THE UNITED States has an important national interest in strengthening relations with India and making it a strategic partner in the 21st century. But efforts to cement ties with India should not be pursued in a way that undermines a U.S. national interest of equal or arguably greater importance: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has made precisely that mistake in the nuclear deal reached this past summer during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington.

In the joint statement released on July 18, India agreed to take several steps to demonstrate its commitment to being a responsible nuclear power and supporter of non-proliferation goals. In exchange, the administration agreed to seek changes in U.S. law and multilateral commitments to permit exports of nuclear equipment and technology to India--a radical departure from longstanding legal obligations and policies that precluded nuclear cooperation with states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Administration officials have claimed that by aligning India more closely with the policies and practices of the international non-proliferation regime, the deal achieves a net gain for non-proliferation. Several of the steps pledged by India are simply reaffirmations of existing positions--for example, continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing, strengthening export controls and supporting negotiations on a multilateral fissile-material cutoff treaty. Some other steps are indeed new and useful. Among these are the commitments to place civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess them.

Still, the non-proliferation gains of the deal are meager compared to the major damage to non-proliferation goals that will result if the deal goes forward as it currently stands.

The U.S.-Indian deal would make it harder to achieve key Bush Administration non-proliferation initiatives. The United States is now asking the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to permit nuclear cooperation only with countries that adhere to the IAEA's Additional Protocol and to ban transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess fuel-cycle facilities. But getting NSG partners to tighten the rules in ways favored by the United States will be an uphill battle if they are also being asked to bend one of their cardinal rules (that is, no nuclear trade with non-parties to the NPT) because it no longer suits the United States.

By seeking an exception to the rules to accommodate America's new friendship with India, the deal reinforces the impression that the U.S. approach to non-proliferation has become selective and self-serving, not consistent and principled. Rules the United States initiated and championed would be perceived as less binding and more optional. Countries with good relations with Washington may conclude that the United States will tolerate and eventually accommodate a decision to acquire nuclear weapons, while China and Russia may feel less inhibited about engaging in nuclear cooperation with "special friends" of their own that the United States might find risky and objectionable.

The nuclear deal in its present form has produced resentment on the part of close U.S. partners like Japan, Germany and Brazil who were forced to choose between nuclear weapons and civil nuclear cooperation. They chose the latter, giving up the weapons option and joining the NPT to realize the benefits of nuclear cooperation. Now that India has been offered the opportunity to have its cake and eat it too, many non-nuclear NPT parties feel let down. Not wishing to harm relations with either India or the United States, they are unlikely to make a public fuss over the sudden reversal of U.S. policy (on which they were not consulted). But they will be less inclined in the future to make additional sacrifices in the name of non-proliferation.

Moreover, U.S. plans to engage in nuclear cooperation with India will make it more difficult to address proliferation challenges such as Iran. Of course, Iran's interest in nuclear weapons long predated the India deal. But the deal has strengthened the case Iran can make internationally. Why, Iranian officials have asked publicly, should Iran give up its right as an NPT party to an enrichment capability when India, a non-party to the NPT, can keep even its nuclear weapons and still benefit from nuclear cooperation?

In general, the Bush Administration's policy shift conveys the impression that the United States--the country to which the world has always looked as the leader in the global fight against proliferation--is now de-emphasizing non-proliferation and giving it a back seat to other foreign policy goals. Other countries can be expected to follow suit in assigning non-proliferation a lower priority relative to political and commercial considerations in their international dealings, and this will have negative long-term consequences for the international non-proliferation regime.

THE DAMAGE can be minimized--and the deal transformed from a net non-proliferation loss to a net non-proliferation gain--if several improvements are made in the course of implementing the July 18 joint statement (whether by the U.S. Congress in adopting new legislation, by the governments of India and the United States themselves, by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in modifying its guidelines or by a combination of these).

The most important improvement would be an Indian decision to stop producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. India need not stop such production unilaterally, but as part of a multilateral moratorium pending completion of an international fissile-material cutoff treaty. A multilateral production halt would make a major contribution to fighting nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism by capping stocks of bomb-making materials worldwide, thereby making those stocks easier to secure against theft or seizure.

Without a moratorium on fissile-material production, the U.S.-Indian deal could actually facilitate the growth of India's nuclear weapons capability. India's indigenous uranium supplies are quite limited. Under current non-proliferation rules--with India unable to buy natural uranium on the world market--India must use those limited supplies for both civil power generation and nuclear weapons, and the trade-off will become increasingly painful. Under the new rules, India could satisfy the needs of the civil program through imports, freeing up domestic uranium supplies for the weapons program and permitting, if the Indian government so decided, a continuing and even major increase in bomb-making material. A production moratorium would preclude such an increase.

Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in July that India "is willing to assume the same responsibilities and practices--no more and no less--as other nuclear states." It so happens that the five original nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, France, the UK and China) have all stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Applying the "no more, no less" standard, it would be reasonable to ask India to join the others. India claims that it seeks only a "credible minimum deterrent capability." If that is the case, then perhaps it can soon decide that it has sufficient plutonium for its deterrence needs and can afford to forgo further production.

ANOTHER WAY to strengthen the July 18 agreement would be for India to assume a more active and constructive role in helping the United States address today's most acute proliferation challenges, especially the challenge posed by Iran. Given its desire to make Iran a long-term source of energy supplies, India has been reluctant to press Iran on its nuclear program. During a September visit to Tehran, Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh made public remarks supportive of Iran's position on the nuclear issue and critical of the approach taken by the United States. The remarks produced a sharp backlash from members of Congress across the political spectrum, including several strong supporters of India, who made clear that India's failure to side with the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue would jeopardize congressional support for the legislative changes needed to implement the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal.

