Exactly fifty years ago, Washington was the scene of what was then
called the Great Debate. The issue in 1951 was the conversion of the
rather spare North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 into a genuine American
military commitment: an integrated military organization under an
American supreme commander and the permanent stationing of U.S.
troops in Europe. Thirty-one years before that, Washington was the
scene of an even more famous Great Debate; the issues in 1920 were
U.S. membership in the League of Nations and a permanent U.S.
security guarantee to Britain and France.

This June, President Bush proposed in a major address in Warsaw that
"Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all
that lie between" be admitted to NATO, with invitations for some to
be issued at the NATO summit to be held in Prague in November 2002.
Although the President did not mention specific countries, it was
taken for granted that he had the three Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania in mind. Other nations that have applied to
become members of NATO and that are being given positive
consideration are Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

The admission of these countries into NATO would entail an extension
and transformation of U.S. military commitments as serious as those
at issue in 1951 and in 1920. But there is little sign thus far of
any Great Debate, just as there was no such debate--except in some
highly cloistered intellectual circles--during the mid- to late-1990s
over the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. This
lack of public political interest is all the more curious given that
great powers traditionally have considered their alliance obligations
and military commitments to be at the heart of their foreign
policies, and that both the First and Second World Wars began because
particular great powers were in fact honoring such commitments. NATO
is supposed to be a military alliance, but there has been almost no
public discussion about the implications of NATO enlargement for its
military strategy. And although there has been much talk about not
drawing a new line that would divide Europe like the old Yalta
agreement did, the whole point of a military alliance is to create an
alignment--that is, to draw a line. Obviously, the line that will be
drawn by round ii of NATO enlargement will be one between Europe and
Russia. Russia has consistently argued that it should be defined as
part of Europe, and it has even proposed that it be admitted into
NATO. Conversely, the United States has referred to almost every
other country in Europe as a prospective member of NATO, but it has
consistently refused to include Russia among them. The line, then, is
bound to remain.

The U.S. refusal to consider NATO membership for Russia is not based
upon a Russian military threat to NATO's prospective new members,
however. In the minds of the U.S. foreign policy leadership, NATO
enlargement is not really about the expansion of a military alliance
but about something else. Its real purpose is to consolidate Europe
into a coherent and integral part of the American vision and version
of world order; it is to make of Europe a solid base and loyal
partner in the worldwide struggle now developing over the grand
American project of globalization. But because NATO nevertheless
remains a military alliance--Article v guarantee and all--its
enlargement will have serious military and strategic consequences.

Globalization is us

For the past decade, the grand project of the United States in world
affairs has been globalization. Indeed, globalization has been so
central to the United States, and the United States has been so
central to world affairs, that it has given its name to the new era
that has succeeded the Cold War; more than anything else, the
contemporary period has been defined as the era of globalization.
Globalization itself has been defined by American leaders as the
spread of free markets, open borders, liberal democracy and the rule
of law--in short, an essentially high-tech Wilsonian world in which
the main elements of democratic peace theory are assumed to be valid.
The Clinton Administration was particularly consistent in promoting
globalization and each of these elements. The Bush Administration has
been less explicit about doing so, but its business wing is pressing
for free markets and open borders, while its neo-conservative wing is
pressing for liberal democracy and the rule of law, at least as they
interpret it.

Most accounts of globalization have assumed that the phenomenon is
indeed global in its scope, or that it will soon become so. This
assumption is mistaken, and the awareness that globalization is not
global, and probably never will be, will itself soon become
widespread.

After a decade of experience with globalization, we can see a greatly
variegated map of the globe, and the reality that it presents is not
a linear and smooth progression, but a lumpy and jagged construction.
It is a pattern of uneven development, uneven acceptance and uneven
resistance. When even the U.S. State Department--one of the most
enthusiastic promoters of globalization--identifies 27 countries
(including such major ones as Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria and
Colombia) that Americans should avoid entirely because of war, crime,
anti-American hostility or simply chaos, it is clear that
globalization's ambit is hardly complete.

