"None of this is going to matter if you're dead.  And that's why you need air defense."  General Mark Milley, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, said those words as he defined the Army's six modernization priorities in October of 2017.  General Milley's remarks are spot-on and recent combat operations in the Ukraine, Syria, and Southwest Asia validate them.  His words clearly state that air and missile defense (AMD) is No. 5 on his list of six modernization priorities, but air and missile defense is not his second to last priority - it is the pre-eminent priority, on a list of few, which mandates resourcing.  That is a point which must resonate with all.

America's adversaries have invested in low-cost, simple air forces and capabilities.  All the while, the U.S. has neglected our ground-based air defense force, in the belief that our air forces were omnipotent.

Combat operations have proven our assumptions to be wrong.  We have accepted extreme risk in the air and missile defense force and must ensure its modernization does not become a COVID-19 fatality.  Another Army Chief of Staff often said, “You can't fix a problem, once the crisis has begun.”  We have an air and missile defense problem that requires priority in resourcing now, before we find ourselves in a crisis with inadequate defensive capability.

Current Environment

Today, if you cannot defend yourself from aerial observation or attack, you will not survive and all of the tanks, artillery, and aircraft the Pentagon has invested in will be of little value or use.  If the warfighter cannot defeat a complex aerial attack, the U.S.' strategic, operational, and tactical assets and objectives, are at extreme risk.  Without air and missile defense, a force cannot enter or effectively operate in any combat environment.  It is fair to say the threat is presently focusing more on relatively inexpensive air and missile systems than on major land, sea, and air programs of the past.

In fact, the air and missile threat has continued to expand at both ends of its operational spectrum.  Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are common use by near-peers, as well as non-state actors.  The rocket is the indirect fire weapon of choice for most non-state actors, and the U.S. simply cannot ignore the Houthis' use of ballistic and cruise missiles.

We cannot disregard the lessons of the 2019 cruise missile and UAS attack on the Saudi ARAMCO facility, nor dismiss Iran's ballistic missile attacks on U.S. bases at Al Asad and Erbil.  Were those intentional misses or the randomness of circular error probabilities?  If intentional misses, then the lesson is that the adversary has fairly accurate missiles.  If the impact points were simply the result of circular error probabilities, we must note that those warheads pack a serious punch and that the U.S. was lucky.

Do we want to rely on luck in the future?

The variety of threats is increasing, enabling more complex attacks, and challenging our defense designs.  We are vulnerable to 360-degree attacks.  In addition, the warfighter must counter high- and low-altitude attack profiles, presented by small, low-radar cross section long-range aerial reconnaissance and weapon systems, while simultaneously defeating maneuvering ballistic missiles with closing velocities measured in thousands of meters per second.  Our forces must also ensure our aviation and air forces can safely operate in the airspace.

Put simply, one-trick-ponies, operating in isolation with stove-piped architectures, will not survive in today's air and missile fight, nor do they enhance friendly air operations.

Importantly, challenges facing the U.S. military go beyond technology.  They include force structure.  The Peace Dividends of the 1990s decremented the Army and its air and missile defense force.  The airbase defense units and all of the Cold War's HAWK battalions no longer exist.  Further exacerbating things, in 2004, the Army used the air and missile defense force as a bill payer to create more brigade combat teams as it designed the Modular Force for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  That decision reduced the total short-range air defense force by more than 60 percent and halted its modernization, as constrained budgets and combat operations stymied modernization across the air and missile defense force.  Today, the Army has very-limited capacity or capability to provide air and missile defense to the joint force - which is one of its core functions.

Today's environment requires an integrated approach to air and missile defense.  Air and missile defense operations are inherently joint and combined, requiring a versatile and flexible architecture that leverages all available information and engagement capabilities.  An integrated approach enables us to achieve the tenets of air defense:  unity of command, unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution.  Stove-pipe systems and parochialism are obstacles to achieving these tenets, as are foreign disclosure policies that prohibit allies and partners from seamlessly operating in our architecture.

