EVEN BEFORE September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration faced difficult challenges and choices as it charted U.S. policy toward Iraq. The period of Iraqi quiescence following Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 was clearly over, the containment regime on Iraq had weakened, and the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian violence had imposed constraints on Washington's diplomatic leeway while creating new trouble-making opportunities for Baghdad. Sensing that momentum was on his side, Saddam Hussein seemed increasingly self-confident and assertive.

From the outset, most of President Bush's senior foreign policy advisors seemed to favor "regime change" over the continued "containment" of Iraq. Yet, a State Department-led effort to bolster containment and to steal a march on the proponents of regime change by "smartening" sanctions--well before the new administration's Iraq policy review was completed--suggested deep divisions in the Bush team. Though the smart sanctions effort failed due to a threatened Russian veto that was, somehow, not anticipated by the State Department, the administration's Iraq policy review still had not been completed before September 11.

The events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax incidents should have been transformational events. They should have highlighted the dangers of "business as usual" in an age of sophisticated terrorism and weapons proliferation, and the potentially high costs of ignoring the likes of Osama bin Laden and rogue regimes such as that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet, regarding Iraq, all signs indicate the contrary. The old arguments continue, albeit in slightly different form, inside the administration and out, about whether, when and how to deal with Saddam Hussein and his regime. 

Some believe that Iraq is connected to the events of September 11 or to the anthrax terror campaign that followed, and that these events make regime change more important and urgent than ever. Some believe that Iraq's relation to September 11 is irrelevant, that its enormous potential to harm America makes the status quo intolerably dangerous, and that after September 11, more people recognize this. But others argue that attacking Iraq, even if it was complicit in the September 11 events, would alienate Arabs and Muslims whose support is vital to the ongoing campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. For this reason, they argue, containment will have to do for now--if not for the indefinite future as well.

The future of containment, however, is increasingly uncertain. Weapons inspections have not occurred in Iraq since 1998, and sanctions--a central pillar of containment--have eroded significantly, and will continue to do so. Furthermore, experience has shown that deterrence is an inadequate policy instrument vis-a-vis Iraq. Sooner or later Saddam's ambitions will bump up against U.S. interests, and he will again miscalculate in such a way as to generate conflict with the United States. Thus, while containment can limit Baghdad's trouble-making potential, it cannot stop Iraq from stockpiling weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or prevent further U.S.-Iraqi confrontations. And as long as Baghdad possesses chemical, biological and--perhaps in the future--nuclear weapons, a confrontation with a neighboring state or the United States could lead to their use. For this reason, the longer that hard decisions are delayed, the greater the potential costs of a future confrontation. It is simply too risky for the United S tates not to take bold steps to prevent such an eventuality. The case for regime change is more compelling now than ever before--even if it is not clear that the international environment is more supportive of it.

The shortcomings of containment go beyond questions of sustainability, or the risks of complacency. Containment requires an onerous forward U.S. military presence in the region that is clearly counterproductive politically for the United States. And to the degree that sanctions contribute to a sense of Arab/Muslim grievance against the United States and the West, containment stokes political extremism in Iraq and beyond.

Another drawback of containment is that by its very nature it is a preventive rather than a constructive policy; it does not hold out the possibility of a change for the better in Iraq. Regime change, by contrast, offers at least a potential path for a better future for the long-suffering people of Iraq, and for achieving long-term U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf. It is the key to the emergence of an Iraq that can live in peace with its own people and its neighbors, and to stemming further WMD proliferation in the region. At least at the margins, too, a less troublesome Iraqi regime could make an Israeli-Palestinian accommodation easier to achieve. For all these reasons, the risks associated with containment now outweigh those associated with regime change.¹

If the case for regime change is clear, the way forward is not. The debate in Washington about regime change in Iraq has become highly partisan. Most who favor regime change have become disposed to support the "enclaves" strategy of Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Most who favor containment justify their view on the belief that deterrence can work, and that the "enclaves" strategy is unrealistic--as though this were the only path to regime change. The way the debate has been framed has had the effect of placing controversies about personalities and organizations over substantive discussions of means and ends.

In truth, there is no support for the enclaves approach in the region, and Iraqi opposition groups are unlikely anytime soon to be capable of using liberated enclaves in northern or southern Iraq as springboards for offensive operations against Baghdad--with or without U.S. air support. Even if such an approach were to enjoy unexpected success, it probably could not work fast enough to avert the potentially disastrous use of WMD by the Ba'athi regime, should it feel its survival threatened. By nibbling away at its periphery, rather than by landing crushing blows to the nerve centers of the regime, the enclaves approach eschews the type of devastating and decisive American military action that is probably required to unseat Saddam and his regime, without disastrous consequences for innocent Iraqis and the peoples of the region.

