THESE DAYS, news reports from Latin America suggest that citizens throughout the hemisphere are fuming with anti-capitalist and anti-American rage. The recent elections of leftist presidents in Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, as well as the fulminations of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, are cited as evidence that the region has turned against Washington's "hegemony", including its despised and failed free market policies.

Are these impressions correct? Did the economic and political reforms undertaken during the 1990s impoverish Latin Americans, and is there a rising tide of anti-Americanism that jeopardizes the U.S. relationship with Latin America?

Assessing the Washington Consensus

WHILE THE term "Washington Consensus" has been misused and co-opted to the point of meaninglessness, it is important to recall that in its initial incarnation it represented the understanding that newly democratized governments needed to pursue economic reform to secure hard-won freedoms. In Latin America, this meant, in part, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, macroeconomic reform with an eye to controlling inflation, and trade and price liberalization.

We forget that by the end of the 1980s, Latin America was dangerously close to economic implosion from hyperinflation, negative growth, high unemployment and crushing foreign debt payments. In contrast, today's Latin America is much healthier without rampant inflation, uncontrolled fiscal profligacy and the other economic ailments that plagued the region during the "lost decade" of the 1980s.

No one should have expected the Washington Consensus would act as a magic pill that Latin America could swallow to alleviate centuries of economic instability; wrenching poverty and inequality still beset the region. But the frustrating persistence of poverty does not negate the success of these reforms.

Perhaps no country in Latin America is more closely associated with the alleged failures of the Washington Consensus than Bolivia. Indeed, Bolivia has become the poster child for everything wrong with "U.S.-backed" economic reforms. The international press zooms in on colorful anti-globalization protests and riots, ignoring the fact that before liberalization began Bolivia's average real GDP growth rate was negative. During the height of the reforms, the GDP growth rate was 4 percent, and hyperinflation was eliminated. In the past five years, Bolivia's growth has averaged about 2.5 percent--a growth rate certainly inadequate to meet the country's pressing socio-economic needs but nevertheless a vast improvement. Bolivia's "much improved, much improvement needed" situation echoes the regional reality, too.

Latin America's economic growth has not been nearly adequate to keep up with the region's pressing social agenda. Weak government institutions and weak rule of law hinder sustained economic development. Citizens often have little faith in their elected leaders. As a result, the region is stymied at times by a vicious cycle of voter apathy, poor public institutions, anemic economic activity and continued social unease.

But the most encouraging sign is that Latin Americans seem predisposed to solve social and economic problems via the ballot box. Popular dissatisfaction with the pace or outcome of reforms has not lead to revolutions or coups d'etat. Increasingly, democracy has become the only game in town in Latin America. Over the past several years, there have been several instances where threats to democratic rule have been resolved (some more effectively and permanently than others) through constitutional means. Guatemala in 1993, Paraguay in 1997, and, more recently, Bolivia and Ecuador (repeatedly) are but some examples.

One major step toward the maturation of democracy is the electoral success of the democratic Left. In the immediate aftermath of the democratic opening, conservatives won presidential elections in most countries. More recently, leaders such as Argentina's Nestor Kirchner, Uruguay's TabarŽ V‡squez, Chile's Ricardo Lagos and Brazil's Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (or Lula, as he is known) have come to power, ending the conservative monopoly.

Yet, while these leftist leaders hold unquestionably different ideological perspectives from their more conservative predecessors, their performance in office has usually been far from radical. Many observers expected them to govern in a radical manner, but these left-leaning governments of the region have, even with their social agendas, continued on the general path of economic reform set out during the 1990s. This is the "pothole" theory, whereby utopians or revolutionaries often become more pragmatic when faced with practical governing challenges. It's telling that the current leftist presidents have dyed-in-the-wool, pro-liberalization ministers running their finance ministries. Were Lula to shave his beard, he and his economic policies would be almost indistinguishable from his more neo-liberal predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

These new leftist governments recognize that supporters voted for them to lead their governments toward more responsible and humane policies, not down a previously traveled path to the dark past. They understand that, while imperfect, the Washington Consensus path is part of the solution to, not the cause of, Latin America's ills.