Indeed, vast areas of the globe are less integrated into the global
economy and a world order than they were fifty years ago. This is the
case with most of Africa, most of Southwest Asia, an increasing part
of Southeast Asia, and an increasing part of the Andean region of
South America. These four regions add up to a vast realm where
globalization has already failed and where it is highly unlikely to
succeed in the foreseeable future. There has been much talk about
"the African renaissance", "the Islamic resurgence", and "Plan
Colombia", but no one has offered a credible plan or even hope for
turning these regions into stable parts of the global economy and
world order. On the contrary, they have created their own perverse,
underworld version of the global economy consisting of a very
widespread traffic in narcotics, diamonds, weapons and human
beings--all run by global criminal or terrorist organizations.

Furthermore, major powers, in particular China and Russia, have
declared that they oppose the American version of globalization.
China is probably the biggest single winner from the globalization of
the past decade, and Russia may well be the biggest single loser, but
they can agree on one thing: they are not going to be globalized in
the American way. There are also those "rogue states" (or "states of
concern"), especially Iraq and Iran but also Afghanistan and North
Korea, which persist in trying to thwart the American project.

The regions where the American way of globalization is succeeding are
actually rather few, and together they add up to much less than half
the area of the globe and much less than half its population. These
regions include almost all of Europe, much of Latin America, some of
the countries on the periphery of East Asia, and of course Australia
and New Zealand. As it happens, these four regions largely correspond
to the U.S. system of alliances as it existed fifty years ago (NATO,
the OAS, a series of bilateral treaties with Asian countries, and
ANZUS). The extent of "globalization" in 2001 is not that different
from the extent of the "Free World" in 1951.

There is one big difference, of course, and that involves what was
then Eastern Europe--the communist Europe--and what is now once again
central Europe along with eastern Europe--a liberal-democratic and
free-market Europe. This is also the region where the recent round of
NATO expansion occurred and where the second round of expansion is
proposed. It is this difference that links the American way of
globalization with the American proposals for NATO enlargement.

Globalization and America's Europe

It is natural that the United States should want to expand and secure
its new trade and investment relations with central and eastern
Europe. More fundamentally, however, it seeks to consolidate all of
Europe--western, central and eastern--into a secure core of the
American way of globalization. It is crucial that this European core
be integrally joined with the American one (now defined by NAFTA) and
that it accepts American leadership on matters of major importance.

It might seem odd to imagine that Europe will accept American
leadership at a time when much of the European media is criticizing
American policies on issues ranging from the death penalty to global
warming agreements, and when many young Europeans are demonstrating
against globalization. But in truth there is now a vast realm of
Europe that is willingly recreating itself in the American image.
This is especially the case with people engaged in the new
information economy and the technical professions. It is also
especially the case with the peoples of central Europe and the Baltic
states. It is true that many of the peoples there are not
enthusiastic about NATO, especially after its experience with Kosovo,
but they do want to be part of an American alliance, even of
something that would be akin to an American commonwealth. They loathe
the Russians, are suspicious of other Europeans, and are attracted to
the Americans. For these central and east Europeans, it is true today
what was true for many West Europeans fifty years ago: the purpose of
NATO is to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans
down.

At the same time, the United States seeks to influence the economic
and diplomatic policies of European states and to balance the weight
of the European Union within the wider European continent. The
countries of central and eastern Europe are generally less critical
and more accepting of America than those of western Europe, and U.S.
objectives can best be met by advancing the fortunes and status of
the former as a balance to the latter. This would be furthered by the
enlargement of the European Union; but it would be furthered with
even more assurance by the enlargement of NATO. The result of NATO
enlargement would be the consolidation of Europe under American
leadership and its rendering into an embodiment and an expression of
the American way of globalization. The inclusion of the Baltic states
would consolidate this American-led European core up to the frontier
where the American project of globalization meets one of its
principal opponents--Russia. The inclusion of the Balkan states would
consolidate this core up to the frontier where the American project
meets another set of opponents--the rogue states of the Middle East.

NATO Enlargement: A Default Position

What might be the ideal form of organization for this American-led
Europe, which will be characterized by all the goals of
American-style globalization--free markets, open borders, liberal
democracy and the rule of law--all within a security community or
zone of peace? It would actually be some sort of American
Commonwealth of Nations, rather like the British Commonwealth of
Nations of the first half of the 20th century (composed of Britain
and the "dominions" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa). But this is not a practical possibility. The idea of an
American Commonwealth would seem too close to the idea of an American
Empire, and it would be unacceptable to both Europeans and Americans.

