Many pundits in Russia and abroad, recalling the Red Army’s tenacity in World War II, remain convinced that Russia can somehow endure and perhaps even prevail. But it decisively lost the Crimean War of 1853-1855, which in many respects was a precursor to the present conflict. The internal turmoil that ensued led to a crisis of leadership and the dawning of an age of reform that included the emancipation of Russia’s serfs (two years before Abraham Lincoln’s emancipation of America’s slaves), a new legal system, and a degree of local self-government.

Of course, we can only speculate on what might follow Putin’s inevitable fall, but it is worth assaying the possibilities. Unfortunately, the United States is even less well-informed on Russia’s domestic social and political realities today than it was on the eve of the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Instead of accepting the imminent end of Putin’s rule and the collapse of his regime as a serious possibility, Washington is fixated on the fighting front and divided over urgently needed support for Kyiv.

Judging by what is being said on Russia’s home front, Putin has already lost the war and the only question is what face-saving measures can be extracted through a settlement. At this point, Putin’s best hope would be to reach some kind of territorial deal that will enable him or his successor to withdraw what’s left of the Russian army. Put bluntly, his hand is weaker than commonly assumed.

In truth, Russia may well be heading for a major upheaval, akin to what followed the Crimean defeat in 1855. Nicholas I conveniently died a year later, while Putin’s personal fate remains for now unknown. It is too late for the United States and Europe to devise face-saving measures for Russia’s ruler. Russians themselves sense that their country is near or at the end of Putin’s rule and the policies that defined it. And it is also too late to avert Russian destabilization, for it is already occurring.

Yet even after Putin, there will still be Putinists who remain committed to the Eurasian fantasy of a continent-spanning empire ruled from Moscow. Any settlement that leaves this cabal intact will invite a repeat of Josef Stalin’s promise, after he called off his murderous program of collectivization, to wait a while, then “hitch up our pants” and renew the fight. Thus, any settlement must address Russia’s lingering imperial dreams. As to the fear of “loose nukes,” Russian leaders of all stripes know that Putin’s nuclear threats have proven ineffective and that in any case, the United States is capable of responding to any reckless moves on Moscow’s part with devastating effect.

The best first step toward solving both the Ukraine war and the nuclear problem, then, is for the West to acknowledge the existence of those official and unofficial Russians who are considering what Putin has wrought and respect their effort but otherwise leave them alone. While standing aside, the West should indicate that the United States and Europe are prepared to work with any emerging leaders in Russia who seek a post-Putin order that elevates international cooperation above confrontation.

S. Frederick Starr was the Founding Chairman of the Kennan Institute and is currently Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council. He can be reached at [email protected]

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