Unfortunately, the "containment versus enclaves" structure of the debate over Iraq has obscured the real choices before us. This essay proposes to re-invigorate the debate by offering an alternative approach to regime change. The opposition has a role in it, but so does a significant use of U.S. airpower combined with psychological and economic warfare to create conditions in which a coup or an uprising by domestic opponents of the regime could occur. This alternative is based on several assumptions.

First, regime change offers the possibility of a better future for Iraq-including perhaps a less repressive, more broad-based government--though admittedly, the ultimate outcome of either a coup or uprising cannot be assessed with confidence.

Second, even less desirable outcomes might still offer advantages over the status quo. While a coup that would sweep Saddam, his family and his inner circle from power would still likely lead to an authoritarian military government, the head of such a regime is unlikely to possess the combination of personal attributes that make Saddam and his inner circle so dangerous: extreme ruthlessness, unbounded ambition, a propensity to miscalculate and a burning desire to avenge the Desert Storm defeat. And while a military government might still be wedded to WMD, it could be easier to manage the consequences of proliferation in Iraq with a regime less prone to miscalculation and aggression. Alternatively, while an uprising could result in a loss of central government control over much of Iraq, such an outcome would not necessarily be more harmful for the Iraqi people, the United States and its allies than the status quo--with its potential for an Iraqi nuclear breakout and another regional war. (Indeed, the resident s of northern Iraq have experienced a net improvement in living conditions during the past decade due to the absence of central government control there.)

Third, it may be possible to achieve regime change without the United States and its allies having to occupy Iraq, and undertake a protracted and intrusive nation-building effort.

Finally, the United States will require access to bases and facilities of one or more regional Arab allies (or Turkey), so that it could commit substantial land- and sea-based airpower to the effort. Such support will not be forthcoming without a major diplomatic push, and unless the United States can convince its allies that it is serious about regime change and can show them a credible, carefully considered plan.

What is proposed here is not a sure thing; regime change could ultimately require a Desert Storm II. It is not clear, however, that domestic or international opinion would support a Desert Storm II. The plan outlined below, then, is put forth in the spirit that it is better to pay less than more to achieve the same outcome, and imprudent to ignore the very real political and military constraints on U.S. freedom of action, even when pursuing key U.S. policy objectives.

The Plan

THE SUCCESS of regime change in Iraq will hinge largely on the ability of the United States to harness the potential inherent in four principal policy levers that it holds, but has hitherto failed to effectively employ in concert: 1) military action; 2) psychological operations and propaganda; 3) economic pressure; and 4) support for the opposition. None of these alone can reliably overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein; taken together, however, synergy among them could create the necessary conditions for a coup or popular uprising that could sweep the Ba'ath from power. Let us take these four elements one by one.

I. Military Action

THE MAIN obstacle to overthrowing the Ba'athi regime is not a lack of desire among Iraqis to get rid of it, but the efficacy of the regime's internal security apparatus and the extraordinary measures taken by Saddam Hussein to ensure his own survival. These security organs include the Presidential bodyguard, the Special Security Organization (SSO), the Special Republican Guard (SRG, a division-sized force located mainly in and around Baghdad), Saddam's Commandos, and the three Republican Guard (RG) armored divisions ringing Baghdad.

Nearly every coup attempt originating inside or outside the country in the past three decades has been compromised beforehand or nipped in the bud. Likewise, the regime succeeded in putting down the 1991 uprising following Operation Desert Storm--the most serious challenge to Ba'athi rule to date--and it has put down several minor outbreaks of violence since then (in Ramadi in May-June 1995 and in Basra in March 1999). The bottom line is that as long as the internal security apparatus remains loyal, intact and alert, coup attempts and uprisings are likely to fail. Consequently, U.S. air strikes that land damaging blows to these organizations and thereby disrupt their functioning are a sine qua non for a successful coup or uprising. Recognition of this fact has thus far been missing from U.S. policy.

An air campaign that visits grievous injury upon these security organizations, and that immobilizes them for at least several days, could compromise the survival of the regime. By forcing the units that form the main pillar of Saddam's rule to disperse and lay low, a U.S. air campaign could create a window of opportunity for a successful coup or uprising (though each would require different targeting strategies). This concept is not founded on blind faith in the promise of airpower, for it does not require airpower to do anything that it has not already done in previous wars (e.g., force static ground forces to disperse, and interdict them when they move).

