Yoram Hazony, The Virtue of Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 273 pp., $28.00.
Marxism has its place in civilized discourse, as do questions about the morality of nuclear weapons. Even torture, slightly euphemized, is a suitable topic for debate; there are two sides at least, each with something to say. But next to nothing can be said for nationalism, which is all but a synonym for racism, persecution and war. Nationalism was responsible for World War I. Nationalism was behind the Nazis. And so on.
Yoram Hazony, an Israeli political theorist, will have none of this. Over the past two years Hazony’s byline has appeared frequently in the Wall Street Journal , where he has challenged many of the assumptions of modern liberalism, including the idea that there is such a thing as “illiberalism.” In the pages of the quarterly journal American Affairs , Hazony and his Herzl colleague Ofir Haivry have set out to construct a new genealogy of Anglo-American conservatism, one in which John Fortescue and John Selden loom larger than John Locke. The Virtue of Nationalism draws together many threads of Hazony’s recent work, weaving them into a larger tapestry—a picture of nationalism and its alternatives, above all the worst alternative, as Hazony sees it: universal empire.
The book sets out a theory of nations and nationalism. Drawing upon biblical precedent, Hazony understands a nation to be the product of a fusion of tribes. The tribes are made up of families, but this is not to say they are purely blood-based: families, after all, include members by choice, such as spouses and members by adoption, as well as members by birth. Tribes with a common language and faith and experience of fighting common foes have reason to band together into a larger entity, the nation, which takes political precedence over its components. Tribes are prone to feuding among themselves, leaving them at their mercy of their enemies. By subordinating the tribes to a superior authority, the nation establishes conditions in which self-determination and its constituent elements’ freedom can flourish.
Hazony does not much care for Thomas Hobbes, whom he interprets—following Leo Strauss, among others—as a liberal individualist in principle. The freedom that concerns Hazony is not the freedom of the detached individual but the freedom of the groups to which he belongs. Organic loyalty—the love of parents for children and children for parents, of siblings and cousins as well as husbands and wives for one another, as well as soldiers for their squadmates—is the glue that binds the tribe, and above the tribe, the nation. A nation of individuals is a contradiction in terms, for nothing would attach the individual to authorities above himself in the absence of such particularistic loyalties. Only force and cash would connect citizen to citizen and citizen to state in the absence of a tribal framework.
Nationalism is a virtue because it is the sum and expression of lower, more personal types of fidelity. There is also virtue in the way the nation leaves its components free to achieve their own excellence—to practice and perfect the virtues of religion, family and community. There is room for the individual here, in the intersections between these groups and between them and the nation at large. Hazony also takes care to note that no nation in reality is entirely homogeneous or organic: there are always some strangers in the midst of the tribes in a great nation, and allowances ought to be made at every level to respect those strangers’ persons and practices. Hazony is no advocate of intolerance. He is, however, an unembarrassed advocate of a nation’s freedom to set its own standards of hospitality, as well as its freedom to define its membership on its own terms.
All of this fits the Israeli experience, both biblical and modern, reasonably well. Squint a little and perhaps it describes certain European nations also, with their roots in shared language, tribal ties and conflicts with neighbors. Hazony describes the United States too, however, as a nation-state in this sense, with the individual states serving as the discrete “tribes” that compose the nation. He allows that today other kinds of groups, including interest groups, may also have a tribe-like character. This is all something of a stretch, if taken quite literally: North Carolina, however distinctive it might be, is not a “tribe.” Hazony does not devote enough attention to the United States to explore how it might be “tribal” in a loose but still accurate sense. He might have done well to say more about America’s patchwork of religious and racial elements as virtual tribes. Even then, there would be grounds for skepticism—but if nothing else, Hazony has ventured a hypothesis worth testing. Could even America, diverse and individualistic as it may seem, be a tribal nation?