The past few weeks have witnessed a kind of turning point in the Trump administration’s foreign policy, as the president cycles back to some of his original campaign themes. These include the continued pulverization of ISIS, hardened sanctions against Iran, repeat calls for increased allied military spending, summit meetings with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, an American tariff campaign against China, and similar tariff campaigns against U.S. allies. Some of these directions are warranted, and even welcome. But all require careful monitoring, and some could cause problems. Current trade wars with U.S. allies, for example, threaten to undermine the rest of the president’s stated foreign-policy agenda, along with a good deal more.

Insofar as there is a Trump doctrine in U.S. foreign policy, it might be described as an attempt to squeeze out what the president views as relative gains for the United States through the applied escalation and de-escalation of American leverage. Trump typically believes in making threats at each point of escalation in order to ensure that target audiences—including foreign governments—understand he may be willing to go even further than they are. Sometimes he escalates tensions in sudden, unpredictable ways. He can also de-escalate very rapidly and unexpectedly. Indeed the president makes it clear in almost every case that he’s ultimately looking for a negotiated settlement, but one he finds satisfactory, and that he’s willing to walk away from the bargaining table if it isn’t.

For Trump, then, the purpose of escalation is most often to de-escalate on favorable terms. To describe his approach as “zero-sum” is not strictly accurate. On the contrary, he regularly refers to the possibility of mutual benefit between the United States and other countries. But he is attuned to the relative gains to be had from these various negotiations—or at least what he thinks of as gains—and insists that America’s material interests be pushed more aggressively within those same diplomatic frameworks. Moreover he does not instinctively insulate economic issues from security concerns, nor U.S. allies from adversaries. All are subject to the application of leverage up and down the ladder.

The actual foreign-policy practice of the Trump administration therefore appears to involve a sort of pressure campaign, on multiple fronts. These fronts can be pictured as follows:

1. Pressuring adversaries over security issues.

2. Pressuring adversaries over commercial issues.

3. Pressuring allies over security issues.

4. Pressuring allies over commercial issues.

Some key advantages and disadvantages of these various pressure campaigns can be summarized briefly.

1. Pressuring adversaries over security issues.

On the first front, the administration pressures Iran and North Korea via sanctions and deterrence, asserts American naval patrols around waters claimed by China, strengthens the U.S. military presence along NATO’s eastern border, boosts efforts against the Taliban, and forcefully rolls back ISIS. At the same time, President Trump makes clear his willingness to sit down and negotiate with any of these competitors, apart of course from ISIS.

These efforts to counteract and impose costs upon numerous authoritarian adversaries are well justified, and have already produced some positive results. Of course, any foreign-policy approach carries risks, and so does this one. One risk commonly noted, and a valid concern, is that of accidental military escalation with a peacetime competitor. But an equally valid concern is the risk of premature de-escalation involving excessive American concessions.

Take the case of North Korea. The Singapore summit brought a reduction in warlike tensions, a reduction welcome to most Americans. At the same time, in order to succeed, the U.S.-led “maximum pressure” campaign against Pyongyang should be maintained without any lopsided American compromise on key issues. Otherwise, what was its purpose in the first place? All things considered, the main challenge on this front is to build up negotiating leverage without veering into accidental warfare—and to hold out the promise of diplomacy without offering one-sided accommodations. The same might be said with regard to U.S.-Russia policy, especially after President Trump’s bizarre press conference alongside Vladimir Putin in Helsinki. Fortunately, the current administration’s policies on the ground are tougher toward Russia than were President Obama’s.

2. Pressuring adversaries over commercial issues.

On the second front, the main target is China’s foreign-economic practices. Here, the president levies tariffs against Chinese goods, referencing discriminatory practices under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, and threatening additional tariffs while holding out hopes for resolution.

Trump deserves credit for drawing attention to a longtime pattern of Chinese abuses against the United States and its allies. These abuses include intellectual property theft, state-sponsored cybercrime, forced technology transfer, and industrial espionage on a massive scale. A forceful U.S. response is long overdue. Punitive tariffs are an admittedly blunt tool in America’s toolkit against predatory Chinese practices. The United States also has multiple other economic tools to use, if it chooses to use them—and it should. The goal should be to extract concessions on the above practices, rather than fixating on the trade deficit per se. A lengthy Sino-American trade dispute will of course carry economic costs and risks for both sides. But these risks are worth taking if they force significant policy changes from Beijing. In fact one possible danger is that the administration might concede too easily in exchange for superficial Chinese concessions on the U.S. trade deficit. Again, the risks of premature de-escalation are worth considering.

3. Pressuring allies over security issues.

On the third front, Trump presses allies to bolster their own armed forces. Given the existing range and balance of allied capabilities, this effort centers especially on Europe.

NATO is arguably the most successful peacetime alliance in history. In terms of pressuring U.S. allies to spend more on their own defense, the central request, however roughly expressed, is not unreasonable. In fact numerous allies agree with the basic direction, and are taking steps to adjust. This was in evidence at the recent NATO summit, where members agreed to keep bolstering common military capabilities. Some of course find the request to be mostly unwelcome, obnoxious, or unrealistic, given their own domestic politics. The Germans, in particular, seem to prefer focusing on verbal reiterations of rules-based order, while simultaneously buying natural gas from Moscow and relying on American troops for protection. Trump isn’t actually wrong about that. Liberal internationalists respond, in effect, that the United States must adopt German political preferences. But why U.S. foreign policy should be based upon the Merkel government’s herbivorous conception of international security is not exactly obvious. In any case, with the current administration, that particular danger is absent.

As always with Donald Trump, there is a great deal to critique and debate on specifics. But assuming the administration looks to counter U.S. adversaries, then all three of the above pressure fronts are basically justified. It is the fourth front—trade wars with U.S. allies—that is most problematic, in part because it complicates the other three.

4. Pressuring allies over commercial issues.

On the fourth front, the president levies tariffs against U.S. allies—notably Canada, Mexico, and the European Union—on the grounds of national security, referencing Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Act. Again, he offers to negotiate, but on his own terms.

To be clear: Neither the United States nor its democratic trading partners are entirely innocent of selective commercial protectionism. Some of the specific American complaints regarding allied tariffs are well-founded. Still, lengthy U.S. trade disputes with democratic allies carry all of the economic costs of a trade dispute with China, but with no possible strategic benefit. China is a great-power rival, an authoritarian force, and a longtime practitioner of deeply predatory commercial practices. In terms of this unique combination, it is unlike any other U.S. trading partner, and most Americans know it. Trade wars with U.S. allies, on the other hand, cost all sides economically, while rendering strategic cooperation on other matters less likely. The United States should therefore de-escalate these commercial disputes with its allies, and focus on forming a common front with them against Beijing.

In the coming months, the president may agree to a new set of renegotiated trade agreements with Canada, Mexico, and the EU—and then declare victory. That would be the prudent course. On the other hand, given his long-standing views on trade policy, he may escalate the American position even further, introducing tariffs on automobiles and/or withdrawing the United States from NAFTA.

Now the president’s readiness to take on all comers is a quality his supporters understand. And it definitely has its uses. But as he himself suggested two years ago, when it comes to foreign policy, fighting in all directions at once can be strategically unproductive. In pointing out Chinese economic aggression, he set the agenda, and has everybody’s attention. The president should settle his differences with U.S. allies over commercial matters, work with Congress, take the win, and move to assemble an international coalition that targets China’s economic practices relentlessly.

Colin Dueck is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, a Kirkpatrick fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author of The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (Oxford 2015).