In going after the regime's security apparatus, the United States should strike only essential targets, dealing concentrated blows against the Special Republican Guard, Special Security Organization and the Republican Guard. It should avoid the temptation of using the opportunity to hit other target sets (e.g., conventional military units or WMD-related facilities) that could dilute the impact of its effort. Because the United States pays a political price every time it uses force against Baghdad--even in a post-September 11 environment--the United States must not squander prestige, political capital, and a rare opportunity to achieve key objectives by diffusing its efforts.

Even were such an air campaign not to achieve its primary goal of regime change, it would still weaken Iraq's military capabilities and shake the confidence of the regime, thereby bolstering deterrence and containment. The three RG armored divisions around Baghdad that would be prime targets of such an effort form the backbone of Iraq's conventional military might. And it should be recalled that the four days of strikes of Operation Desert Fox--which targeted some of Saddam's key internal security organizations (the SRG and RG)--shook Baghdad so hard that the regime turned inward for nearly a year and a half afterwards.

There are, of course, major obstacles to pulling off a successful coup or uprising. In either case, success will require extensive planning. The few individuals both willing and able to undertake a coup need to be identified, a candidate from among them recruited and his reliability assessed before such an operation begins, in order to avoid falling victim to Trojan horse-type schemes engineered in Baghdad. Here, members of the Iraqi opposition might help identify potential coup-makers, though their potential contribution must be weighed against the risk of compromising the effort by involving oppositionists who might be incapable of keeping secrets or, worse, who are working for Saddam.

There are also practical obstacles to a successful coup. Assuming that a coup plotter could attract support from fellow officers for his effort without being detected (admittedly, a tall order), the ability of coalition airpower to support such an effort could be limited by various factors. It could prove difficult, for example, to distinguish friendly from hostile units involved in close-in fighting during a coup (though "friendlies" could solve this problem by placing aerial identification panels on their vehicles). Washington has also to consider the possibility that should Saddam learn of such U.S. efforts, he might organize a "coup" against him self in order to cause the United States to call off its air campaign, re-emerging once U.S. forces had returned home. He has, in the past, spoken obliquely of such a ploy.² Some skeptics may worry, too, that by supporting potential coup-makers, the United States will be tainting them as American stooges and thus doom them to failure. Such risks could be mitig ated if the United States were initially to adopt a positive, yet somewhat detached stance toward a new government, allowing the latter to define the parameters of a new relationship with Washington.

Clearly, organizing a successful coup will be difficult. Sparking an uprising would not be easy either, but it is not unprecedented. The 1991 uprising was a direct consequence of Iraq's defeat in Operation Desert Storm. Because it was unexpected and spontaneous in its origins, it has been passed off as a one time event--a missed opportunity never again to be repeated.³ This need not, however, be the case. Several factors contributed to the 1991 uprising:

* pent-up hatred caused by decades of domestic repression, economic hardship (due to the Iran-Iraq War), and the regime's ruinous military adventures;

* the lopsided coalition victory in Desert Storm, which undermined Saddam's image of invincibility and caused many Iraqis to momentarily lose their fear of the regime;

* the disintegration of Iraq's army, which freed large numbers of retreating soldiers--many still armed--from the strictures of military discipline and the watchful eyes of the security services, enabling them to serve as a catalyst for the uprising;

* the defeat in Desert Storm, which paralyzed the regime's supporters with fear, while the disarray and confusion caused by the air campaign limited the ability of the regime's internal security apparatus to follow and respond to events;

* the belief that the United States would provide military support to an uprising, which encouraged and emboldened the rebels.

While it may not be possible to replicate all these conditions today, the United States could recreate some of them. A concerted air campaign against the main pillars of the regime could undermine Saddam's image of invincibility, shake the confidence of his supporters, cause disarray in the ranks of the security services, and embolden its enemies to seize the day. Much would depend on the perception in Iraq that the United States is serious about removing the Ba'athi regime. In light of its mixed track record, producing the necessary perception will not be easy, though an air campaign that focuses on regime targets could rapidly alter popular Iraqi estimations of American resolve. The opposition could play a role in exploiting such altered perceptions and expectations; in accordance with prior plans, oppositionists in southern Iraq (including members of the external opposition inserted into Iraq beforehand to organize such efforts) could engage in acts of sabotage and open rebellion to help spark a wider upr ising during a U.S. air campaign. Likewise, oppositionists outside of Iraq might succeed in convincing commanders of units they are in contact with (either regular military or RG formations) to join in an uprising; the participation of ground units in such an undertaking would greatly enhance the odds of success.

