Risky dependence on U.S. support

Will America be willing to help?

European allies see the 100,000 U.S. troops on the continent as a battle-ready core force for any initial fighting. They will count on additional troops being later transferred from the United States in the event of a conflict as well. They believe that the mutual assistance Article 5 of the NATO charter creates an obligation for America to go to war to defend them. And while many in America agree. There are also other perspectives. 

As one of the authors has noted, the NATO charter signatories indeed obligated themselves through Article 5 to assist each other “with such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” However, they also agreed to the Article 3 requirement that they “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Countries that do not live up to their Article 3 spending obligations should not expect the mutual defense benefits of Article 5.

President Trump expressed publicly and forcefully a widely held view in the United States that many European countries are free riders. He was not the first American president to do so. President Dwight Eisenhower admonished NATO members against “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam” by not committing enough resources to their own defense. Barack Obama said in a 2016 interview, “free riders aggravate me.” His Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, warned that “there will be dwindling appetite and patience” in America for supporting countries that don’t invest in their own defense.

Will America be able to help?

The 2024 report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy notes the increasingly close relations between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea and “the very real threat of simultaneous conflict in more than one theater.” Russia could attack Europe, while China could attack Taiwan, North Korea, or South Korea. Similarly, Iran could launch attacks in the Middle East. Under such a scenario, U.S. military resources would be seriously stretched under the current “one major war” standard for the conventional force.

It is often argued that fighting in Asia would require mostly U.S. naval and air forces, while European fighting will mostly call on ground forces. This is only partly correct and too comforting. Air defenses would be in strong demand in both theaters, as would logistic assets for strategic air and sea lift. Even more critically, in practical terms, it is extremely difficult and taxing both politically and economically to fight one great power war, let alone two at the same time. 

In other words, should the United States be involved in a conflict against China over Taiwan, the odds that it would come to Europe’s defense if Russia simultaneously invades a NATO country are much lower than in the case of sequential conflicts. 

An Urgent Three-Year Action Plan

With a sense of urgency, European NATO countries must develop plans to have the people, weapons, supplies, and transports to defend themselves with limited U.S. support. Meaningful work must start shortly to be ready in three years. 

Increase defense spending to 3.5 percent in three years.

During the Cold War against the Soviets, European countries consistently spent over 3 percent of their GDP on defense. We are again in a new cold war, and there is a hot war in Europe. Poland, a frontline state, is at 4 percent and has decided to jump to 5 percent next year. 

Build larger European country land armies and multiply exercises for combined forces.

Reuters reported in July that, according to a military source, NATO European countries discussed forming thirty-five to fifty extra brigades, approximately 175,00 to 250,000 troops, in order to meet the new defense requirements agreed upon by the alliance. Forming a cohesive fighting force requires an increase in the frequency and size of the exercises for the thirty-two European members of NATO.

Create an integrated European industrial defense base. 

According to a European Parliament briefing, the European defense industry is too fragmented. Only 18 percent of the investments and procurements are collaborative. Defense companies are national, and demand comes from national governments. This creates numerous problems regarding economies of scale and interoperability. For example, Europe produces seventeen types of main battle tanks while the United States manufactures only the M1 Abrams. 

Improve European mobility for personnel and supplies.

Logistics and support are essential to success in warfare. Moving forces and equipment over significant distances requires transport platforms, engineering, and bridge-building tools. European logistics capabilities need urgent improvements. The EU and NATO launched efforts in 2017 to improve military mobility and expanded them in 2022, but these were under-resourced. 

Establish a proportional relationship between U.S. and European battle-ready troops.

For decades, U.S. leaders have asked their European counterparts to do more for their own defense. This was to no avail because European governments figured out that there would be no consequences if they ignored U.S. requests. This must change.

Former National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien recently articulated a Trump foreign policy of “peace through strength.” In that context, he argued that “Washington should make sure that its European allies understand that the continued American defense of Europe is contingent on Europe doing its part.”

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo introduced the idea of a 20 percent cap for the U.S. contribution to a Ukraine aid fund. The level of this cap notionally relates to the about 16 percent share of the United States in the common funding scheme agreed to by the thirty-two NATO member countries. 

This “proportionality concept” should be extended to the U.S. force posture in Europe through an agreement that the number of U.S. brigades in Europe should be no more than 16 percent of the total number of battle-ready allied brigades. So, if the United States is to maintain its existing five brigades in Europe, the Europeans must form within three years at least twenty-six battle-ready brigades of their own for a total allied force of thirty-one brigades.

Pulling More Weight

Earlier this year, NATO’s secretary general observed that confrontation with Russia is a reality and will last decades. The expansionist bloc countries of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are rapidly growing their military capabilities and have shown themselves willing to use and threaten to use military power to achieve their revisionist aims.

The wealthy and populous nations of Western Europe nations, in particular, must summon the political will to move—and move urgently—to shore up the defense of their freedoms, security, and prosperity. Relying on America’s protection as a substitute for their own national strength is not a sound strategy. 

From across time, one of Europe’s great statesmen has a fateful question for today’s European leaders. In a 1936 speech to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill asked this question: “Will there be time to put our defenses in order.. or will the awful words ‘too late’ be recorded?” 

Lt. General (ret.) Keith Kellogg was a National Security Adviser to both President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence. He is currently Co-Chair of the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute.

Dan Negrea served in the U.S. Department of State as a senior advisor in the Secretary’s Policy Planning Office and as the Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs. He is a Distinguished Fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Image: Martin Hibberd / Shutterstock.com.