There is only one American-led organization for Europe that can have
legitimacy among the major states of Europe, and that is NATO. The
fact that NATO is supposed to be primarily a military alliance makes
it ill-suited for organizing all of the complex relations between
Europe and America, which add up to something actually as dense as an
American Commonwealth. On the other hand, it is because NATO is
supposed to be a military alliance that provides useful military
benefits to the west Europeans that it can remain legitimate while
actually furthering other purposes and performing other functions.
But it is, of course, the construably narrow military character of
NATO, which makes it more legitimate with thewest Europeans, that
makes it illegitimate with the Russians.

An economic organization, in contrast, would very likely be
legitimate to Russia. Russia would agree to the enlargement of the
European Union to include the Baltic and the Balkan nations. This
would not be that different from its earlier agreement to the EU's
admission of Austria, Sweden and Finland, other nations that have
been of strategic concern to Russia but that have never become
members of NATO. The European Union should have taken the lead in
admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary before NATO did, and
it should do the same for the Baltic and the Balkan countries now.
However desirable this would be for international comity, it is
unlikely to happen.

The admission of new members into NATO, even though they are weak
militarily, does not entail any immediate and substantial costs for
the existing members; the price that they will have to pay to help
upgrade the militaries of the new entrants is modest. However, the
admission of new members into the European Union, since they are poor
economically, does entail immediate and substantial costs for the
existing members; the price they would have to pay to help upgrade
the economies of the new members is large and burdensome. It is not
surprising that the EU's current members have persisted in stalling
what, as an abstract ideal, would seem to be an obviously good thing.
The recent vote in Ireland against the admission of new members is
only an explicit and crude expression of a more implicit and
sophisticated policy pursued by most of the other members of the EU.
There has not been enough vision or inspiration, either in the EU
institutions or in the major west European states, to overcome their
wholly natural, if narrowly-conceived, economic self-interest. But
since western Europe has not filled the vacuum in central and eastern
Europe with its economic organization, the EU, the United States can
readily propose filling it with its military one, NATO.

The expansion of NATO to include the Baltic states, however, would
bring this American military organization, indeed an implicit
American Commonwealth of Nations, right up to the Russian border. Of
course, this is not the first time that an American military alliance
has immediately abutted a Russian border. NATO, with Poland, has
bordered the Kaliningrad region of Russia since 1999; NATO, with
Norway, has bordered the Kola Peninsula of Russia since 1949; and the
United States itself has bordered eastern Siberia at the Bering Sea
since it purchased Alaska in 1867. From the Russian perspective,
however, the admission of the Baltic states into NATO would produce a
quantum leap in the strategic significance of their vulnerable border
regions, a few dozen miles from St. Petersburg, and with the three
Baltic countries together located astride the military approaches to
all of Russia lying between St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Some analysts have argued that there are better ways to provide for
collective security in the Baltic region than by NATO expansion. One
alternative would be to follow the example of Finland, a Baltic state
that is a member of the EU but not a member of NATO. Finland is
clearly in the Western sphere in regard to politics, economics and
culture, even though it is practically in the Russian sphere, at
least as a buffer state, in regard to security. Another alternative
would be to admit Russia itself into NATO. This would redefine NATO
from an American military alliance into a European collective
security system. It would also dissolve the line dividing Russia from
Europe.

There is much to be said in favor of each of these two (very
different) alternatives to NATO enlargement. Clearly the Russians
prefer them, but many west Europeans may do so as well. Indeed, the
admission of the Baltic states into NATO may eventually be blocked by
one or more of its west European members. However, just as clearly,
the Baltic states themselves much prefer NATO enlargement, as does
the United States. From the Baltic perspective, only NATO membership
will consolidate their hard-won national independence. From the U.S.
perspective,only NATO enlargement will consolidate Europe into a
secure core of the American way of globalization. This is why we can
expect the United States to press forward with an enlargement of NATO
that focuses upon the Baltic nations, which have progressed so far
and so successfully along the American way.