A future attempt to foment a coup or uprising would also benefit from the fact that the United States would be dedicating all available assets toward achieving this goal--whereas past efforts to target Iraq's leadership were unfocused, and not supported by other policy instruments. In Operation Desert Storm, the United States devoted only 260 out of nearly 36,250 strike sorties against "leadership" targets. (Even so, it reportedly came close to killing Saddam Hussein once or twice). American planners at the time, moreover, had only a vague understanding of how the regime's internal security apparatus worked. We have a much better picture today. Finally, these 260 strikes were not carried out in accordance with a detailed concept of how to bring about either a coup or an uprising, and there was no supporting psychological operations (psyops) effort to speak of. Even so, the United States succeeded in fomenting an uprising that might have succeeded in overthrowing the regime had not the United States withheld crucial support for the rebels. Presumably, Washington would not make that same mistake again.

In considering the relative advantages of a coup versus an uprising, policymakers face a conundrum. While a coup offers the possibility of a relatively swift, smooth transition, limited bloodletting, few if any adverse consequences for regional stability, and the possibility of regime change without the use of WMD, it is very hard to do. On the other hand, while an uprising is more "doable" and offers the possibility of fundamental political change in Iraq, it carries several major liabilities, including the possibility of a messy denouement that leads to chaos, massive bloodletting, or the use of chemical or biological weapons against the rebels and America's allies in the region. The risks associated with these outcomes, however, are still less daunting than those associated with the survival of the present regime: a revanchist Iraq armed with biological and nuclear weapons, perhaps provoking another regional war.

II. Psyops and Propaganda Activities

PSYOPS AND propaganda activities that aim to diminish Saddam in the eyes of his supporters, exacerbate existing strains between his inner circle and the military, stir up popular discontent, and embolden opponents of the regime are a crucial component of any policy that seeks regime change in Baghdad. Such efforts could keep Saddam on the defensive and create an atmosphere of crisis and tension, forcing the regime to divert assets to deal with internal security, and leaving fewer resources available for clandestine technology procurement or trouble-making elsewhere. Such efforts could transform the psychological environment in the country; creating an atmosphere in which a coup or uprising might occur.

Saddam understands this well. He devotes enormous energy to efforts that make him appear larger than life and invest him with an aura of invincibility. This explains the huge posters and murals of Saddam found everywhere in Iraq. The importance Saddam attaches to the psychological dimension can be gauged from a speech he delivered to senior Ba'ath officials from Basra in June 1999 in which he exhorted them to "strive to defeat the enemy's plans" and to "stand firm in the face of the influence of hostile media and information", which has an "influence bigger than that of bombs."⁴ Saddam realizes that psychological domination of his subjects is the key to their physical subjugation, and that losing the propaganda and psychological warfare battle could threaten his regime.

For this reason, the United States should support opposition radio and television propaganda efforts that seek to diminish Saddam through ridicule, and by planting doubts and raising questions about the stability of his rule and the long-term prospects of his regime. Such propaganda--especially on the eve of a crisis or in tandem with U.S. military action against Saddam's internal security organizations--could help undermine his carefully cultivated image of omnipotence and erode the climate of extreme fear that paralyzes his opponents. It could help create--at least briefly--the necessary conditions for a coup or an uprising.

Relations between Saddam and the military have never been warm. Saddam distrusts the military and has consolidated his control over them by fear. Moreover, the army quietly resents his interference in military affairs, and many officers are bitter at the ruinous impact that his rule has had on the country and its armed forces. American propaganda should play on this distrust and resentment, emphasizing the risks incurred by the armed forces as a result of continued Ba'athi rule. Such propaganda, along with the adoption of more aggressive rules of engagement for coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones (e.g., allowing them to strike Iraqi ground forces, especially RG units), might encourage members of the armed forces to turn on the regime if given the opportunity to do so.