In response to these congressional warnings and tough messages conveyed in person by President Bush and Secretary Rice to their Indian counterparts, the Indians on September 24 joined the United States and Europeans in voting yes on an IAEA board resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations but deferred the matter of when and how the Iran question should be referred to the United Nations Security Council. This was a positive step but not yet an indication that India is prepared to use its influence in a sustained and determined way to get Iran to abandon its plans for an enrichment facility capable of producing both fuel for civil nuclear reactors and fissile material for nuclear bombs. Indeed, since the IAEA vote, the Indians have sought to mollify the Iranians, stating that they had acted in Iran's interest by persuading the Europeans to back down from seeking an immediate referral to the Security Council. The key test in the months ahead will be whether India makes a real effort to persuade Iran to forgo an enrichment capability and whether it eventually supports referral to the Security Council, which is required by IAEA statute after a board finding of non-compliance.

The risks of the nuclear deal could also be reduced by preserving some distinction between NPT parties and non-parties in terms of the nuclear exports they would be permitted to receive. A long-standing element of the non-proliferation regime has been the "NPT preference policy"--giving NPT parties benefits in the civil nuclear energy area not available to those outside the NPT. The July 18 joint statement undermines that policy by calling for "full" nuclear cooperation with India. A way of maintaining some preferential treatment for NPT parties would be to modify U.S. law and the NSG guidelines to permit nuclear-related exports to non-parties except equipment, materials or technologies related to sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, including enrichment, reprocessing and heavy-water production. Such a distinction would permit India to acquire natural uranium, enriched fuel, nuclear reactors and a wide range of other nuclear items, but it would retain the ban on transfers of those items that are most closely related to a nuclear weapons program.

Non-proliferation risks could also be reduced by implementing the nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not as a special exception to the rules for India alone. Although the administration has been slow to indicate how specifically it would seek to adjust U.S. law and NSG guidelines, it has suggested that one option would be to leave the general rules in place but waive their application in the special case of India because of its qualifications as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology." A problem with that option is that it would accentuate concerns that the United States is acting selectively on the basis of foreign policy considerations rather than on the basis of objective factors related to non-proliferation performance. Moreover, in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where changing the guidelines requires a consensus, some countries--notably China--might well resist a country-specific approach and press for permitting nuclear cooperation with other non-parties to the NPT with whom they are friendly--notably, Pakistan.

To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific exception without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is clearly not yet merited, the administration should propose modifications of U.S. law and the NSG guidelines that would permit nuclear cooperation (except in sensitive parts of the fuel cycle) with any state not party to the NPT that meets certain standards of responsible nuclear behavior. To avoid creating an incentive for countries to withdraw from the NPT, the modified rules should apply only to countries that were outside the NPT as of a specified date, which should be chosen to exclude North Korea and include only India, Pakistan and Israel. For such non-NPT states to be eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports under a revised U.S. law, the president should be required to certify that the state fulfill several criteria of responsible nuclear behavior.

First, the state must provide public assurances that it will not test nuclear weapons or produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Second, it must show that it has placed its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, including all nuclear reactors and R & D facilities related to electricity generation. Third, the state must play an active and constructive role in helping address acute nuclear proliferation challenges posed by states of proliferation concern. Fourth, it must establish and rigorously implement a national export-control system that meets the highest international standards, including stringent rules and procedures banning unauthorized contacts and cooperation by personnel with nuclear expertise. Fifth, it must work actively on its own and in cooperation with other countries to stop illicit nuclear transactions and eliminate illicit nuclear commercial networks, including fully sharing the results of any investigations of illicit nuclear activities. Sixth, the state must also apply physical protection, control and accountancy measures that meet the highest international standards to any nuclear weapons and to all sensitive nuclear materials and installations, both military and civilian, on its territory.

These criteria could be written into U.S. law. They could also be adopted by the NSG as criteria for deciding, by consensus, whether a particular non-party to the NPT should be eligible for nuclear transfers from NSG member states. While such an approach would be country neutral, it would enable both the U.S. government and NSG members to distinguish among the non-parties to the NPT in terms of whether--and how soon--they would be eligible for nuclear cooperation.

STAUNCH SUPPORTERS of the NPT can be expected to argue that these criteria do not go far enough--and that only NPT adherence should make a country eligible for nuclear cooperation. But it is unrealistic to expect India or the other non-parties ever to join the NPT, given their longstanding positions. Continuing to insist on adherence as a condition for nuclear cooperation could forfeit the contribution to non-proliferation that steps short of NPT adherence could make.

Those who strongly support the July 18 joint statement can be expected to argue that the criteria are too demanding and could result in India's walking away from the nuclear deal. But even the most demanding criterion--ending fissile-material production--is a step India supports in principle and says it is willing to take when its minimum deterrence needs are satisfied. If India is prepared to stop production now, it could readily meet the remaining criteria. If not, the door would be open for India to walk through at a time of its own choosing. This would be a major change from the status quo that has prevailed for decades, in which the door to nuclear cooperation for India and the other non-parties has been locked as a matter of law and policy.

In its ardent desire to transform U.S.-Indian relations, the Bush Administration has given too little weight to the damaging implications of its actions for the non-proliferation regime. The remedy should not be to reject the deal struck in July but to require that it be pursued in a way that enables the United States to advance its strategic goals with India as well as its non-proliferation interests--not to serve one at the expense of the other.

Robert J. Einhorn, currently a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation from 1999to 2001.