Forward Progress and the New Challenge

General Milley also said in 2017, "We will reform our entire battlefield air and missile defense capability...which has tragically atrophied over the years.”  As one of the Army's original six modernization priorities, the Army has moved aggressively to rebuild the Army's air and missile defense capabilities.  Key initiatives include reestablishing a short-range air defense (SHORAD) force and capability, while continuing to improve capabilities to counter the cruise and ballistic missile threat; addressing the 360-degree threat aspect; and achieving an integrated air defense command and control capability which optimizes capabilities, while simultaneously mitigating the potential for fratricide.

Now, as the Department of Defense faces a potential budget reduction to pay for COVID-19 response, the Army will have to make tough decisions.  As the Army weighs its decisions, it should not lose sight of General Milley's words, nor ignore the excessive risk it has accepted by allowing its air and missile defense capability to "tragically atrophy."  The Army has made significant progress on many air and missile defense initiatives and must continue to focus and resource those programs to ensure it can open, operate, and survive in any combat theater.

Fixing Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD)

The Maneuver-SHORAD (M-SHORAD) capability is critical to forward area and maneuver force operations and begins to fill the gap past modularity efforts created.  Its on-board sensor suite and ability to network across platoon-operations and into the division's air defense network represents the tactical level of integration and is essential to defeating today's forward area threats.  In support of General Milley's priorities, the Army must reestablish this capability across all Army maneuver divisions, not just the four it has currently funded.

The Avenger air defense system entered the Army inventory in 1988 and has not seen a major upgrade since 2004.  It is a rear-area air defense system, not designed to support a maneuvering force, and it would not survive nor be effective in defending a heavy force on the move.  M-SHORAD is the right solution to solving this operational need.

The Sentinel-A4 sensor upgrades are essential to countering the UAS and cruise missile threat; in building the forward area's integrated air picture; and contributing information to the joint air picture. This sensor plays a key role in fratricide mitigation, while also providing SHORAD units early warning and situational awareness.  Sentinel is also a key sensor in the homeland's air defense architecture and will be M-SHORAD's area sensor.  Additionally, the A4-upgrades will improve Sentinel's contribution to the counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) mission.

In 2005, after only one year of development and testing, the Army fielded a C-RAM intercept capability to protect our modular forces in OIF basecamps.  It is not an impressive looking weapon system, and its initial test grades were only in the 'C-range of an alphabetical grading scale', but as one Army General Officer commented to one of this paper's authors, "When you don't have any capability, a C is a pretty good grade."

C-RAM deployed to Iraq in the summer of 2005 and demand for its capabilities has ensured near, back-to-back deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan for the two U.S.-based active-duty SHORAD battalions and occasionally requiring augmentation from the National Guard.  C-RAM has been improved over time, and it recently deployed with Patriot and Avenger units to Iraq.  In 2005, it was far from exquisite, but it was good enough, and it is still on-mission, 15 years later.

The advent of the C-RAM mission led to the development of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability program (IFPC).  Unfortunately, the threat is dynamic, and the counter-unmanned aerial systems and cruise missile capability gap took precedence, morphing IFPC into IFPC Increment-2 to close those critical gaps.  IFPC Increment-2 (hereafter referred to as IFPC) was envisioned to be a non-developmental item, leveraging a multi-missile launcher - developed by Army laboratories and produced in Army depots - which employed existing interceptors and missiles to defeat cruise missiles and UASs The Sentinel radar is IFPC's primary sensor, and the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) would serve as its command and control center and gateway into the integrated architecture.

IFPC is envisioned to replace Avenger as the rear-area air defense system capable of dealing with the cruise missile and UAS threat, and eventually, the rockets, artillery, and mortar threats.  IFPC has been challenged - in some cases by technology and possibly by operational requirements plated with "un-attain-ium."