Finally, Washington needs to rebuild its credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people. In particular, it needs to convince them that it is serious about removing the Ba'athi regime. Average Iraqis are unlikely to join another uprising if they believe that the United States will once again abandon them in midstream. The way to do this is by speaking out against human rights violations by Baghdad, supporting the opposition (the INC as well as other groups), and most importantly, by using massive force against regime targets. The bombing of organizations responsible for repressing the Iraqi people and ensuring the survival of the regime would be the most effective way to convince Iraqis that the United States is serious about ridding Iraq of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

III. Intensified Economic Pressure

SANCTIONS ARE a crucial component of containment: they prevent Iraq from rebuilding its conventional military capabilities and recouping much of the political and economic clout it enjoyed before the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, Baghdad has been able to generate a stream of unsupervised income through illicit oil sales to Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran, and by manipulating the "oil for food" program. The amount earned through smuggling amounts to $ 1-2 billion a year (depending on oil prices)--sums that Saddam uses to assure the loyalty of his largely Sunni Arab power base and to insulate them from the effects of sanctions. Intensified efforts to reduce the flow of unsupervised oil income in order to reduce the amount of money Saddam can disburse to his power base might make some of them more receptive to regime change.

In modern Iraq, conflicts among members of the regime's inner circle and popular political unrest have often had an economic dimension: the 1920 nationalist revolt against the British; the tribal rebellions of 1935-36; fighting since 1994 among the two main Kurdish opposition groups; and the defection of Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamil in 1995 were all at least partly due to struggles over money, land or other material assets. The potential role of economic pressures in contributing to political unrest should not be underestimated, and should be exploited to the utmost.

It has proven difficult to stop unsupervised oil sales. America's Kurdish friends and Turkish and Jordanian allies all benefit from the illicit oil trade, and none of the Arab Gulf states is yet willing to supplant Iraq as Jordan's main source of oil (many still harbor grudges over Jordan's position during the Gulf War). U.S. efforts in the spring of 2001 to rally UN support for a new Security Council resolution that would have reduced illegal oil sales failed when they came up against the threat of a Russian veto. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the post-September 11 situation is different, though this proposition needs to be tested. Should political efforts to tighten the economic noose on the regime fail, the United States retains the option of bombing Iraqi oil pumping terminals near the border with Syria and in the south, in order to reduce Iraq's oil income and pave the way for regime change.

IV. Support for the Opposition

SUPPORT FOR opponents of the regime is one of the most tangible expressions of America's commitment to regime change in Baghdad. Such support--including tangible assistance for opposition political and military activities--could lay to rest the widespread perception in parts of the Arab world that the United States really wants Saddam to remain in power.

The external opposition also has other potentially important roles to play in achieving regime change. As noted above, they could identify and vet potential coup makers, or army officers who might commit their units in support of an uprising. Moreover, oppositionists with paramilitary training might be inserted into the country by the United States to catalyze and coordinate an uprising with the help of U.S. advisors outside of Iraq, with whom they would be in radio contact. (The lack of an ability to communicate and coordinate between different regions and cities was a key weakness of the 1991 uprising.) They could videotape images of rebellion, to be beamed around the world by satellite television in order to mobilize international support for a nascent uprising. Under certain circumstances, opposition military personnel could also be used to direct U.S. air strikes against regime forces, and perhaps to coordinate the airdrop of light arms to rebels.

Implementation of the approach to the opposition described here need not await the creation of a large, well-trained, well-equipped insurgent organization--which could take years to accomplish. Rather, the role that the external opposition might play in the event of an uprising could be filled by a relatively small number of highly motivated individuals who could be recruited and trained in a matter of weeks or a few months at most.

Ensuring an Acceptable Outcome

HOW CAN Washington be sure that a coup or an uprising will bring to power a more acceptable government in Baghdad? It can't. While it can shape the environment and help create the circumstances that might lead to a coup or an uprising, Washington will have but modest influence over the potentially messy, unpredictable, and probably violent process of regime change. Moreover, as suggested above, even under the best of conditions, a coup attempt or an uprising could prompt Baghdad to use chemical or biological weapons against its domestic enemies and those neighboring states associated with the United States. A subtle public diplomacy is required to ensure that the ultimate objective of the U.S. campaign remains ambiguous, so that Saddam does not recognize the existential threat to his regime until it is too late. But success at that cannot be guaranteed, so coalition airpower must be ready to conduct secondary strikes on nonconventional weapons stocks and associated delivery systems should they be deployed in preparation for use. This will require timely and accurate intelligence, and the ability to exploit it in real time. This is a very demanding requirement.

Such uncertainties and requirements, however, must be faced. Should Saddam or an equally vicious successor (probably one of his two sons) acquire nuclear weapons, all bets are off. The United States would likely face determined regional opposition for even a limited air campaign against a nuclear Iraq. Nor would the United States lightly incur such a risk to its troops in the region, let alone against the U.S. homeland. An Iraqi nuclear breakout would probably sound the death knell for U.S. efforts to achieve regime change in Baghdad. It is thus imperative that the United States overthrow Saddam Hussein before an Iraqi nuclear breakout renders such an option untenable.