In Brazil, Lula does not blindly follow in the footsteps of his predecessor as he navigates the tightrope between his social agenda and the austere financial measures needed for macroeconomic stability. His balancing act has no doubt angered former supporters who accuse him of selling out Brazil's poor for the favors of Washington and Wall Street. Yet Brazil is currently enjoying a much more sustainable period of economic expansion than experienced under Cardoso, which should allow Lula more flexibility for progress on the social front in the future. While it is unbelievably difficult, Lula's efforts demonstrate that a social agenda and economic reform are not incompatible.

There is a consensus between the Right and the Left about the success of the Chilean model as a fascinating example of a surprisingly stable and lasting combination of economic reform, deepened democracy and gains in the social arena. In the 1970s and 1980s, Augusto Pinochet's military government imposed the liberal economic model that remains the foundation for Chile's current economic stability and dynamism. Yet, since the transition to democracy in the late 1980s, a series of governments have worked to "humanize" Chile's economic model in order to address what is still a glaring deficiency on the social side.

This "social liberalism" has continued under President Lagos, someone who well knows that returning to the quixotic policies of the Marxist former President Salvador Allende is neither practical nor appealing. For Lagos, old-school populism is not a painless way to utopia. Instead, social and institutional gains must be made within the framework of an economy marked by fiscal and monetary stability. Lagos's policies model how liberal economics and an aggressive social agenda can help deepen democracy's roots and give citizens a stake in their society. Chileans now talk with justifiable pride about virtually eliminating severe poverty within the next few decades; given the way that its socio-economic indicators are tracking, the country may be the first in Latin America to be considered a fully developed economy.

The Chavez Factor

STILL, THERE are other developments in the region that are of serious concern. Hugo Chavez's "Bolivarian Revolution" is often cited as the most effective and popular counterweight to a "U.S.-imposed" order in Latin America. Chavez's rhetorical flair and focus on social issues is thus welcomed as a long overdue contrast to the orthodox policies peddled by Washington and its "surrogates" in the international financial community.

Elected in 1998 at a time when the price of oil was barely into double digits, Chavez has subsequently used his swollen oil revenues to support his "revolutionary" political agenda at home and in the region. Similar to its first cousin, "Fidelismo", "Chavismo" represents both rhetorical panache and active policies fashioned as an aggressive alternative to the alleged Yankee-imposed neo-liberal model.

In April 2002 the Bush Administration severely damaged its credibility on the democracy question when it failed to immediately condemn the coup attempt against Chavez. Since this time, Washington tried a policy of "watch what he does, not what he says", but this approach has been abandoned over concerns about Chavez's increasing efforts to tighten his grip domestically and promote regional instability.

There is no question that Chavez has tapped into latent public frustration with ineffective and unresponsive governments and chronic unemployment and inequality--mostly inside Venezuela but also regionally. In April a faction of Argentine piqueteros (protestors) announced that it was joining as "volunteers of the civil force that in Venezuela is defending the Bolivarian Revolution."

But Chavez's bark is much stronger than his bite in terms of fomenting any sort of viable region-wide Bolivarian movement. Witness the vituperative reaction of many Bolivian citizens in June of this year to his verbal support for groups calling for the removal of their then-President Mesa. Protestors were ultimately able to pressure Mesa to resign, but if anything, some of the more radical elements in Bolivia were weakened by the suspicion that they were doing Chavez's bidding. Many Bolivian citizens are visibly frustrated with their political and economic situation, but few see Hugo Chavez or his revolution as a viable alternative to democracy, however weak or unresponsive democracy may be.

Examining Chavez's rhetoric and actions illustrates why he has garnered so little regional support. His rhetoric on his weekly television show, Hello, Mr. President, tends to echo Marxist guerrillas in Colombia and Fidel Castro in Cuba. While Chavez's policies are not identical to those held by Colombian guerrillas or Castro, the ideological cohesion is undeniable. Chavez increasingly governs with the Castro playbook, supporting undemocratic movements throughout the region, while clamping down on civil liberties and promoting a zero-sum populist agenda at home.

Paradoxically, some observers are so eager to embrace the Bolivarian Revolution as the real deal, an authentic and preferable response to what they perceive as savage U.S. imperialism and global capitalism, that they are willing to overlook Chavez's militarization of Venezuela and his attacks on democracy and civil rights. These are the same individuals who were first to condemn abuses in countries such as Pinochet's Chile or Fujimori's Peru. But the fact that Chavez is providing the country's many desperate citizens with more handouts and educational opportunities is not sufficient grounds for ignoring increasingly gross abuses.

