Less than a week after U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation and chief U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad announced that the protracted negotiations with the Taliban are nearing completion, President Donald Trump brought an end to the ceasefire talks as retribution for the group’s killing of an American soldier. The agreement reached “in principle” would have allowed the Trump administration to begin drawing down U.S. troops from the country heading into an election year. The reports of progress in the talks with the Taliban were welcome news for advocates of military restraint and those who champion diplomacy and responsible statecraft grounded in foreign policy realism. 

President Trump is right to deliver on his campaign promise to bring our troops home. The breakdown in the talks should not impede the Trump administration from ending our “forever war” and leaving Afghanistan after close to two decades. It was always doubtful whether the Taliban had any serious intent to end hostilities with the United States or that the group could be trusted to hold up its end of the bargain. The cessation of U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan should not depend on negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban and could still be accomplished regardless of developments on that front. 

Our strategic imperative to leave could be realized by adopting a strategic realignment on three fronts in our Afghan policy. First, Washington should encourage the Afghan government to deal directly with the major regional stakeholders in its neighborhood who have a permanent interest in a secure and stable Afghanistan.  

Second, the Trump administration needs to use its leverage with its allies in Riyadh and Islamabad to undermine the Taliban's external sources of support via instrumenting a “maximum pressure” campaign against rogue elements among Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and private Wahhabi donors in Saudi Arabia. 

Lastly, the United States already has a robust military presence in the surrounding region with which it can support Kabul. By conducting special forces operations and surgical strikes as a last resort, Washington can prevent international terrorist organizations from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan or seeing the country succumb to a full-fledged civil war that foreign Islamist fighters, such as the Islamic State, could exploit. Such operations will not prevent a full withdrawal and can serve as a useful stopgap as the United States implements its primary objective of transitioning its Afghanistan counter-terrorism strategy to major regional stakeholders. 

Pushing for a Regional Security Architecture

The international system abhors a vacuum. From a realist standpoint, it is likely that a U.S. pullout will open the Afghan theater to a host of regional powers rushing in to protect their interests. This strategic rebalancing is a reality that should be encouraged rather than feared. The majority of these regional powers will hope to strengthen the central government in Kabul and avoid the scenario of Afghanistan falling into another civil war and becoming a safe haven for global terrorism. In practice, this should result in burden sharing among these powers looking to bolster Kabul against internal threats and realize a secure, stable, and independent Afghanistan they could partner with moving forward. A deal with the Taliban does not need to be a litmus test for a successful withdrawal.

What became increasingly clear through multiple rounds of the Doha talks was the faulty assumption that the only path to withdrawal for an American administration desperate to leave would entail the United States securing an agreement with the Taliban, even if that meant accepting an unpalatable deal. Instead of relying on a problematic agreement with the Taliban that will be difficult to enforce if it could even be attained, the United States should instead focus on assuaging Kabul’s concerns post-withdrawal. This means encouraging Kabul to engage with regional stakeholders and develop strategic partnerships with Tehran, Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing in order to establish a working regional security architecture that would serve as an ultimate safeguard against the Taliban overrunning the country. We can call this post-U.S. strategic environment, the Afghan Corridor Security Architecture (ACSA).

It is a fact that the United States cannot remain in Afghanistan forever. As both the New York Times editorial board and realist scholar Barry Posen have argued, in the wake of U.S. withdrawal, Afghanistan’s neighbors will find it necessary to step up to protect their interests there because they can no longer pass the buck to the United States. Washington might as well spearhead efforts to bring in the major regional stakeholders, while it still has some leverage left. Afghanistan’s stability as a nation-state is in the long-term interest of its neighbors: Iran is fearful of a potential Salafi stronghold on its eastern front as it also struggles to host millions of refugees, the majority of which are Afghans. India sees Afghanistan as a central hub for expanding its economic footprint in Central Asia. For China, given its strategic commitment to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a secure and stable Afghanistan that could sustain safe and dependable transportation routes is of critical importance. Lastly, Russia regards radical Islam as a threat to its national security given the large Muslim population in its southern territories (particularly in North Caucuses and Tatarstan) and can ill afford an Afghanistan that serves as a sanctuary for global Salafi terrorism. 

Iran has long-standing cultural, economic, and security ties with Afghanistan. Last year, Iran became Afghanistan’s largest trading partner—replacing Pakistan—with trade reaching $3 billion in 2018. In fact, Iran’s economic role in Afghanistan was significant enough that the Trump administration gave waivers to Iran’s Chabahar port—an Indian-financed port and free trade zone that will serve as a critical link to sea for landlocked Afghanistan, while also giving New Delhi access to Central Asian markets bypassing Pakistan. This is despite the hawkish pressure campaign against Iran led by the administration. Iran already hosts 2.5-3 million Afghan refugees, given decades of instability and war, which could only increase as ISIS’ offshoot in Afghanistan, Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP), escalates its targeting of civilians in that country. 

