Washington experienced one of its more notable political weeks in recent memory, with U.S. President Joe Biden stepping down from his political campaign for a second presidential term and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu giving an unprecedented speech to the U.S. Congress. The impacts of these two events cannot be understated in the context of U.S. foreign policy on Israel and Palestine, let alone the broader Middle East, during an election year. The question at hand is whether those effects will be felt immediately or in the long term, with the latter much more likely given Washington’s foreign policy inertia and long-running deference to Israel.

Biden dropped out of the presidential race on July 21, marking the first incumbent president to do so since Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War. While many conditions are different between these two events, political upheaval and unpopular foreign policies draw a direct through line between the administrations. While Biden likely dropped out due to ever-worsening polling stemming from concerns about his age, anti-war sentiments like those facing Johnson at the time played a significant role in lowering those poll numbers as well. 

Biden immediately endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic Party’s nominee for president, with the party apparatus largely falling in line. Harris has played a traditional background role common for her position while fulfilling a “bad-cop” role in the administration concerning Israel’s military operations in Gaza. In contrast, administration officials have claimed there is no distance between her and the president on the issue. Some experts, pundits, and former officials have tried to cast Harris as frustrated with the administration’s Israel-Palestine strategy, highlighting her calls for a more aggressive stance against Israeli human rights violations—indicative of the difficulty of campaigning as vice president.

This series of events overshadowed Netanyahu’s now-notorious visit to Washington. During his address to Congress, the Israeli prime minister presented a campaign speech designed to bolster conservative support for his political survival, quickly moving away from the previously promised “unity” speech he foreshadowed ahead of the trip. Indeed, Netanyahu pushed numerous falsehoods about his country’s operations in Gaza while attacking U.S. citizens to the thunderous applause of their elected representatives. 

Notably, Harris chose not to chair the joint session of Congress, as is customary for the vice president. She, alongside roughly half of the Democratic Party’s congressional delegation, skipped the speech. Although Harris did not criticize Netanyahu’s address like many of her party colleagues—including a substantial number of traditional Democrats who attended the speech and likened it to a leader more interested in self-preservation than Israel’s survival or the U.S.-Israel relationship—she did meet with the prime minister on July 25 in private, with a cold public reception designed to retain distance. 

Of note, most Democrats did not remain in the chamber to speak with Netanyahu or shake his hand after his speech. Many condemned it after the fact, in no small part due to his apparent disinterest in discussing Israeli hostages or a ceasefire as Capitol Police arrested multiple hostage family members for protesting the event.

Such a situation would be unprecedented just a few years ago. To be sure, most of these elected officials have aggressively supported Israel since well before the Hamas attacks of October 7 and do not embody, at least publicly, a strong affinity for the pro-Palestine movement. However, the sudden shift in tone and approach within the Democratic Party reflects a slow and long-running—albeit important—shift underway that can influence U.S. foreign policy, especially if Harris wins the presidential election in November.

However, any future Harris administration will constitute a step in that shift as opposed to its natural conclusion. Major policy changes are likely to occur slowly because current conditions are the result of accelerated frustrations stemming from Israel’s military operations in Gaza. It is still somewhat taboo to criticize Israel in the halls of Congress—something a future Harris administration will not alter overnight. Indeed, the vice president draws her roots from a traditional pro-Israel camp that still dominates the party and has members with wide-ranging positions in pro-Palestine circles like the Congressional Progressive Caucus.

Thus, time will tell whether Harris played the good-cop, bad-cop routine rather than genuinely desiring a harder line on Israel. The fact that she skipped Netanyahu’s speech should speak to her apparent interest in shifting U.S. foreign policy away from Biden’s unique bear-hug approach, even if such considerations are electoral at their core. In that vein, Harris’s thinking could reflect an interest in avoiding the politically toxic prime minister—now a convenient punching bag for Democrats afraid of being overly critical of Israel. 

Notably, she does not seem to share Biden’s views on Israel, although the beliefs of the septuagenarian politician and self-proclaimed “Zionist” may be difficult to match. Ultimately, personal feelings matter for an individual with as much extensive foreign policy power as a president.

Regardless, a future Harris administration could take a harder line on a permanent ceasefire, humanitarian aid access, and criticism of the far-right Israeli government—especially including illegal West Bank settlements. This approach will still largely match the Biden administration’s strategy in many ways, albeit with the potential for more public criticism. Those interested in influencing the Harris campaign should and likely are taking note of her positions, how she would change the White House’s foreign policy team, and other shifts already underway. 

In this regard, Harris’s foreign policy advisor, Philip Gordon, is an individual to watch. A former Obama administration official, Gordon has been quite critical of the prevailing U.S. foreign policy consensus of the last few decades. His previous publications reflect a disdain for the status quo, particularly concerning regime change policies and a general frustration with Washington’s constant desire to “do something” everywhere, all the time. However, Gordon and Harris’s broader team are not restraint-oriented and hold relatively traditional views on Israel and the Middle East, at least for the Democratic Party.

Thus, whether the vice president’s previous rhetoric and action, alongside her foreign policy team’s beliefs, lead to real change remains to be seen. Netanyahu’s presence in Washington and meetings with Harris already reflect serious friction in the U.S.-Israel relationship that will be difficult to reverse, especially as the Israeli leader gives more and more Democrats reason to criticize the nature of that relationship. Harris clearly understands this and, with wise thinking and engagements with the pro-Palestine camp, can course correct—at a minimum by demanding Israel accept a future Palestinian state and ending the war in Gaza.

Image: Philip Yabut / Shutterstock.com.