One of those uncertainties is that the outcome of a coup or uprising may lead to a military government not all that much different from Iraq's current government. Even with Saddam and his sons out of the picture, an Iraqi military regime could desire nonconventional weapons and even the inclusion of Kuwait as Iraq's 19th province. Alternatively, an uprising that succeeds in installing a regime dominated by Shi'a, or that fails and results in the mass slaughter of Shi'a, could stir unrest among Shi'a communities elsewhere in the region. An uprising, too, runs a risk of inadvertently producing a loss of central government control, perhaps even chaos, in large parts of Iraq. But it is hard to see how either would pose more of a threat to Iraq's neighbors or to the United States than continued Ba'athi rule under the looming shadow of biological and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the collapse of central government control in Iraq is unlikely to adversely affect the stability of neighboring states. The one neighbor that stands to be most affected-Turkey--has been effectively dealing with the consequences of a lack of central government control in northern Iraq for a decade already. The most likely consequence of a collapse of central government control in Iraq is the emergence of regional warlords, and competition among neighboring states for influence among them. In other words, Iraq is more likely to implode than to explode. While certainly not a desirable outcome, and not an outcome that U.S. policy should seek, the implosion of Iraq would not necessarily be a disaster for the Iraqi people, the region or for core U.S. interests. Even the continued extraction and export of Iraqi oil might not be much affected, since a number of its major oil fields are located in the far north and south of the country, in regions that could be seized by pro-Western Kurdish factions or U.S. forces now in Kuwait.

Although Washington might not be able to decisively influence the process of regime change once started, it would have some influence over a new government, which it could use to bring Baghdad to accept relevant UN resolutions related to disarmament, Kuwait's borders and terrorism. Progress toward compliance on these issues should remain a precondition for an end to sanctions. The United States should also underscore its readiness to build a new relationship with a post-Saddam Iraq, to include very generous assistance with debt relief and reconstruction.

BEFORE September 11, U.S. policymakers would have been hard-pressed to justify significant military action against Iraq without a major provocation. In the wake of September 11, it should be clear that America can no longer afford to ignore the danger posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and that is true regardless of Iraq's association, or lack thereof, with the events of September 11. But if Washington is to use force against Iraq, it should do so not just to punish, degrade capabilities, or deter. Rather, it should aim for regime change. Were such an effort to fail, it would still result in the diminution of Iraq's military capabilities and likely have the effect of deterring future aggression. Even that lesser outcome would help bolster a faltering containment regime.

The approach outlined here involves daunting risks and challenges. But, again, the risks of further delaying a serious effort at regime change are even greater, particularly because the passage of time increases the possibility that Baghdad might acquire more advanced biological arms or nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Bush Administration should focus now on forging a serious, long-term strategy for regime change in Iraq, despite the formidable risks and challenges involved. For if ridding Iraq of the regime of Saddam Hussein will be difficult, experience has shown that living with it will be even more so..

1 For more on the shortcomings of containment, see Ofra Bengio's analysis just above.

2 In December 1991, in a speech to senior military officers, Saddam mocked reports of a coup in Iraq appearing in the foreign press at the time by sarcastically asking his commanders: "They are talking every day about an expected military coup in Iraq ... [and] how to help the coupists.... We need people among you to prepare for a military coup, in which I will take part, so that the West may feel pleased. Nothing remains except that we, you and I, arrange a military coup. Let us write down the names of those who wish to join us in staging such a coup." INA, December 14, 1991, in FBIS-NE.5-91-241, December 16, 1991, p. 36.

3 The 1991 uprising erupted spontaneously amid the confusion and tumult of post-war southern Iraq. According to one account, the uprising started when soldiers returning from the front turned their guns on portraits of Saddam in downtown Basra, thereby breaking the barrier of fear that had heretofore paralyzed opponents of the regime, and prompting a mixed mob of soldiers and civilians to storm the offices of the Ba'ath party and the intelligence services there. The unrest spread quickly through much of the south. The Kurds in northern Iraq--watching developments in the south and sensing a perhaps unique opportunity to shake off central government control--joined the uprising, implementing a plan they had prepared for just such an eventuality. However, operational coordination during the uprising between the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north was practically nonexistent.

4 A1-Hayat, June 18, 1999, p. 2.

Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy