Inönü made it plain that Turkey’s military intervention could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union, in which case it would be uncertain whether Turkey’s NATO allies would feel an obligation to protect Turkey in accordance with Article Five. 

Two months earlier, in an interview with The New York Times, Inönü proclaimed, “​​If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up…A new kind of world will then come into being, and in this new world, Turkey will find herself a place.” Sixty years later, this is what is happening now.    

Turkey’s axis shift has been apparent for some time. For example, in 2018, President Erdogan’s head of international relations, Ayşe Sözen Usluer, explained that Turkey had felt no need to choose between the West and the East or between the U.S. and Russia for the previous ten to fifteen years. It no longer saw its foreign policy within the framework of the Cold War or East vs. West alliances. 

Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, later Erdogan’s chief advisor, foreign minister, and prime minister, kicked off the process in 2001 with his book Strategic Depth, now considered a founding work of “neo-Ottomanism.” However, another Islamic scholar, Ibrahim Kalin, now head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), provided the ideological basis in his keynote speech at the Istanbul Forum in October 2012. 

Here, he spoke of a new geopolitical framework that rejects the Western-centric political and economic order. He also rejected the European model of secular democracy, politics, and pluralism.

The modern Turkey that Mustafa Kemal founded in 1923 not only abolished the Ottoman caliphate and introduced secularism but also secured the borders defined by the Treaty of Lausanne. However, this treaty, which recognized Britain’s annexation of Cyprus and ceded most of the Aegean islands to Greece, has not been recognized by President Erdogan, who has called for its revision.  

Instead, Erdogan intends to revert to the borders agreed in the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî) passed by the last Ottoman parliament in 1920, which included Cyprus, the Aegean islands, Western Thrace, Aleppo, Mosul, and Kirkuk. This is evidenced by three cross-border operations in 2016, 2018, and 2019, which have led to the Turkish occupation of parts of Syria. 

There’s also the current Turkification of Kurdistan and Turkey’s “Blue Homeland,” the maritime doctrine that rejects Greek and Cypriot claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. As Aurélien Denizeau points out, Blue Homeland and Eurasianism seem complementary, cultivating a common sense of distrust of Western powers and advocating the need for alternative partnerships.   

In a speech four years ago, Erdogan made Turkey’s intentions plain: “Turkey has the political, economic and military power to tear up the immoral maps and documents imposed on it.” With Turkey’s decision to join BRICS, the die is cast. With regard to the UN Security Council, Erdogan has often said, “The world is bigger than five,” and Turkey’s membership in the BRICS is demonstrably bigger than the G7. 

Turkey also aims to join the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), which the European Council of Foreign Relations has branded “Rogue NATO.” However, Erdogan stated that Türkiye was not compelled to choose between the EU and the SCO. “While strengthening our relations with the East, we seek ways to advance our deep-rooted cooperation with the West.”

Exceptionally, at the end of August, Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan was invited to an informal Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers. Turkey still maintains EU membership as a strategic goal, but an update on the customs union and visa liberalization are its immediate goals. Hakan Fidan has also urged the EU not to let the unresolved Cyprus issue impede Turkish-EU ties. 

Then, there is also the question of Turkey’s NATO membership, its long-term dependence on Russia for nuclear power, and its export to Russia of military-linked goods. At the same time, Erdogan has declared Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and called for the return of Crimea to Ukraine. 

There seems to be no limit to Turkey’s cakeism.

Robert Ellis is a Turkey analyst and commentator. He is also an international advisor at RIEAS (Research Institute for European and American Studies) in Athens.

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