Lebanon today witnessed another round of hundreds of explosions, this time of handheld radios issued by Hezbollah, one day after a similar episode involving pagers. Twelve people have been confirmed dead in the pager blasts, with around 2,800 injured. Today’s blasts will add to that. Israel has not denied responsibility, and sources quoted anonymously have said the United States was informed in general terms by Israel that an operation was about to be carried out in Lebanon. For the United States, which has for nearly a year been trying to contain the war in Gaza and prevent the low-level exchanges of fire in southern Lebanon from escalating into a broader regional conflict, this is a most unwelcome development. It raises the question: why does Israel appear to be trying to goad Hezbollah into escalation in Lebanon? And why do it right now?

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is in Cairo for yet another round of negotiations between Israel and Hamas, mediated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt. However, it has become quite apparent that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not want a lasting cease-fire in Gaza, which would lead the two extreme-right parties in his coalition to bring down his government and lead to a focus on the “day after” in Gaza, where the United States would likely push against an Israeli reoccupation. It also would, however, likely lead to an end to Hezbollah’s attacks on the northern border areas of Israel, for now. 

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein was also just in Israel on September 16, the day before the pager blasts, admonishing Netanyahu against widening the war in Lebanon, warning him that this could lead to uncontrolled escalation into a broader and protracted regional conflict. However, alongside the U.S. attempts at persuasion, the Biden administration has made clear that policy differences between Jerusalem and Washington will not impact U.S. material assistance to Israel. The only exception was a pause in the delivery of 2,000-pound aerial bombs, while Biden’s March 10 “red line” for Israel on an offensive into Rafah was allowed to melt away in bureaucratic obfuscation once the offensive took place. The bottom line is that Netanyahu has every reason to believe that the United States will not impose significant consequences if he just ignores U.S. concerns about our own interests.

Supporters of Israel have argued that these blasts were narrowly targeted at an armed foe, and there is a good deal of truth to that. While there was clearly collateral damage, most of those injured were connected to Hezbollah. But the question is, why now?

Reporting by Al-Monitor suggested that individuals in Hezbollah were becoming suspicious of the pagers, and it was a “use it or lose it” situation for Israel. But even so, an Israeli attack which might have been perfectly justified in the midst of a fully-escalated conflict looks more like a goading provocation in the context of what has been a contained level of simmering conflict along the border, leaving Hezbollah’s most potent capabilities unused.

Israel does have an argument for the necessity of eventual escalation with Hezbollah in order to remove the missile threat to northern Israel, where the local population has had to be evacuated since last October, and allow those people to return home. But the question, again, is why now? 

A ceasefire in Gaza might prompt Hezbollah to stand down on the border, an option which arguably should be explored. Even many Israelis who see a major war with Hezbollah in Lebanon as inevitable for this reason have argued that it can wait until Israeli military reservists are rested and the Israeli economy has had some time to recover from the current dislocations, which is a significant concern. In this context, the major attacks of the last two days seem intended to provoke Hezbollah into escalation without any further delay.

Over the last few months, a pattern has emerged. Netanyahu repeatedly flicks matches into the tinder of the Middle East, hoping that it will catch fire. The aerial attack on Iranian generals at a diplomatic facility in Damascus, which led to Iran’s well-telegraphed missile attack on April 14, certainly seemed to be intended to escalate. Still, Iran did not take the bait, clearly pulling a punch. The July 31 killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during his visit to Tehran prompted President Biden to criticize it as “not helpful” to Gaza ceasefire talks, but Iran has not responded yet. Hezbollah’s response to the killing of one of their senior commanders at the same time was partially preempted by Israel and allowed to end without escalation. It is in this context that the attacks in Lebanon over the last two days should be seen. Even if there was a “use it or lose it” situation with the devices themselves, there was no compelling reason Israel needed to strike right now unless seen in the context of initiating a broader conflict with Hezbollah and possibly Iran.

The disregard for U.S. concerns and national interests is palpable. If another U.S. ally or partner undertook actions that risked drawing the United States into a major conflict against its will, there would be consequences. The timing also raises the question of whether there is an intention to impact the U.S. presidential race, given the support Donald Trump has received from figures on the Israeli extreme Right and the negative impact that rising fuel prices have historically had for incumbent parties in presidential races.

The United States absolutely should continue to support Israel’s security. Still, the relationship needs to be reset and perhaps made a bit less “special.” Both countries should acknowledge that their interests are not entirely identical and that Israel, due to the enormous economies of scale inherent in the development of modern weapons systems, cannot stand alone despite its technological sophistication. President Biden could still try to shape the relationship by pushing harder for a ceasefire in Gaza, and the next U.S. administration needs to establish a new set of norms about how we deal with Israeli governments that are problematic for broader U.S. interests. One can hope that Hezbollah (and Iran) will again hold back from uncontrolled escalation, but the sheer number of casualties from this ill-considered attack may make that impossible.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest. Follow him on X: @GregPriddy1.

Image: ramiz dallah / Shutterstock.com.