A Tale of Three NATOs

Almost all discussions of NATO speak of it as a homogenous alliance
with its different members integrated into the organization in
similar ways. In reality, however, NATO has always included a wide
variety of forms and degrees of integration. It would be useful,
particularly in future negotiations with the Russians, to distinguish
between three quite different NATOs, to be found respectively on the
Central Front, the Northern Flank and the Southern Flank.

The Central Front: "High NATO." During the Cold War, the highest,
fullest degree of integration of NATO was reached on the Central
Front, especially in regard to West Germany but also at times with
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain. High NATO was distinguished by
three major features: (1) U.S. troops were permanently stationed on
the member's territory; (2) U.S. nuclear weapons were positioned on
the member's territory; and (3) the member possessed serious and
substantial military forces, which were integrated with U.S. military
forces in regard to strategy, planning and command. The ideal-type or
model for NATO was West Germany. Given the central importance of West
Germany and the Central Front during the Cold War, it was natural to
think of this model when thinking of NATO. But even in regard to the
Central Front, France provided an exception after 1966, when
President de Gaulle had France, including French forces in West
Germany, withdraw from NATO as an organization, while remaining
within the North Atlantic Treaty as an alliance.

The Northern Flank: "Low NATO." A very different NATO existed on the
Northern Flank, particularly in regard to Denmark and Norway. Here,
none of the three features of "high NATO" was present: (1) U.S.
troops were never permanently stationed on Danish and Norwegian
territory (although Greenland is an atypical exception in the former
case, and U.S. troops did engage in periodic exercises in both
countries); (2) U.S. nuclear weapons were never positioned in these
countries, nor did U.S. naval ships carrying nuclear weapons normally
visit their ports; and (3) the military forces of Denmark and Norway
were hardly serious or substantial--in reality they were more like a
national guard--and they were not integrated with U.S. forces in any
operationally important way. For all practical purposes, the NATO of
the Northern Flank was neither an integrated organization nor an
alliance of equivalent powers; it was essentially a unilateral
military guarantee given by the United States. Yet Norway actually
bordered upon Soviet territory (for about 80 kilometers along the
Kola Peninsula).

The Southern Flank: "Pseudo NATO." Yet another very different NATO
existed on the Southern Flank, particularly in regard to Greece and
Turkey. Here, each of the three features of high NATO was present but
in a greatly reduced form: (1) U.S. air forces were permanently
stationed on Greek and Turkish territory, but U.S. ground forces were
not; (2) U.S. nuclear weapons were occasionally positioned in these
countries, but they were rather peripheral to U.S. nuclear strategy
(and even expendable, as was the case with the Jupiter missiles in
Turkey on the occasion of the Cuban missile crisis); (3) the military
forces of Greece and Turkey were large but not modern, and have
always been more of a threat to each other than to the Russians; they
could not be integrated with U.S. forces in any substantive way. For
all practical purposes, the NATO of the Southern Flank was neither an
integrated organization nor an alliance of equivalent powers; it was
essentially a loose and sometimes fragile military coalition grouped
around a leading power, the United States.

Even though no one today thinks in terms of the old Central, Northern
and Southern fronts, these three versions of NATO during the Cold War
can nevertheless help us in thinking about NATO enlargement in the
contemporary era.

If there were a successor to the old Central Front in today's NATO,
it would seem to be central Europe, especially the three new
members--Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. But these countries
have been integrated into NATO not like the "high NATO" of the old
Central Front but instead like the "low NATO" of the Northern Flank:
(1) no U.S. troops are stationed upon the territory of these three
countries (or even on the territory of the old East Germany--the six
eastern Länder of united Germany); (2) no U.S. nuclear weapons are
positioned in these countries; and (3) despite (or because of) their
Warsaw Pact past, the military forces of these three countries are
not serious modern forces and have not been integrated with U.S.
forces in any substantive way.

Of course, the United States could conceivably decide to transform
one or more of these three features of "low NATO" into a feature of
"high NATO." To do so, however, would entail breaking yet another
agreement between the United States and the old Soviet Union: in this
case, the agreement that led to the reunification of Germany. The
United States would most likely undertake this transformation only if
there were a prior and comparable transformation in the Russian
threat to these countries. It was such a transformation of the Soviet
threat (evidenced by the outbreak of the Korean War) that led to the
transformation of the original NATO of 1949 (merely a military
alliance) into the NATO of 1951 (with all the features of "high NATO"
on the Central Front). On the other hand, despite the ups and downs
of the Soviet threat over the forty years from 1949 to 1989, the
United States never seriously attempted to transform the Northern
Flank from "low NATO" to "high NATO."