ISIS’ expansion into Iraq and Syria was deemed a critical threat to Tehran, leading it to send its elite Qods force and military to neutralize them. The larger footprint of ISIS in Afghanistan continues to be a grave concern to Tehran’s Shiite government. If the Taliban were to afford the ISKP a foothold in their occupied territories, Iran will likely intervene in Afghanistan as it did to its west. Iran has a long track record of fighting Islamic Salafists in the region. In 2001, Iran was willing to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban, so much so that James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, called the Iranians “particularly helpful.” In fact, Dobbins claims it was a coalition of Russia, India, the Northern Alliance, and Iran, aided by American airpower, that led to the fall of the Taliban—not the United States alone. As recently as last year, Iran participated in trilateral talks with Kabul and New Delhi where combating extremism was a main talking point. 

China, too, has an interest in a stable Afghanistan. In the past two decades, Beijing has accelerated its aid to Kabul with investments totaling over half a billion dollars. China’s interests in Afghanistan are both economically motivated and driven by Beijing's national security priorities. China seeks increased security and stability in the region in order to expand its infrastructure projects, namely its transportation corridor, as part of BRI. The security issues have already led to a failed mineral mining deal. Domestically, Beijing is growing weary of ties between the Taliban and Uighur separatists in Xinjiang province. There have been reports of Uighur fighters joining the Taliban’s war effort in Afghanistan. China fears the spread of Islamic extremism into its western frontier could further destabilize its already problematic relationship with its Muslim Uighur minority.

Similarly, Moscow has experienced decades of conflict owing to the spread of Islamic extremism to its borders and hopes to avoid re-instigation in its southern regions with radical fighters and ideology extending into Tatarstan and the Caucasus as they have in the past (Chechnya is a case in point). Stability in Central Asia also constitutes a strategic necessity for Russia. Afghanistan remains a buffer state between the secular states in Central Asia ranging from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan and the extremist Taliban. 

The central solution to our Afghanistan quagmire entails creative diplomacy—not a military approach. The powers in the region have a major stake in a stable Afghanistan. If the United States wants a smooth transition out of Afghanistan, liaising with these powers would be both pragmatic and prudent. For Washington, it could also serve to de-escalate tensions, whether it be in the context of the nuclear dispute with Iran, trade negotiations with China, or with Russia due to its intervention in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions.

Leveraging our Regional Allies

The United States must also leverage its influence over its partners in Riyadh and Islamabad to clamp down on the major sources of the Taliban’s external support, especially the group’s long-held connections with the Pakistani ISI and individual Wahhabi donors in Saudi Arabia. 

Despite assurances from Riyadh over the years, individual donors from the Kingdom continue to fund the Taliban. The Taliban’s finance minister admitted that members of the Taliban would visit Saudi Arabia under the guise of going on pilgrimage in Mecca only to acquire funds. Financial support is obtained not only from wealthy Saudi donors, but also from Pashtun guest workers in the Kingdom whose families the Taliban would threaten back home, as noted by eminent foreign policy scholar Vali Nasr. Recently, there have been encouraging signs that the Saudi government has adopted a tougher line on the Taliban and attempted to rein in its international sources of support, given Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s more secular (albeit nationalist) approach to foreign policy. The Saudi government has publicly called for and even facilitated talks between the Taliban and Washington. The Trump administration should verify that its key ally’s claims of a shift in strategy are indeed genuine and press Riyadh to do more to undercut the Taliban’s access to funds and arms. 

The other critical source of support for the Taliban emanates from Islamabad, specifically the Pakistani ISI. The United States has long accused Pakistan of sponsoring the Taliban, but despite years of security cooperation and billions of dollars of aid, the Pakistani ISI continues to covertly work with the Taliban—among other Islamist militant organizations like the Haqqani Network. This has laid the foundation for U.S.-Pakistani distrust, which led to high tensions in the relationship on several occasions, namely when President Barack Obama went after Osama Bin Laden inside Pakistani territory without alerting Islamabad, and more recently when President Trump tweeted that the United States has “foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years” and accused Pakistan of “lies and deceit.” Despite this problematic history and the fact that the Trump administration has taken the bold step of suspending U.S. military aid to Islamabad, Washington has been unable to encourage meaningful change in Pakistan’s disruptive actions in the region.