The U.S.’ counter-UAS and cruise missile defense capability gap is real, as is our military's ability to deploy a layered defense against these threats or to adequately defend assets in a maneuver force's rear area or airbases.  IFPC's contribution to filling those gaps and achieving the air and missile defense's Principles of Mass and Mix - as well as setting the basis for establishing a layered defense - is critical.  The Army cannot walk away from this requirement, and the Army's Fiscal Year 2021 IFPC Shoot-Off is a solid approach to solving the challenge.  We do not need an exquisite solution - we need effective weapons.

The Foundation of Army Air & Missile Defense

The venerable Patriot air defense system has been the mainstay of Army air and missile defense for more than 35 years.  Patriot batteries were the first U.S. ground forces to deploy for Desert Shield in 1990, and for almost 30 years, Patriot has had a continuous mission in Southwest Asia.  Patriot is a tactical weapon with strategic value and impact.  As a U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General, in the U.S. Embassy in Israel, commented to one of this paper's authors in December 2002, as the 69th ADA Brigade was deploying into Israel, "if you park an aircraft carrier in a region it sends a powerful signal. However, positioning a purely defensive Patriot battery forward in a partner nation sends an equally powerful signal of our national intent."

Today, more than nine of the Army's 15 battalions are forward-deployed, with at least five of them in Southwest Asia.  Continually improved through software upgrades and technology insertion, and with a family of versatile and effective interceptors, Patriot is expected to remain in our force for another 20 years.

Patriot is the only true air and missile defense system in the Army inventory, and 16 partner nations employ it.  Designed to fight as integrated battalions, Patriot was intended to integrate with THAAD and operate as an air and missile defense task force.  Unfortunately, this requirement was lost during the transition of THAAD's development from the Army to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and is just now being pursued.

Patriot's continued improvement is essential, as is integration with THAAD, and other joint and combined AMD capabilities.  Additionally, the U.S. should leverage cooperative development opportunities with our partners, as Patriot and THAAD foreign military sales are continuing to increase. Building partner capacity and capability means you have a path to integrating the partners into the defense and operating as a combined-integrated air defense force.

The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) will greatly improve Patriot's performance and contribute to the joint air and missile defense fight.  LTAMDS replaces Patriot's sectored radar with a 360-degree radar, using Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology, to provide greater range, precision, and search volume.  A 360-degree search and track capability, coupled with its increased sensitivity, counters the challenges posed by today's unmanned aerial and cruise missile threats and offers a modern platform to counter the emerging hypersonic threat.

The ability to search and track an aerial threat in 360-degrees is not a "nice to have capability" - it is essential to surviving on today's battlefield, and it cannot become budget fodder.  A 360-degree radar is also critical to expeditionary operations, where individual, early-entry forces arrive in an immature theater and must execute their mission, as other theater capabilities arrive.  Case in point: one has to wonder how different last September's attack on the Saudi ARAMCO facility might have been if the Kingdom's air and missile defenses had a 360-degree sensor with LTAMD's capabilities?

LTAMDS is the Army's wide-area air and missile defense sensor and a key contributor to fighting as an integrated air and missile defense force.  Its demonstrated performance in a 2019 sensor competition and rapid acquisition path will provide four sensors for testing by the fall of 2022 and initial fielding in 2025.  It has momentum and promise and needs to remain at the forefront for resourcing.

The final element in the Army's air and missile defense reformation is its Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS).  Command and control systems are referred to as "the glue that binds a family of systems - the element that melds capabilities to create synergies and greater capabilities which could not be realized if capabilities operated in isolation."  IBCS is that command and control system, which has demonstrated the ability to

1. accept data from a joint family of sensors (including the F-35) to generate a single integrated air picture, which provides enhanced situational awareness and enhanced protection for friendly aircraft;
2. provide an integrated fire control network which optimizes the single air picture, thereby allowing the optimal weapon to engage a threat and enable earlier engagements, potentially multiple engagements (if necessary), and defend in depth;
3. perform integrated defense planning, to minimize gaps in cover; and
4. provide automated battle management aids to operations.

IBCS got off to a rocky start, but it has made tremendous progress and now exemplifies the Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy's language, "[we] may not succeed on the first demonstration and experimentation...but we will learn and rapidly adjust."³  IBCS has had five successful flight tests, and its development has been informed by Soldier Check-Out Events, which put soldiers on the system much sooner than traditional acquisition programs.  As it executes this summer's Limited User Test (LUT) and the Army weighs a production decision, it will be important to not only assess how well IBCS performs on the test but to assess the operational value of its performance and how early fielding of this capability improves air and missile defense operations and force protection.  Rolling out IBCS capabilities as soon as possible, while addressing lessons from the LUT, is essential.

IBCS has demonstrated joint integration and the ability for a Patriot battery to defeat multiple cruise missiles, at extended range, by utilizing Sentinel radar track data.  During a recent test, the Patriot battery's radar never saw or tracked the cruise missiles - it executed the engagement from the fire control network's composite track data, with the intercepts occurring at a never before demonstrated range.  This is the power of fighting as an integrated air and missile defense system.

Imagine this: Sentinel radars operating in the forward area with M-SHORAD detect and track a flight of cruise missiles inbound but outside the range of M-SHORAD or a forward area IFPC battery.  Those tracks are passed via the integrated fire control network to Patriot units well in the division's rear area for engagement.  Patriot executes an engagement, intercepting a portion of the cruise missile flight.  Simultaneously, the cruise missile data is passed to an Air Force control and reporting center, which directs F-35s to execute a second engagement against the flight of cruise missiles, again defeating a portion of the flight.  Finally, the few remaining cruise missiles are defeated by IFPC, which is defending the Division's aviation brigade, the cruise missile's intended target, in the division's rear area.  All the while, LTAMDS and Patriot are providing ballistic missile defense to the division's critical assets, contributing vital data to the single integrated air picture, and providing air tracks to the control and reporting center for engagement.

Way Ahead

Integration is powerful - and this kind of integration is necessary.  Integration turns point defense weapons into a networked system to provide area defense.  It enables a layered defense and defense in depth.  It allows for earlier target evaluation, weapon assignment, and engagement, and it greatly reduces the potential for uncoordinated engagements and interceptor wastage.  Integration overcomes the challenges of earth curvature, which confounds terrestrial sensors, mitigates terrain masking, and enables the joint or combined mission commander to apply the best weapon options.  It also closes the seams - which all operators hope to exploit.

Integration made possible by IBCS is not service specific.  It crosses into joint and combined operations.  Countless wargames and tabletop exercises point to the need for an integrated air and missile defense command and control system.  Unfortunately, the Army is only funded to integrate its systems.  That plan must expand to include THAAD, AEGIS, and other AMD capabilities and those of our partner nations, and must do so as soon as possible.

In 2003, 95 percent of our Patriot force was deployed, with most of it committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Partner nations contributed 16 additional Patriot batteries to this operation, but collectively, only 50 percent of the Joint Force Commander's critical assets were defended.  An integrated defense would have increased that 50 percent value and improved the defense's effectiveness, most likely defeating the five Iraqi cruise missiles fired into Kuwait and preventing the two fratricides.  Integration is one of the four, doctrinal air and missile defense principles and has been a commander's planning task since World War II^, and maybe even World War I.

Today, we stand on the cusp of being able to operate in an integrated manner.  IBCS's upcoming LUT will inform the Army's fielding decision for only Army systems.  There is no plan or funding to integrate THAAD, or AEGIS, or any element of the homeland's air and missile capabilities.  Success in this summer's test and the decision to field IBCS should be the catalyst to develop and fund a plan to integrate those systems and open the door to partners.  It will also be important to address any latency issues associated with the integration of various systems while ensuring cyber protection for the overall integrated air and missile defense architecture. Congress has a tough job as it attempts to battle and pay for the COVID-19 response, and decrementing the defense budget may be necessary.  If lawmakers make defense a bill payer, they should do so with language that safeguards the Army's air and missile defense capabilities and initiatives and sets the plan for an integrated air and missile defense capability to expand beyond the Army.

If COVID-19 has taught our nation anything, it should be that you cannot fix a problem once you are in the crisis.  The U.S. has clear gaps in air and missile defense capabilities, and we have a plan to address those gaps.  Leaders in the Pentagon and in Congress need to resource, execute, and expand that plan before our warfighters find themselves in a crisis and without the capabilities to meet its challenges.

The Poor Man's Air Force is now much more than just ballistic missiles.  It is unmanned aircraft, rockets, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.  Today, there are more Poor Men with Air Forces than there ever were before.  Our adversaries always go to the path of least resistance, exploiting our capability gaps for their advantage.  The Army has accepted extreme risk in air, and missile defense and its capability gaps are serious and are prime for successful exploitation by an adversary.

None of our other modernization initiatives will matter if we are all dead.  And the likelihood of that increases the longer the holders of the federal purse strings constrain and delay modernization of our air and missile defense force.  The U.S. simply cannot let the pursuit of the perfect solution be the enemy of one that is good enough - especially when good enough improves today's capabilities and is ready to be fielded.  You cannot fix a problem once the battle has begun - and we have a significant problem.

Lieutenant General David L. Mann (U.S. Army, Ret.), is the former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.  His air and missile defense assignments also included Commanding General, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (USSTRATCOM), Commanding General, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and Commanding General, White Sands Missile Range.  Dave has over 35 years of experience in all aspects of space and air and missile defense operations.  He has commanded U.S. Army air and missile defense forces in Iraq, Southwest Asia, and throughout the U.S.  Dave is currently an independent aerospace defense contractor and a Stellar Advisor for Stellar Solutions, Inc.

Major General Roger F. Mathews (U.S. Army, Ret.), is a former Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army-Pacific.  His air and missile defense assignments also included Commanding General of the 94th Army Air & Missile Defense Command, Commandant U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Deputy Commanding General U.S. Army Air Defense Center.  Roger has over 36 years of experience in all aspects of Joint and Combined Integrated Air and Missile Defense.  He has commanded U.S. Army AMD forces and conducted operations in Israel, Germany, and the United States.  Roger is currently an independent aerospace defense contractor and a Stellar Advisor for Stellar Solutions, Inc.

Major General Francis G. Mahon (U.S. Army, Ret.), is a former Director for Strategy, Policy, & Plans at NORAD-U.S. Northern Command.  His air and missile defense assignments also included Director for Test at the Missile Defense Agency, Commanding General of the 32nd Army Air & Missile Defense Command, and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Air Defense Artillery School & Center.  Fran has over 34 years of experience:  in joint, combined, and inter-agency operations; developing operational requirements; testing and integrating new technologies; and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for AMD operations.  He has commanded U.S. Army air and missile defense forces in Southwest Asia, Korea, Germany, and the United States.  Fran is currently an independent aerospace defense contractor and a Stellar Advisor for Stellar Solutions, Inc.

Notes:

1. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/dont-dumb-down-this-us-army-radar/#:~:text=Mark%20Milley%20declared%3A%20%E2%80%9CNone%20of,enemy%20threats%20they%20cannot%20see.>
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=LKBpNW9rE44
3. <https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf>
4. <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM44-2.PDF>,

This article by David L. Mann, Roger F. Mathews, and Francis G. Mahon first appeared in Real Clear Defense on June 16, 2020.

Image: Specialist Tevin Howe and Specialist Eduardo Martinez take part in training on a U.S. Army Patriot surface-to-air missile launcher at Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates, January 12, 2019. Picture taken January 12, 2019. U.S. Air Force/Tech. Sgt. Darnell T. Cannady/Handout via REUTERS.