If NATO is expanded to include the Baltic states, this could be
interpreted as an expansion of NATO's new Central Front; i.e., an
extension of central Europe. The historical connections between
Poland and Lithuania lend themselves to such an interpretation.
However, the inclusion of the Baltic states could instead be
interpreted as an expansion of NATO's old Northern Flank, i.e., an
extension of northern Europe. The historical connections between
Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Finland and Sweden, on the
other, lend themselves to such an interpretation. In either event,
the expansion to the Baltic states could be merely the expansion of
"low NATO." It might be that a version of "low NATO" could be made
more acceptable to the Russians than the notion of NATO in general.
They have already accepted a version of it on their border for many
years.

The Strategic Anomaly of Kaliningrad

Before 1945, what is now the Kaliningrad oblast, or province, of
Russia was the northern half of East Prussia, a province of Germany.
East Prussia was rich in its history (it had been a center first of
the Teutonic knights and then of the Junker class), but poor in its
economy (the Junkers' grain-producing estates could not compete in an
unprotected market). The city of Kaliningrad itself was then
Königsberg, known as the home of Immanuel Kant and also for its
beautiful buildings and promenades. But between the two world wars,
East Prussia was best known for being a strategic anomaly, separated
from the rest of Germany by the famous Polish Corridor. As such, it
was a perpetual irritant in Polish-German relations; along with the
city of Danzig, the Polish Corridor provided the occasion for the
beginning of the Second World War.

The Soviet Union conquered East Prussia in 1945, annexing the
northern half while giving the southern half to Poland. Virtually
every German living in the Soviet portion was either expelled or
killed, and virtually every building in Königsberg was either
destroyed or demolished. The Soviets renamed the city after Mikhail
Kalinin, who served as the titular president of the Soviet Union for
Stalin, and they rebuilt it as an especially ugly and dreary example
of the typical Soviet style. They also made of the Kaliningrad region
a vast military complex, which included the headquarters for the
Soviet, and now the Russian, Baltic Fleet. Today, the province (whose
population is about 900,000 and whose area is less than that of
Connecticut) represents a miniature version of the worst aspects of
contemporary Russia; its rates of narcotic abuse, infectious diseases
(particularly aids), environmental pollution and criminal activity
are among the highest in the Russian Federation. Kaliningrad's
condition, and its contrast with the three Baltic states and with the
old East Prussia, is a vivid reminder of what a mess Russians can
make of a part of Europe when they are utterly free to be themselves.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad province has
been separated from the rest of Russia by the territory of
independent Lithuania, by a sort of Lithuanian Corridor. Across this
corridor there runs a military railroad line, which supplies Russian
military forces in the territory. This strategic anomaly and dismal
slum is a black hole that will be located right at the center of
NATO's new military commitment to the Baltic states.

During the Cold War era, West Berlin was a Western island and
strategic anomaly, which was surrounded by a Soviet sea. For many
years, it was a crisis in waiting, and indeed it became an actual
crisis in 1948-49 and again in 1958-61. If the Baltic states are
admitted into NATO, Kaliningrad will become a Russian island and
strategic anomaly surrounded by a NATO sea (along with the Baltic Sea
itself). In its earlier incarnation during the interwar era as East
Prussia, it was similarly a German island and strategic anomaly; it
was also a crisis in waiting, and it became an actual crisis in 1939.
Given these historical and geographical antecedents, it should not be
surprising if, in what is supposed to be the new era of
globalization, this obscure and backward place should also become a
crisis in waiting, a real blast from the past.

Of course, the very vulnerability of Kaliningrad might make it into a
hostage for Russian good behavior in international affairs,
particularly their behavior in the Baltic region (rather like the
vulnerability of West Berlin was a factor in restraining American
behavior on occasion). On the other hand, the Russians already have
in place a nuclear tripwire in Kaliningrad (dozens of nuclear
weapons), which makes the territory more like a landmine than a
hostage.