The reason for Pakistan’s continued support for the Taliban, according to Cato Institute scholar Sahar Khan, is that “militant sponsorship has become a kind of whole-of-government principle of Pakistan’s security policy and national identity.” Pakistan also fears a stable Kabul becoming an ally of India and encircling it, and so, Islamabad continues to use the Taliban and related groups as a proxy. With Pakistan’s support for Afghanistan-oriented militant groups being this fundamental to Islamabad’s national security strategy, this complicates Washington’s efforts to apply real pressure. However, considering the divisions between the civilian and military leadership in Pakistan, Washington could seek to induce change by strengthening ties with the civilian government while applying pressure on the ISI and Pakistani military. Plus, the United States does not have to be the only one using its leverage. Pakistan’s neighbors, including China—through its investments in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port—have considerable sway over Islamabad they can use as they pursue a more stable and durable Afghanistan. 

Regardless, as the United States explores ways to compel Islamabad to change course, Khan argues that Washington should “look for alternative solutions to securing a durable peace in Afghanistan.” One such alternative solution remains encouraging the formation of a new strategic environment—as part of ACSA as we called for earlier. Pakistan has long wagered on a destabilized, misgoverned Afghanistan dominated by its only ally there, the Taliban. The emergence of ACSA would help Kabul secure long-term stability with the added benefit of incentivizing Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban and alienating Kabul out of fear of losing its stakes and influence in Afghanistan, especially as its direct rival India establishes a more enduring relationship with the Afghan government.

Reassuring Kabul

In order to reassure the fragile Afghan state and allow Kabul to function independently, the United States should be prepared to use its regional military presence to strike the Taliban or ISKP targets as a part of its global counter-terrorism strategy—albeit with caution and only in the most vital of circumstances. This will not prevent a complete withdrawal, but would give Kabul breathing room and reassurance that an ISKP foothold would not be established or civil war would not break out as the United States pursues creative diplomacy with regional stakeholders. These regional power brokers would eventually assume a greater role in assisting Afghanistan with its security needs. 

For the sake of transparency, the special forces operations should return to the Pentagon’s umbrella as was done under the Obama administration. The Trump administration returning special forces operations in Afghanistan to a C.I.A. mandate with limited oversight undermines our defense strategy and our cooperation with Kabul. At the same time, it remains critical that Afghanistan’s forces will continue to receive training. Since 2014, the Afghan security forces have lost a staggering 45,000 troops. This is where allies can assist in a non-combat capacity. According to former NATO commander James Stavridis, “it is a smart division of labor to have the United States shift the bulk of its effort toward the special forces mission and having the Europeans do the training mission.”

Conclusion

It is a fact that the prospect of a U.S. pullout has left the Afghan leadership worried and dismayed. The Afghan central government remains weak with an unproven military and justly fears being overrun by the battle-hardened Taliban forces already occupying a large segment of Afghanistan.

After an eighteen-year quagmire with little to show, it is critical for the United States to withdraw and discontinue one of its many “forever wars.” At the same time, it is possible to withdraw without allowing Afghanistan to become overrun by the Taliban, leave a void for ISKP, or to fall into a full-fledged civil war. The United States must conceive of a diplomatic arrangement which would bolster the central government in Kabul, support the Afghan army, and guarantee the people of Afghanistan do not lose the hard-won cultural, civil, and constitutional rights they have gained. 

Realists contend that the United States should have been focused on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden after the tragic events of 9/11, and not nation-building. Not only is the continued presence of U.S. troops in the country not in our interest, the permanent presence of U.S. military forces on the ground has produced a moral hazard problem (as rightly predicted by former Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry) with the Afghan leadership relying on the U.S. military to neutralize internal security threats. Instead, Afghanistan should work to strengthen its own security forces and create lasting partnerships with actual stakeholders in the neighborhood such as China, Iran, India, and Russia—who arguably have an even more immediate interest in combating Salafist terrorism on their respective borders. 

Close to two decades of U.S. presence has arguably radicalized a new generation of Afghans making them susceptible to Taliban’s anti-American rhetoric and turning them into easy recruits. The cycle of violence, animosity, and extremism has therefore perpetuated despite the heavy toll of thousands of U.S. casualties and close to a trillion dollars spent—with tens of thousands of Afghans killed and millions displaced in the process.   

Virtually everyone agrees that nation-building and democracy promotion in Afghanistan has failed—and disastrously so. As we bring our troops home, the prudent trifecta of regional diplomacy, confronting allies, and a more restrained exercise of our counter-terrorism capability offers the responsible path forward.

Arta Moeini is a political scientist and a Middle East analyst. Dr. Moeini holds a Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University and a Masters in International Relations from Johns Hopkins SAIS. His latest project explores the philosophical sources of realist foreign policy thinking. 

Shahed Ghoreishi is a U.S. foreign policy analyst and a graduate of the Johns Hopkins SAIS. His publications can be found in The Atlantic, The National Interest, and the Huffington Post, among others. You can follow him on Twitter @shahedghoreishi.

Image: Reuters