It was a “simple question,” the moderator told former president Donald Trump during the recent presidential debate, “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?” Trump answered that he wanted to end it and has been pilloried for not just saying “yes.” Vice President Kamala Harris didn’t say yes either, but unlike her rival, she made it clear she backed Ukraine against Russian aggression.

In truth, it is not a simple question. What does it mean to win? There is no shared view in the West or between the West and Ukraine.

From the very beginning, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has defined victory as liberating all the Ukrainian land Russia has seized since 2014. That would make his country whole again within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 when Ukraine emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s Peace Plan calls unequivocally for the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity. “It is not up for negotiations,” the plan declares. Polls indicate most Ukrainians share Zelensky’s goal, although attitudes are shifting as the costs of war mount.

Others would claim victory if Ukraine could push Russia back to the de facto borders of February 23, 2022, the day before Russia invaded. That would still leave Moscow in control of the roughly ten percent of Ukrainian territory it seized in 2014, but it would deny it any gains from its most recent aggression.

Still, others would argue that the preservation of a sovereign and independent Ukraine, even if stripped of the territory Russia now occupies, would spell victory for Ukraine and a strategic setback for Russia, which aimed to subjugate the entire country. Some would even go so far as to claim Ukraine has already won on the argument that Russia is unlikely to advance much further into Ukraine than it already has.

What Say America, Post-November?

The Biden-Harris administration, meanwhile, has never clearly defined victory or stated unambiguously what it seeks to achieve. It has never publicly claimed Zelensky’s goal as its own. Rather, Biden has so far delivered two inspiring odes to the power of freedom to subdue autocracy, but in neither one did he define victory for Ukraine in concrete terms.

Other officials have offered glimpses into administration thinking, but none has provided a comprehensive articulation of the administration’s goals. Under Congressional pressure, the administration finally sent a classified strategy for Ukraine in mid-September, but no details have yet been made public.

What we are left with are fragments of a policy that is not necessarily internally coherent. The administration, for example, has promised to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” leaving “it” undefined. It has said that it is arming Ukraine now to strengthen its position at the negotiating table without indicating the parameters of the deal it hopes Ukraine could negotiate.

It has declared its goal to be the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence without specifying clearly within what borders, even though the United States officially recognizes the 1991 borders. And since before the war began, President Joe Biden has been emphatic that the United States will not go to war with Russia to defend Ukraine and run the risk of nuclear cataclysm that would entail. Would that hold even if that were the only way to prevent Ukraine’s defeat and subjugation by Russia? No one knows for sure.

All of this suggests the administration itself has not agreed internally on its goals or that it believes it could not withstand the rigors of public debate. It may also be concerned that, if made public, its vision of success would risk rupturing Western unity and alignment with Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.

This is a losing strategy. It endangers the popular support that is critical to the success of any foreign policy in a democratic society. It ensures that resources will be wasted. It encourages endless public bickering that saps American strength. It reinforces the Kremlin’s belief that it can outlast the West to achieve its goals in this conflict.

It is time for the United States to offer a compelling vision of what it is trying to achieve in the Ukraine conflict and a strategy for success. It should be grounded in objective reality, with a clear assessment of Russian, Ukrainian, European, and U.S. interests and capabilities, and identify the resources that will be needed to achieve its goals. It must embed its goals for Ukraine in a broader vision for Europe’s future security architecture in the face of continuing Russian hostility and obstructionism. It must chart a course to co-existence with Russia that, no matter what the outcome of the Ukraine war, will not cease to be a major rival while remaining a necessary partner in managing strategic stability and dealing with urgent transnational threats, with climate change at the top of the list.

It is much too late for the Biden administration to take on this task. However, it should be a priority for the next president to define what it means for Ukraine and the United States to win the war.

About the Author: 

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and was the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

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