Thus arises the question of Chavez's relationship with the democratic Left. Do these leaders share Chavez's revolutionary vision? Will the memory of the 1970s persecution by right-wing military dictatorships lead leftist presidents to oppose instinctively any serious effort by Chavez to promote the Bolivarian agenda at home and abroad?

Behind the scenes in private bilateral and multilateral settings, these governments often profess their profound concern with Chavez's antics and his ability and desire to challenge the democratic consensus. Yet, too often various Latin American governments indulge Chavez rhetorically in a display of "hemispheric solidarity." As has been the case for decades with Castro, there is often a strong temptation to overlook Chavez's alarming actions so that governments can bolster their "independent" or "non-aligned" bona fides, even if they totally reject such undemocratic practices in their own countries.

The recent case of the controversy over the election of a new secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS) draws out this point. In their efforts to secure the election of Chilean José Miguel Insulza, the Chilean government modified its behavior toward Chavez, knowing full well that he supported Insulza's candidacy and would thus use oil largesse with numerous Caribbean countries to secure their votes for him.

What's more, Latin American governments are all too willing to allow Washington to do the heavy lifting on criticizing Chavez, a "good cop, bad cop" position that invariably leaves Washington on the receiving end of Caracas's ire for meddling in Venezuelan affairs.

The good news is that the democratic Left knows that Chavez's regional influence is antithetical to democracy and stable social reform; they are loathe to see him champion himself as leader of the region's poor. Yet, tacit acceptance of Chavez's antics and rhetoric is a weak way out, with unknown and potentially devastating consequences for democracy in the long run.

Washington Ignores Latin America?

IT IS COMMON to hear that the Bush Administration is ignoring the region; distracted by its military and political efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and its policies in China, the thinking goes, an apathetic Washington has turned a blind eye to Latin America at the very time when the region is in the throes of instability.

There is no question that many critical global issues take priority over much of the Western Hemisphere agenda, but given Washington's historic relationship with its Latin American neighbors, perhaps a little bit of distance between Washington and Latin America is not such a bad thing.

Of course, what is interesting about any sort of interventionist approaches toward Latin America is that they often backfire. Take, for example, Bolivia's 2002 presidential election when the U.S. ambassador publicly commented that the United States would cut assistance if voters elected indigenous candidate Evo Morales. The comments sparked a meteoric rise in Morales's support, vaulting him to within less than two percentage points of the presidency. Sometimes words and actions can have unintended, deleterious effects, especially given the sensitivity of the region's relationship with the United States. What is needed is a not a non-interventionist policy, but a low-key approach. While Morales now appears poised to win election in December, given the divided vote, his victory would likely not signify majority support from the population.

A number of Latin American governments--especially the leftist ones--are hesitant to be seen as too close to Washington; yet, behind the scenes they are developing increasingly deep and trustful relationships with the United States. The increasingly intimate and direct Lula-Bush dynamic comprises one of the most unexpected and overlooked odd couples in global relations right now. Journalists and other observers love to focus on the more visible rifts in the U.S.-Brazilian relationship, and trade is one area where disagreements abound. But this approach overlooks the frank and constructive ties that continue to grow away from the headlines. Indeed, the bilateral relationship is arguably the strongest in almost fifty years. To take one example, U.S.-Brazilian bilateral cooperation on terrorism and narcotics trafficking is encouraging other nations to become involved in what is undeniably a regional concern.

All of this does not mean, of course, that there are never differences of opinion between Washington and its Latin American counterparts. But even a fair amount of public friction is a sign that relations are increasingly mature and frank, devoid of the paternalism that characterized earlier eras.

Washington can point to Colombia as an example of successful U.S. engagement in the region. Starting under the Clinton Administration in 1999, Washington embarked on an aggressive and costly effort to support Colombia's fragile democracy and eradicate drugs. Known as Plan Colombia, the program first focused on the drug war, but by 2002 the Bush Administration expanded it to help the Colombian government defend its citizens against pernicious narco-insurgencies.

For many, the term "Plan Colombia" quickly became a symbol for U.S. imperialism. Human rights groups and European governments immediately concluded that Plan Colombia would further "militarize" Colombia's domestic conflict. A veritable library of academic work outlined the ills of Plan Colombia, and numerous experts predicted that the United States was blindly heading into another Vietnam.

