After a period of calm in U.S.-Chinese relations, in which U.S. China policy stressed economic engagement, cooperation against terrorism and stability in the Taiwan Strait, attention has returned to the military and economic rise of China and the challenges to American security.

China's economy has been growing at 9 percent per year since 1979. China's reforms have transformed its bankrupt socialist system into an increasingly unregulated and openly trading economy that drives economic growth throughout the world. Since the early part of this decade, China has been replacing the United States as the most important market for all of East Asia. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore already export more to China and send more investment capital to China than they do to the United States. The export and investment trends elsewhere in East Asia make it increasingly clear that the East Asian economies depend more on China than on the United States for economic growth, employment and political stability. Moreover, Chinese trade policy actively reinforces these trends. Its free trade agreements with the ASEAN countries promote expansion of their exports to China. The result of these developments is the determined emergence of an East Asian economic system with China as its hub.

Will Chinese economic power cause local states to align increasingly with China? The behavior of the regional states clearly answers this question. Where the United States retains military supremacy, states are enhancing their military cooperation with the United States, despite regional economic trends. The rise of Chinese economic influence is not a threat to U.S. strategic interest in a divided East Asia.

There is no question that countries that are vulnerable to China's improving ground force and land-based capabilities are realigning toward China. South Korea understands that the United States cannot offset Chinese ground force improvements, given constraints on U.S. military power in mainland theaters, and the ROK has readjusted accordingly. It no longer supports U.S. policy toward North Korea, but rather cooperates with China to undermine U.S. efforts to isolate and coerce North Korea.

The growth of Chinese military power also affects Taiwan's foreign policy. Chinese short- and medium-range missiles and Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft threaten Taiwan's economy and democracy. Even if the United States intervened in a war between China and Taiwan, China would still likely penetrate Taiwan's defenses. Although the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan is stronger today than at any time since the 1960s, the Taiwanese independence movement is dying. Taiwanese polling consistently reveals that less than 10 percent of the population supports a declaration of independence. Eighty percent of the people oppose changing the name of the island from "Republic of China." The defeat of Chen Shui-bian's party in the December 2004 legislative election reflected widespread dissatisfaction with his mainland policy. Since then, opposition politicians have made popular high-profile visits to Beijing and made strong statements against independence, while Chen's popularity has plummeted. Meanwhile, Taiwan resists U.S. pressure to purchase advanced American weapons. Fifty-five percent of the respondents in a recent poll believe that U.S. weaponry cannot make Taiwan secure, and only 37 percent support purchasing the weapons. Another poll reported that nearly 60 percent of the public believes that Taiwan cannot defend itself against the mainland. Taiwan's Ministry of Defense concurs. In 2004 it concluded that the mainland would gain military superiority over Taiwan in 2006.

China's soft power has followed the rise of its hard power. More than one million Taiwanese now have residences on the mainland. By the end of 2004 there were more than 250,000 "cross-strait marriages", and these marriages had grown to over 20 percent of all new Taiwanese marriages. In early 2004 there were 5,000 students from Taiwan enrolled in Chinese universities, even though Chinese degrees are not recognized by Taiwan.

But while South Korea and Taiwan reconsider their dependency on the United States for security, the countries of maritime East Asia, despite their growing dependence on the Chinese economy, are moving closer to the United States. As early as 1995 Tokyo agreed to revised guidelines for the U.S.-Japanese alliance, facilitating closer war-time coordination between the Japanese and U.S. militaries, including U.S. use of Japanese territory in case of war with a third country. Since then, Japan has become the most active U.S. partner in the development of missile defense technologies. It has agreed to a five-year plan for U.S.-
Japanese joint production of a missile defense system, and it will contribute $10 billion by the end of the decade. In 2001 it passed legislation allowing the Japanese military to provide non-combat support to U.S. anti-terrorist operations and then sent its navy to join in the search for Al-Qaeda forces in the waters off Pakistan and Iran. That same year Japan passed legislation allowing the government to deploy ground troops in support of U.S. operations in Iraq. As China has risen, Japan has strengthened defense cooperation with the United States. It has become Washington's closest global strategic partner and its most robust partner against the rise of China.

Southeast Asian countries critical to U.S. security have similarly strategically moved closer to the United States. Since 1995, maritime Southeast Asian militaries have conducted annual bilateral Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises with the U.S. Navy. Even Indonesia, whose regional aspirations discourage alignment, continued to participate in these exercises despite the U.S. military embargo imposed on Indonesia following the 1999 crisis in East Timor, and in 2002 it resumed security cooperation talks with Washington. Singapore and Malaysia now participate with the United States in the annual Cobra Gold military exercises, the major U.S. defense exercise in Southeast Asia.

Singapore and the Philippines have been the most active in cooperation with the U.S. military. In 2001 Singapore completed construction of its Changi port facility, which is explicitly designed to accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier, and in March 2001 it hosted the first visit of the USS Kitty Hawk. As Singapore's defense minister explained, "It is no secret that Singapore believes that the presence of the U.S. military . . . contributes to the peace and stability of the region. To that extent, we have facilitated the presence of U.S. military forces." In 1999 the Philippines reached a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, permitting U.S. forces to hold exercises in the Philippines. Since then, the size of the U.S. participation in joint exercises has steadily expanded, doubling between 2003 and 2004. In addition, the focus of the exercises has expanded beyond anti-terrorist activities to include U.S. participation in amphibious exercises in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands, which both Beijing and Manila claim as their territory. Then, in late 2004, the U.S. and Philippine air forces conducted joint exercises. Since 2001, annual U.S. military assistance to the Philippines increased from $1.9 million to a projected $126 million in 2005, and the Philippines is now the largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in East Asia. Manila is also planning to purchase U.S. fighter planes. Whereas for most of the 1990s the Philippines was hostile to the U.S. military, it is now a "major non-NATO ally" with an expanding U.S. presence on its territory.

In conjunction with the development of its economy, China has been modernizing its military since 1979. Chinese purchases of Russian military hardware, including missiles, naval vessels and fighter aircraft, are a well-known trend. Annual Defense Department reports on Chinese military power have repeatedly warned of emerging Chinese superiority over Taiwan and of Chinese efforts to develop "asymmetric capabilities" to disrupt U.S. naval superiority in the western Pacific. Taken with the realignment toward China--for both economic and military reasons--of some East Asian nations, China's ongoing military improvements seem to pose a serious problem to U.S. strategy in the region.

The key issue in appraising the Chinese threat to U.S. security, however, is not the ongoing growth of Chinese military and economic power per se, but its effect on the U.S. presence in the western Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia. Chinese military and regional political advances to date reflect its improved ground force and land-based capabilities. But the United States keeps the peace and maintains the balance of power in East Asia through its overwhelming naval presence. This is the source of ongoing local alignment with the United States. For the rise of China to pose a direct threat to U.S. security, China must possess sufficient military capabilities to challenge the United States in the western Pacific, including sufficient capability to risk war. Alternatively, it must have at its disposal sufficient economic or military power to undermine U.S. security guarantees for the region's maritime countries, compelling them to align with China.

At the strategic level, after decades of research and testing, China is preparing to deploy solid-fuel ballistic missiles that can target U.S. allies in East Asia and may be nearing completion of an intercontinental ballistic missile that can target the continental United States. It is also making advances in development of its next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missiles. None of these developments should come as a surprise; U.S. intelligence has been following these programs since their inception. Moreover, these programs should not be considered a challenge to U.S. military superiority. Once these weapons are fully operational, perhaps by the end of the decade, China will have a more credible minimal second-strike capability. Despite recent Chinese bravado, not only is it hard to imagine a scenario in which China would use nuclear weapons in response to conventional hostilities, but U.S. retaliatory capabilities would make Chinese first-use suicidal. Continued modernization of its nuclear forces and massive quantitative superiority over China give the United States a far more robust deterrent posture vis-Ã -vis China than it ever possessed vis-Ã -vis the Soviet Union. Similarly, overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority provides greater strategic security for our East Asian allies than U.S. nuclear capabilities ever provided for our European allies during the Cold War.

More relevant is the considerable Chinese progress in modernizing its offshore maritime capabilities. Most significant has been China's acquisition of advanced Russian weaponry. Russian Kilo-class submarines are difficult to detect and can significantly enhance the likelihood that China could destroy U.S. surface vessels, including destroyers and aircraft carriers. China is also improving its conventional missile capability. Its Russian Su-30s are equipped with air-to-ground missiles that will contribute to its ability to target U.S. surface vessels, and its acquisition of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles enhances its ability to target U.S. aircraft operating in Chinese coastal waters.

These new capabilities pose a danger to U.S. naval security. But China's recent acquisitions from Russia also reveal the PLA's limitations. Chinese modernization enhances a coastal sea-denial capability but does not contribute to a blue-water sea-control capability. Its aircraft and short- and medium-range missiles are tethered to Chinese territory. Its next generation of Russian surface-to-air missiles has a limited range of 200 kilometers. And even in its coastal waters, China's capability is at best limited. It continues to lack the sophisticated guidance capability to allow its missiles to strike moving targets at sea, such as a U.S. aircraft carrier, and ballistic missiles are an ineffective anti-ship weapon. Despite the improvements in China's air force, the United States has finished testing and is preparing to deploy the F-22 aircraft, which is far superior to any aircraft in the world, including Russia's most advanced. China's full complement of Kilo submarines may become fully operational sometime in the next decade. At that time, U.S. aircraft carriers and destroyers may well have to operate at a greater distance from the Chinese coast to minimize casualties--but this will not prevent the United States from establishing air superiority along the Chinese coastline. Moreover, advances in U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities will degrade the capability of China's Kilo submarines and help sustain U.S. ability to operate in coastal waters.

China is also developing indigenous platforms. For example, it recently launched its first post-Mao submarine, the Yuan class. But the capabilities of the Yuan submarine remain limited. Its hiding and attack capabilities are less advanced than the capabilities of the Russian Kilo, limiting it to a supplemental role in sea denial. China has also completed development of its first post-Mao fighter jet, the J-10. But because the J-10 took over twenty years to develop, it is based on the 1970s technology of the cancelled Israeli Lavi jet program, and it remains beset with problems. It is an inferior aircraft compared to both of the aircraft China has purchased from Russia and compared to U.S. carrier-based aircraft in the western Pacific. Although Chinese manufacture of Yuan-class submarines and of the J-10 represent major breakthroughs for the Chinese defense industry, they rely on imported technologies. They are only breakthroughs because the industry began from such a backward position in the aftermath of the Maoist era. China's indigenous missiles are also fairly primitive. Its anti-ship cruise missile technologies still reflect 1960s and 1970s capabilities, and its development of long-range naval surface-to-air missiles for ship defense confronts enduring problems.

In the end, China's development of a coastal-water sea-denial capability neither undermines U.S. sea control nor contributes to a war-winning capability. True, Chinese modernization has transformed the cross-strait balance, but this was all but inevitable once rapid economic development began. In any case, Taiwan has never depended on its own capabilities for security, but rather on the likelihood of U.S. intervention and its deterrence of a Chinese attack. In this respect, Taiwan is as secure as ever.

Improved Chinese capabilities will expose U.S. forces to greater losses than five years ago and will thus complicate U.S. naval operations. Nevertheless, U.S. aircraft deployments at Kadena Air Force Base in Japan and in Guam and the ability to deploy multiple aircraft carriers in East Asia with port facilities in Japan and Singapore assure the U.S. Navy of continued maritime supremacy in the western Pacific. And China's recent advances have not improved its ability to operate in sea lanes of communication. According to the 2005 Pentagon report on Chinese military power, the Chinese navy is vulnerable to attack when it patrols in the Malacca Strait and among the disputed territories in the South China Sea. U.S. maritime supremacy also enables the United States to plan for its fighter planes and bombers to carry out strikes against Chinese territory and place at risk Chinese coastal and interior civilian and military assets, including ships remaining at port.

The outcome of any war between the United States and China would be devastating for Chinese interests. As General Zhu Chenghu recently observed, China has "no capability to fight a conventional war against the United States." Indeed, China would face near inevitable defeat, with the military, political and economic costs far outweighing any costs incurred by the United States. China would risk losing its entire surface fleet, and it would expose its coastal territory, including its port facilities and its surface vessels at port, to U.S. air and missile strikes. The economic costs would also be devastating. China would lose access to Western technologies for many years after the war. It would also lose its peaceful international environment and risk its "peaceful rise" as its economy shifted to long-term war-footing and its budget contended with a protracted U.S.-Chinese arms race, undermining domestic infrastructure development and long-term civilian and defense technology development. Finally, the political costs would be prohibitive. A military loss to the United States could well destroy the nationalist credentials of the Chinese Communist Party and cause its collapse.

Nowhere is Chinese caution more evident than in the Taiwan Strait. Despite the advances in Chinese capabilities, the mainland has been exceedingly tolerant of Taiwan's movement toward sovereignty. Over the past five years Chen Shui-bian's rhetoric has amounted to an informal declaration of independence. Much to the concern of both the Bush Administration and Beijing, Chen has frequently suggested his intention to replace the current constitution with a new constitution that would establish de jure Taiwanese independence. In response, China has fulminated, threatened, deployed its forces and rattled its sabers, but it has refused to use force, despite the leadership's conviction that Chen is determined to move Taiwan toward formal sovereignty and Chen's apparent disregard for Chinese resolve. Chinese leaders know that should there be a war in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy would intervene and the cost to China would be intolerable. Only if Taiwan actually declares de jure independence, thus challenging the Communist Party's domestic survival and leaving Beijing no choice but to retaliate militarily, would China risk war with the United States over Taiwan.

But the status quo is an insufficient indicator of future trends. What are China's strategic intentions, and what are the implications for U.S. maritime security? Thus far, China has cautiously developed its naval capabilities. In many respects its strategy resembles the Soviet Union's response to U.S. maritime dominance from the end of World War II to the 1970s. To compensate for its limited naval capabilities, Moscow deployed attack submarines and aircraft to push U.S. maritime forces away from its coastal waters.

Only when Moscow expanded its Pacific fleet and attempted to develop blue-water power-projection platforms did Washington begin to assess the Soviet Navy as a serious threat. In much the same way, for China to pose a threat to U.S. security it must move beyond coastal sea-denial capability and develop a similar blue-water power-projection navy. However, China faces considerable long-term constraints in pursuing such an objective. First, it has to overcome the technological obstacles. Unlike sea-denial capabilities, power-projection capabilities cannot be imported; they must be developed indigenously. No country will sell China a capable carrier and the necessary aircraft and support ships. Moreover, maintenance of advanced carrier technologies and effective management of a carrier task force require a large contingent of civilian and military personnel with highly advanced training. The limited capability of China's Yuan-class submarines and J-10 aircraft reflects its ongoing struggle to develop 21st-century weaponry, including advanced aircraft for deployment on carriers. Indeed, Pentagon officials recently testified that China still must overcome many obstacles before it can use its existing Russian weaponry to improve its operational capabilities. It has yet to develop the personnel that can maintain the equipment and use it to its full potential. Chinese submarines have the worst safety record in the world; in the past three years the Chinese navy has lost one submarine and disabled another.