Since the time of Peter the Great, no European power has ever made a
commitment to defend the Baltic countries from Russia. As different
as they were from each other, Sweden, Prussia, France, Germany and
Britain all concluded that the risks and costs of guaranteeing the
independence of the Baltics from their massive Russian neighbor were
beyond their interests and their capabilities. When the United States
does make such a commitment to the Baltics, it will therefore be
doing something that is not only unprecedented in American history
(the closest prototype being the U.S. commitment to defend Norway and
Denmark), but that is unprecedented in European history as well. It
is also noteworthy that, as every serious military analyst believes,
the United States can only credibly defend the Baltic states by
featuring nuclear weapons as a means. It is thus odd that an
administration sincerely determined to reduce the numbers and status
of nuclear weapons worldwide would consider raising their
significance in such a sensitive locale as the Baltics.

This historical leap by the United States to defend the Baltic
republics rests upon the current American conviction that, for
decades to come, America will remain as strong and as committed as it
is today and that Russia will remain as weak and as feckless.
However, the current balance (or imbalance) between American and
Russian power would have been inconceivable only two decades ago.
Will it still be conceivable only two decades from now?

Slovakia and Slovenia as Strategic Consolidation

The admission of Slovakia into NATO would actually remove a strategic
anomaly, one that was created with the admission of Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary. This left Slovakia as a geographical wedge
inserted between the other three states. If Slovakia also joins, this
wedge would be transformed into an integral component of a neat and
compact bloc of four.

The admission of Slovenia would remove yet another strategic anomaly.
Of course, many Americans confuse Slovenia with Slovakia (the two
countries not only have similar names but nearly identical flags),
and many others think that Slovenia is in the Balkans (it is,
however, geographically closer to the Alps and culturally closer to
Austria). However, Slovenia has made more progress in establishing a
liberal democracy, free markets and the rule of law than any other
country being considered for NATO membership. Its admission would
also provide a direct geographical connection and transit route
between Italy (and NATO's southern region) and Hungary, which at
present has no land frontier with any NATO country. Slovenia's
admission would thus make NATO's central region even more coherent.
(It would also mean that Switzerland and Austria, two non-NATO
states, would be completely surrounded by NATO members.)

The Balkan States as "Pseudo NATO"

The expansion of NATO to include the Balkan states, even if only the
relatively peaceful ones of Bulgaria and Romania, would not remove
anomalies but multiply them. The Balkan region might become an
American sphere of influence, but it would not be a real part of the
American Commonwealth of Nations.

For most of the period since the middle of the 19th century, most of the Balkan countries have been ensconced within a Russian sphere of influence. This has been especially true of peoples that were both Orthodox in religion and Slavic by ethnicity (i.e., Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia), but Romania (Orthodox but not Slavic) often has been in the Russian sphere, as well. Of course, NATO has had an Orthodox member, Greece, since 1952, but Russia could always interpret Greece as an anomaly, more of a Mediterranean county than a Balkan one. The admission of Bulgaria and Romania (Macedonia, with its present difficulties, is not a serious candidate) into NATO would put a definitive end to any semblance of a Russian sphere in the Balkans. It would also put in place yet another enduring Russian grievance against the West.

Fifty years ago, the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO was supposed to contain the Soviet Union and to extend American influence into the Middle East. In practice, the most important consequence was to make the management of the perennial conflict between Greece and Turkey a perennial responsibility for NATO, and particularly for the United States. Similarly, the admission of the Balkan states into NATO might be justified as containing neighboring rogue states and, again, to extend American influence into the Middle East. In practice, the most important consequence will again be to make the management of the perennial conflicts between and within these states a perennial responsibility for NATO, and particularly for the United States.

The Balkan states have never achieved political stability in the same way as the other members of NATO, be they in western or central Europe. Indeed, they are hardly states at all in the European sense. They are the heirs to very different religious traditions (Eastern Orthodox or Islamic rather than Roman Catholic or Protestant) and to a very different imperial history (Ottoman rather than Habsburg), and their political cultures reflect both of these differences. If Greece and Turkey, taken together, have been difficult and troublesome members of NATO, Bulgaria and Romania could prove to be so as well.

