Will the United States greenlight Ukrainian “deep strikes” into Russia? It is a question that has plagued American policymakers since this summer’s NATO summit. Thus far, Ukraine has largely been limited to drone attacks on Russia. This has had some success, the most recent of which was a spectacular drone strike on a weapons arsenal in Toropets on September 18. But Kyiv says this is not enough. It wants permission to fire long-range missiles (300-400km) into Russia. President Zelensky visited Washington this week to pitch his “victory plan,” which involves deep strikes and new weaponry.

UK prime minister Keir Starmer recently visited U.S. president Joe Biden to approve a green light to Kyiv. Several European countries, including Poland, the Baltic States, Sweden, and Finland support the UK. In contrast, German chancellor Olaf Scholz has ruled out permission for Ukraine to use its Taurus cruise missiles. The Biden administration also appears very cautious while it weighs the costs, risks, and benefits of long-range strike approval.

There is a sense of déjà vu here. We have seen similar “sagas” of Western weapon supplies throughout this war. Recall the hesitancy to send HIMARS, then NATO tanks, ATACMS, and F-16s. Each time, America and Germany demonstrated reluctance only later to agree. In each case, the pantomime tension of “will they or won’t they” is finally resolved; Ukraine gets its weapons, and morale is boosted.

While these stories keep Ukraine in the news cycle, in military-strategic terms, it is far from a success. Giving too little, too late has been the recurring theme of the West’s dysfunctional support of Ukraine’s war effort. NATO weapons systems are expensive and in short supply. Drip-feeding them to Ukraine means they can only be used in sporadic and indecisive ways. In addition, this approach provides Russia with a sandbox environment in which to study Western weapons and work out technical countermeasures. Having adapted to each wave of NATO weaponry deployed against it, Russia continues its grinding and methodical war of attrition. There are increasing signs that Ukraine is reaching a breaking point. Kyiv insists on permission for deep strikes, claiming this can stem the tide.

The Biden administration has good reason to doubt the effectiveness of deep strikes. The range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles is around 300km. They cannot threaten Russia’s military-industrial heartlands, energy system, or wider war-making capacity with strategic bombing on a mass scale. On the tactical and operational level, however, such strikes can cause significant inconvenience to Russia. Such missiles can hit Russian bases, supply dumps, transport, and energy systems in the logistical rear of the frontlines. This could disrupt Russia’s progress in the Donbas for some period.

But can Ukraine really be supplied with enough of these costly missiles to slow Russia for a long enough time? And how will this stop Russia’s ongoing destruction of Ukraine’s energy grid and its deepening humanitarian tragedy? How do deep strikes solve the problem of Ukraine’s shrinking population or the lack of basic military materiel to equip Ukrainian brigades and hold the line? Zelensky is looking for escalation permission, as Ukraine runs out of time and options. We will soon find out how much leeway the Biden administration will give them.

Naturally, the staunchest supporters of Ukraine are outraged by the current reluctance, which many are calling a betrayal. Washington, however, is worried about the bigger picture. They know approving deep strikes may not only derail chances for peace negotiations—an option Washington wants to keep open—but also open a Pandora’s box of escalation scenarios. Putin has declared that a greenlight for Ukraine’s deep strikes would mean “the United States, NATO, and the European countries are at war with Russia,” which would take “suitably matched” countermeasures. Alongside Russia’s new and less restrictive nuclear doctrine, what might these be?

On September 16, the Houthis successfully hit central Israel with a long-range ballistic missile for the first time. It is unknown who supplied them with this missile system. If Moscow sends the Houthis Iskander (400km range) ballistic weapons or Zircon (range 1000km) hypersonic missiles, it could spark a massive escalation in the Middle East. U.S. naval assets in the Red Sea would suddenly be very vulnerable. Their sinking would transmit a shocking message of U.S. weakness in the region at a critical time.

Russia could also try to bring the war home to Europeans, whose taxes pay a large part of Ukraine’s war effort. This could be limited to precision strikes on the assets of individual NATO countries located outside of their sovereign territory and, thus, keep from triggering Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Russia may also intensify its currently low-level campaign of sabotage in Europe and even attack major critical infrastructure.

The most extreme scenario would be if Russia retaliated with deep strikes on Ukraine’s own logistical rear, which is partly located on the territory of NATO members Poland and Romania. The triggering of Article 5, whether intentional or not, would lead to a critical moment of decision. Would the United States follow through with a devasting conventional strike on Crimea? Would Russia then use tactical nuclear weapons as its final attempt to restore deterrence?

Thankfully, there is reason to believe that Washington sees these dangers and will work with Moscow to manage the risks. This clearly disgusts a great deal of analysts and commentators in the West who are gung-ho about deep strikes and united in seeing Russia as a paper tiger whose bluffs can be ignored. The historians of the future will likely commend the restraint of the Biden administration. It has kept the world safe from unpredictable escalation between two nuclear powers. Even if deep strikes are greenlighted, Washington will ensure they come too late and be on too small a scale to help Ukraine. It is at this point that Biden and the company will also be judged less favorably by the same historians. Their policy of limited support is failing, and Kyiv cannot achieve success within the parameters imposed upon them.

Matthew Blackburn is a Senior Researcher in NUPI's Research Group on Russia, Asia and International Trade. He is also an affiliated researcher at the Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University. His research mainly focuses on the politics of contemporary Russia and Eurasia, including both domestic political systems and interstate relations. He is engaged in research on Iran-Russia-China cooperation for the Norwegian Geopolitics Centre and is a research coordinator for the Civilizationalism Project based at Stanford University.

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