In addition, China must contend with a daunting geopolitical environment in which it has 13 land neighbors, including Russia, which Chinese leaders cannot and have not dismissed as a future rival, and India, as well as smaller but nonetheless potentially capable states. It also faces multiple disaffected minority movements on its periphery. Should China seek blue-water capabilities, it would have to simultaneously maintain its costly effort to ensure territorial security. Finally, any Chinese effort to develop power-projection capabilities must consider the U.S. response, which would likely be a determined commitment to victory in a naval arms race. The outcome of this race would significantly reflect overall economic capacity. According to the Pentagon, if China sustains its current economic rate of growth until 2025, its GDP would still be approximately 30 percent of the U.S. GDP in 2025.

Of course, China may blunder and challenge U.S. vital interests by trying to develop a blue-water navy. However, Chinese leaders are acutely aware of the costs and limited benefits of becoming a maritime power. The issue has been raised in the Chinese media for the past five years in a debate over whether China should develop aircraft carriers. Thus far, China's leadership has resisted the temptation to acquire this prestigious symbol of great power status. It apparently concurs with analysts who argue that China's geopolitical constraints and the costs of dealing with the U.S. response would be punishing. China's leaders are seemingly aware that a Chinese carrier, unlike Indian and Thai carriers, would challenge U.S. maritime interests and induce an arms race with the United States that China could not win. And Chinese naval expansion would undermine its regional diplomacy by elevating threat perception throughout East Asia. Thus, just as a war with the United States would jeopardize China's peaceful international environment and its ability to sustain its "peaceful rise", so too would a Chinese naval build-up. Just as China is deterred from using force, it has been deterred from challenging U.S. maritime superiority.

U.S. naval preponderance and dominant strategic presence in maritime East Asia both deter war and maintain a favorable balance of power. Continental powers that have tried to become naval powers by challenging maritime powers have failed throughout history. China might try to become a naval power, but it would be foolish and costly and would almost certainly end in failure. Chinese leaders seem to understand this; the United States should understand this as well and should draw confidence from it.

Moreover, the United States is strengthening its deployments in East Asia. Over the past five years the Pentagon has moved attack submarines and cruise missiles to Guam. The Air Force is building an operations center on Guam to serve the entire Pacific. It plans to form a strike force there, with six bomber aircraft and 48 fighters redeployed from continental U.S. bases, as well as twelve refueling aircraft, supplementing U.S. carrier-based aircraft and U.S. aircraft in Japan. The Air Force also plans to deploy Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft on Guam. The U.S. Navy plans to deploy to Japan an advanced aircraft carrier to replace the Kitty Hawk and has allocated funding for deployment of a second carrier in East Asia. The Navy is also converting Trident ballistic missile submarines into platforms for stealth cruise missiles to be deployed in the western Pacific. All of these measures contribute to long-term U.S. sea control throughout East Asia.

Although U.S. influence is declining in South Korea and Taiwan, Washington has never defined the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan as places vital to U.S. security. Our policy of "peaceful resolution" toward both the Korean and Taiwan conflicts acknowledges this. Indeed, Secretary Rumsfeld seems eager to move even faster to downgrade the U.S. force presence in South Korea than regional politics requires.

On the other hand, the United States has long defined U.S. dominance in maritime Southeast Asia as vital to U.S. security. So far, the rise of China does not threaten this interest. Moreover, despite the growth of Chinese economic influence, U.S. strategic partnerships in maritime East Asia are stronger than ever.

So far, the United States has responded well to the rise of China. It has maintained its deterrent and stabilized the regional order. But the greatest challenge to the status quo and the greatest contribution to the rise of China as a maritime power may well be shortcomings in U.S. defense policy. Recent attention to the Pentagon's inability to acquire planned numbers of next-generation aircraft carriers and fighter planes, and the escalating costs of these programs, is disturbing. As Secretary Rumsfeld observed, "Something's wrong with the system." In addition, deployment of U.S. forces in hostilities in peripheral areas weakens our presence in East Asia.

If the United States gives China the opportunity to displace the U.S. presence, it will grab it. The United States should be under no illusion that China will be content with the status quo should its relative power increase. But if the United States does what it can and should do--if it strengthens its regional military presence and continues to modernize its forces--it can maintain its maritime dominance, its deterrent capability, the regional balance of power and U.S. security.