A similar case from the Baghdad Pact’s history is Pakistan and Turkey’s commitment to the alliance for twenty years after its demise. Specifically, Islamabad was a staunch ally of the UK and the United States in an attempt to hedge itself against postcolonial Nehru-India. In 1956, Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy reiterated the need for the alliance even after Nasser’s victory in the 1956 war against Britain, France, and Israel. It took a revolution in Iraq in 1958, the end of the Eisenhower Administration’s military assistance for the Baghdad Pact members, and the Iranian revolution in 1979 for Pakistan to realize that the pact was ineffective and agree to its formal disbandment.

No Offshore Balancer on the Horizon

The war in Gaza reversed the auspicious pre-war scheme at least ten years ago, and the United States has much to repair before crafting a better, more effective, and rewarding exit strategy. Ironically, it is Washington who opposed the obsolete colonial practices of the UK and France during the 1956 Suez War. Washington went even further to threaten London with bankruptcy by selling the U.S. bonds of pound sterling, as it viewed that the tripartite aggression disregarded U.S. and Soviet opinion. More importantly, Egypt was crushed militarily in nine days, and Israel occupied Sinai for four months in 1956 before Nasser emerged victorious to dominate Middle Eastern politics and empower the Soviet Union in the region in the following decade. In other words, counting only on military tools in the Middle East does not guarantee strategic success for Washington or Tel Aviv. The huge loss of IMEC cannot be compensated by whatever death toll or physical loss for its enemies.

In the absence of a peaceful prosperity plan, the pursuit of offshore balancing in the Middle East will remain unfulfilled. A new scheme must consider the influential powers in the region and constrain the disruptive players. Otherwise, the United States risks the Middle East’s exposure to incursions by rival global powers in an era of great power competition.

Islam Alhalawany is a strategic analyst and business consultant. He previously worked as an Assistant Professor and an Assistant Dean for International Collaborations at Jindal Global University in India. He earned his master's degree with distinction in Development and International Business at Queen Mary University of London. Islam is a Chevening Scholar with an interdisciplinary professional background combining international relations, development policy, and international political economy. He has also worked as a senior research Analyst for Standard & Poor's (S&P) in London.

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