What if Russia loses its war on Ukraine? Some consider the question frivolous because, as President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan has asserted, “Russia cannot be defeated in a military sense.” Such thinking has prompted Tokayev, as well as many in the West, to advocate for a deal with Putin, one that would more than likely result in Kyiv’s loss of land that the United Nations, the United States, and Europe all consider Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

Tokayev’s anxious assertions are understandable, as his country is under the gun. Putin himself announced that there is no historical basis for Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. His sidekick, Dmitry Medvedev, may have threatened to invade the proud Central Asian country. But the statements are dead wrong. Timorous Westerners who repeat such claims and use them to propose a “deal” with Moscow should acknowledge this and consider the alternative. Russia is only inching forward in Ukraine with an unsustainable loss of lives and equipment, and it has so far been unable to drive Ukrainian forces from its own territory in Kursk.

Russia’s past military defeats usually yield positive consequences. Without delving too far into history, there is the Crimean War of 1852–5, which Russia lost decisively. The resulting collapse led to the abolition of Russian serfdom in 1861 (two years before Lincoln abolished slavery in America), a new legal system, and elective self-government in the provinces, in which both Tolstoy and Chekhov actively participated. Russia’s humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 led to further reforms and the establishment of Russia’s first elected parliament, the Duma. Similar moderate reforms might well have followed the defeat of tsarism in World War I. Still, the general chaos of the era soon enabled Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik Party to seize power. Stalin’s “Winter War” against Finland ended with a pyrrhic victory and the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations. Finally, the Soviet Union’s ten-year-long war in Afghanistan in 1979–1989 ended with an inglorious withdrawal and the collapse of the USSR two years later.

There are three main reasons for which the United States and its European allies have rebuffed the Ukrainian government’s call for victory over the aggressors. First, they fear that Putin, in his desperation, might unleash tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere. But many commentators within Russia have noted that Ukraine has already crossed several of Putin’s declared “red lines” without his resorting to nuclear arms. As to the fear that a Russian defeat might lead to “loose nukes,” Russian leaders of all stripes know all too well that if Putin acted on his nuclear threats, the United States would be capable of responding immediately and with devastating effect not only on the Russian military but also the country as a whole.

Second, Ukraine’s partners based their strategy purely on their own often inaccurate assessments of the situation on the fighting front. Conditions there are indeed dire. However, the direness extends to both sides, not just the Ukrainians. Russia’s poorly equipped army is running out of fighting gear, while its demoralized conscripted fighting forces are dying in frightful numbers thanks to miserable leadership, against whom they regularly direct withering criticism on their cell phones. The presence of North Koreans on the battlefield, far from reversing the decay, is deepening it as incidents of friendly fire proliferate. Meanwhile, Putin is on the verge of exhausting the huge “rainy day fund” that has hitherto financed his war.

Third, and most importantly, Russia is fast losing the war on its home front. Strict censorship has, until recently, quashed public discussion of the war itself. However, this repression has been unable to stifle public discussion of the impact of the war on Russia’s provinces, cities, and countryside. Prices for basic goods are soaring, and the enormous loss of lives in the fighting is leaving even fewer men to help wives, families, and communities cope with the deepening disaster. Crimes committed by returning veterans are heightening the prevailing disorder. Put bluntly, Putin’s home front is collapsing.

Russian experts are now publicly predicting a demographic cataclysm that may cripple the country for generations to come. This and related issues are now openly discussed in shocked tones by members of Russia’s parliament. In an interview, even the respected president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Robert Nigmatulin, declared, “We’re stuck in a blind alley.” He then took off the gloves: “We must acknowledge that every policy of our president is negative. His ministers are incompetent. Every time they speak, they begin by praising the president.”

So why are Washington officials and America’s friends in Europe straining to achieve a deal with Mr. Putin? Any such deal that does not fully restore Ukraine to the borders recognized by the United Nations will send a clear message not only to Putin himself but also to his waning band of supporters elsewhere. Considering that the Ukraine War has already become the deadliest in Europe since World War II, Western advocates for a deal with Moscow might consider the inevitable concessions to be a small price to pay.

Never mind that any such deal will enable Putin to stay in power in the face of mounting domestic opposition, declare victory, and strengthen his axis with China, North Korea, and Iran. It will also force Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to spend more on rebuilding their defenses against a resurgent Russia. And it will invite mischief elsewhere in the world because the United States and West will have revealed themselves as indecisive and overly eager to compromise.

It would be far better for the United States and its NATO allies to continue to back the full restoration of Ukraine’s legal borders with military and humanitarian assistance.

S. Frederick Starr is the Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and a Distinguished Fellow for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is also the Co-founder of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

Image: Miss.Cabul / Shutterstock.com.