America in the Baltic States: Interests, Ideals and Identity

THE ISSUE of the next round of NATO enlargement and of concomitant American military commitments may not produce a new Great Debate in Washington, but it will represent a new chapter in an old and ongoing debate over American foreign policy. This is the perennial great debate that is variously defined as being between interests and ideals, between realism and idealism, or between conservatism and liberalism (now joined, perhaps, by neo-conservatism, as well). A conflict between these two perspectives can arise over each of the countries that is being considered for admissions into NATO, but it will be especially intense in regard to the Baltic states.

From the realist (and conservative) perspective there are no U.S. national interests at stake in the Baltic states. These three small countries together add up to an area that is only 50 percent of Finland's (whose admission to NATO has never been seen as a U.S. national interest) and a population that is only 50 percent more. The United States has no significant strategic or economic interests in these countries, and certainly none that are anywhere near as weighty as the very substantial strategic risks and costs that would come with a U.S. military commitment to them. As Henry Kissinger, a realist advocate of the first round of NATO expansion, has put it: "[T]he border of Estonia is thirty miles from St. Petersburg. Advancing the NATO integrated command this close to key centers in Russia might mortgage the possibilities of relating Russia to the emerging world order as a constructive member." Put more baldly, when the Baltic states are weighed in regard to U.S. interests and when NATO is defined as a military alliance, the proposal to admit them into NATO seems simply reckless and irresponsible.

Conversely, from the idealist (and both the liberal and the neo-conservative) perspective, there are fundamental American values at stake in the Baltic states. Over a period of more than seven centuries and in at least four successive incarnations, these countries have represented the easternmost extension of Western civilization. They have long seen themselves, and have been seen by other Europeans, as the "East of the West." (Just as, ever since they were acquired by Peter the Great, they have been seen by the Russians as their "window on the West", the "West of the East.") Today, ten years after their heroic restoration of their national independence, the Baltics have been extraordinarily successful in establishing and embodying the American values of liberal democracy, the free market and the rule of law. If any countries ever deserved to become members of NATO by virtue of their achievements by American standards, these do. It would be fitting indeed if, after one decade of national independence, they a re welcomed into many decades of American protection. When the Baltic states are understood with regard to American values and when NATO is defined as a liberal-democratic and free-market community, the proposal to admit them into NATO seems to be one of those truths that we hold to be self-evident.

In reality, what is at stake in the Baltic states is not just American interests or American ideals. It is American identity, in particular the reinvention of American identity by American political, business and cultural elites to make it fit the new era of globalization. When America is by far the strongest power and the largest economy on the globe, these elites think that it no longer suffices for America to be located only on the North American continent and to be composed only of American citizens; that definition of America is obsolete. However, when America is far from being the only strong power and the only large economy, it is not yet possible for America to be located equally on every continent and to be composed equally of every people on the globe; that definition of America is premature. The definition of America that best fits the contemporary era--the era of globalization as an ongoing project, rather than the merely international era of the past or the imagined fully global era of the futur e--is one that includes Europe, the continent that is most advanced along the American way, as part of the new and expanded American identity. When American business elites define America as the free market and the open society, and American cultural elites define America as liberal democracy and the rule of law, then they are drawn to define Europe as being, in all important respects, America.

IN THE 20th century, America met and won three great challenges presented by the old international era--the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War. It did so because of its great military power and economic strength, to be sure, but more important were the sophistication and the determination with which these assets were deployed by successive generations of American statesmen. When either the sophistication or the determination lapsed, as with the Korean War and the Vietnam War, all of America's military and economic assets could not prevent a debacle or a defeat.

The extension of an American military commitment to the Baltic states, up to the very border of a sullen and resentful Russia that is armed with a sense of historical entitlement and 5,500 nuclear weapons, will present the United States with a strategic and diplomatic challenge of unprecedented complexity. At the same time, the integration of the Baltic states into the American commonwealth will represent the culmination of an American calling, of a 225-year project of spreading American values and re-creating Western civilization in the American image until it has at last reached its easternmost frontier, at the "East of the West." To bring both the challenge and the calling into a stable synthesis, to create a Baltic order distinguished by both peace and justice, will require of the American statesmen of the 21st century a level of sophistication and determination that would have amazed those of the 20th.

James Kurth is Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.