The Navy's Constellation-Class Mess Is Only Beginning

The Navy's Constellation-Class Mess Is Only Beginning

The major changes the Navy forced upon the designers of the Constellation-class have compromised the speed and reliability of the class.

 

President-Elect Donald J. Trump may have been paying attention to our reporting here at The National Interest, as I have been banging the drum about the ongoing excesses and failures of the United States Navy’s Constellation-class frigate program that has laid bare the staggeringly inept shipbuilding and design process of Big Navy.

During a recent interview with conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt, the incoming American president complained about the state of a deal that his first administration brokered between the United States Navy and the Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri to produce the Navy’s next frigate.

Trump lamented the fact that his team had crafted a sensible and straightforward shipbuilding deal before leaving office the first. Once out of office, though, the Navy decided to tinker with the design of the Constellation-class—after Fincantieri had already cut the steel for the boat and started laying down the hull!

Understanding the Program

The Constellation-class frigate program was launched by the United States Navy to replace the aging Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. Since then, it has encountered numerous challenges that have raised concerns about the cost, efficacy of this program, and the ability of the program to remain on its contracted schedule. One of the primary problems with the Constellation-class has been the aforementioned deviation from its original design.

America had planned to essentially copy the European Fregata Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM) frigate design to cut down on costs and expedite the delivery of the warship to the fleet. But the Navy could not leave well enough alone: they had to tinker with the design. Of course, the Pentagon waited until the Trump administration changed over to the Biden administration, presumably playing on the chaos of that transition to their advantage.

The Navy has described what transpired in the clinical language of bureaucratese. They say that “unplanned weight growth” is behind the drastic cost overruns and timetable complications.

Massive Complications

That growth, by the way, is estimated at over ten percent above the initial projections promised to Congress and the bean counters at the Defense Department. The entire reason for using Fincantieri to build the warship and to base the Constellation-class on Europe’s FREMM frigate was to enhance interoperability between the US Navy’s newest warship and those of various allied navies in Europe.

Yet, the Navy’s adjustments to the Constellation-class reduced the interoperability with the original European design from 85 percent commonality to just 15 percent!

This has, in turn, led to massively unforeseen consequences in the manufacturing and integration of the Constellation-class. That has, too, created massive cost overruns—to say nothing of significant delays in the production of this warship, as Fincantieri must basically go back to the proverbial drawing board.

Speaking of cost overruns, the original estimate was that each Constellation-class frigate would cost around $800 million per ship. Now, it’s believed that it will cost $1.6 billion—and that estimate is likely to increase even further over time.

Now, the original ship, the USS Constellation (FFG-62), which was initially slated for delivery to the Navy around 2026, has been postponed to 2029. It won’t get much better from here, because the Navy has already shot itself in the foot with the ridiculous changes that Trump highlighted in his recent interview with Hugh Hewitt.

Another factor behind the US government’s selection of the Italian ship maker, Fincantieri, was the fact that they have a massive shipyard in Wisconsin. In other words, they would have supplied a large number of jobs in the United States—to a key electoral battleground state, like Wisconsin, no less.

Sadly, like the rest of America’s sclerotic shipyards, the Fincantieri yard has struggled with significant bottlenecks at the Wisconsin facility, notably with recruitment and retention of workers there, slowing down work on the project.

Others have suggested having other American shipyards assist with the creation of these boats to keep the program on schedule. Unfortunately, the complexity of the design, and the complete redesign that the Navy subjected the Constellation-class frigates to in the eleventh hour, have ensured that other American shipyards are struggling to assist with this program.

And the labor shortages experienced by the Fincantieri yard in Wisconsin are not isolated. This is a systemic problem negatively affecting all America’s naval shipyards. The Constellation-class frigate is just the most recent victim of this pathetic decline.

Why the Delays?

These delays with the Constellation-class frigates have real strategic implications—notably in the Indo-Pacific region, where China’s rise is the most pressing concern facing U.S. naval planners. A lack of frigates because of these delays and cost overruns will hinder the U.S. Navy’s capacity to effectively deter China.

Then again, the entire notion that the U.S. Navy’s manned surface fleet will in any way be effective against China in any conflict over the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the age of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), is a bit ludicrous. But the Navy is committed to their Constellation-class frigate.

More importantly, the major changes the Navy forced upon the designers of the Constellation-class have compromised the speed and reliability of the class. Those are, of course, are the real challenges to the well-being of the U.S. Navy. Because if the Constellation-class fails any harder than it already has, it is doubtful that the Navy will be able to rely upon Congressional support for much of anything the Navy wants to achieve over the next decade.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.