But once Plan Colombia was being fully implemented in 2002 and 2003, the situation in Colombia improved dramatically. Kidnappings dropped by 60 percent, many key roads are free of insurgent roadblocks and a critical state presence has been established in many parts of the country that until recently were in a state of anarchy or controlled by insurgents. Thousands of judges, prosecutors and criminal investigators are working to bring justice to areas of the country where impunity reigns. Moreover, while controversial in the United States and Europe, U.S. assistance to Colombia is backed by an overwhelming majority of the Colombian people. Plan Colombia did not magically save Colombia, but it did provide vital support to Bogota at a critical and lonely time in its war against narco-terrorists and drug traffickers.

Despite continued eradication failures, the broader Plan Colombia represents a resounding policy success for Washington, one that has enabled Colombians to gain more control of their country and has set the stage for future success. And all of this has been accomplished without sacrificing adherence to human rights principles, as happened at times during the Cold War. For one, aggressive U.S. engagement with the Colombian military has made it less abusive, not more. Colombia is still an extremely violent place where injustice is common, but prolonged support from Washington has made the situation significantly better. Compared to Colombia's even more precarious situation prior to Plan Colombia, human rights and other peace groups should be relatively encouraged about what has occurred over the past few years.

There are some areas where Washington has made critical errors, however. Perhaps the most glaring mistake has been the application of the American Service Members Protection Act (2002), which bans U.S. security assistance and most military cooperation unless a country rejects the International Criminal Court (ICC) or signs a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States. Meant to protect U.S. service personnel from politically motivated prosecution at the ICC, the net result has been that Washington has been cut off from its normal engagement with its Latin American military counterparts.

Training of Latin American officers in U.S. schools has dropped precipitously. What makes this development especially worrisome is that China has moved to fill this void by offering Latin American militaries both training and hardware. And, unlike the United States, China has a "don't ask, don't tell" policy on human rights and civil-military affairs issues.

The Bush Administration's Venezuela and Cuba policies are its most controversial. And there is no question that these policies are far from perfect. In particular, Washington's hesitation in condemning the coup against Chavez severely weakened its credibility on the democracy front. Even more damaging was that the coup episode occurred at a time when Washington was making serious and significant gains on helping push the democracy agenda through hemispheric organizations such as the OAS.

As for Cuba, the Bush Administration's policy is essentially an extension of the same economic embargo and political isolation employed by Washington for the past half century. And there are certainly worse policies than ones intended to expedite the removal of a dictator. Yet the argument is often made that this hard-line policy is ineffective because it provides Castro with a convenient bogey-man with which he can justify his repression. This is likely the case--and the argument that liberalizing our policy toward Cuba might expedite the transition to democracy is a strong one. But, the efficacy of the policies aside, we must not somehow conclude that current Bush policies toward Cuba are particularly radical or represent a departure from previous approaches.

Partnership for Democracy

ALARMIST HEADLINES notwithstanding, Latin America is not on the verge of violent, anti-American revolutions nor has the United States abandoned its backyard. To be sure, leftist leaders at times will keep a healthy distance from certain U.S. policies, but we should not interpret that as a wholesale rejection of market-led economic policies, democracy or general interaction with Washington.

For its part, the United States can help Latin America consolidate its democracy and promote socio-economic development by recognizing that we don't have all the solutions nor are we able to determine outcomes in the region--for better or for worse. But the United States must play a significant supporting role as the region continues to consolidate different degrees of democratic and economic practices. Trade, technical assistance and military training are some of the critical areas where Washington should continue to act as a partner. It is in our national interest to see that democracy flourishes in Latin America under both right-wing and left-wing governments. A strong democratic foundation is necessary if equitable and lasting socio-economic development is finally to thrive.

In the long run, the Castro-Chavez "revolution" will fall under the weight of its own ineptitude and anachronistic authoritarianism. But, in a manner not dissimilar to what President Kennedy preached regarding combating communism in the early 1960s, to make this seductive ideology even less appealing in the short run, democratic governments must show that democracy provides its citizens with both material and political benefits. This will not be easy work, but Washington must continue to be a partner in this process.

Russell Crandall is a professor at Davidson College. His upcoming book is Gunboat Democracy? U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (2006). In 2004 and 2005, supported by the Council on Foreign Relations, he served as director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council. He would like to thank Rebecca Stewart for her assistance with this article.