Who will occupy the White House as the next president of the United States is always a matter of international interest. Lately, it has become an even greater global concern, especially when the world is undergoing significant challenges. Whoever leads the United States will need to decide how to defend the U.S. position within the global rules-based order. Moreover, among the many exacerbating geopolitical issues the incoming president faces, the Indo-Pacific remains the most strategically consequential, not only for U.S. national interest but also for preserving an order rooted in international law, openness, democratic principles, and freedom. The ability to enhance its position in this geographic space would be the yardstick of a presidency that is committed to Indo-Pacific security.

Given Beijing’s series of adversarial and threatening actions in the region, the past few years have witnessed an upsurge in mini-lateral responses. The latest is the “Squad”— a four-way security arrangement between the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The Squad has now become yet another building block to the series of security mini-lateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Quad, AUKUS, the United States-Philippines-Japan, and the United States-Japan-South Korea groupings.

What makes the Indo-Pacific geopolitically significant today is the growing security interdependence between the Indian and the Western Pacific Oceans. This interdependence stems from China’s desire to dominate both theaters through coercion and salami-slicing strategies at the expense of national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and territorial integrity of other countries in the region. 

Addressing the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific requires a holistic, consistent, and symmetrical approach among like-minded countries to maintain the rules-based order. At the same time, it is essential to be mindful that several countries in the Indo-Pacific and beyond do not wish to alienate Beijing as they have strong economic and trade ties with China that are crucial to their national interest. How the next U.S. president navigates this complex scenario is critical for peace, stability, and security in the Indo-Pacific.

Current mini-lateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific are significantly focused on East and Southeast Asia due to China’s growing strategic ties with Southeast Asian countries and its expanding militarization of the South China Sea. Even the Quad’s operations have been primarily centered on the Western Pacific despite India’s presence in the grouping—from constantly affirming the significance of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to expressing concerns over China’s belligerence in the East and South China Seas. At the same time, Quad’s major projects have mainly focused on Southeast Asia. Given the vulnerability to Chinese coercion and various non-traditional security threats, these efforts are undeniably crucial. However, for like-minded democracies to disregard the other half of the Indo-Pacific would be a grave mistake as it would be at the expense of preserving and securing the regional rules-based order and addressing Chinese expansionist and revisionist interests.

The Indian Ocean is characterized by its vital trade routes, underwater sea cables, and energy supplies, along with a plethora of security issues ranging from piracy and terrorism to power competitions. Consequently, this geographic space is vital for China to secure its energy interests, expand its economic dominance, and project more power. Since 2008, China has been beginning to operationalize a two-ocean strategy to exercise more control over the two strategic oceans of the Indo-Pacific. However, while the United States and its allies have been trying to apply pressure on China in the Pacific Ocean, the widening power vacuum in the Indian Ocean provides a worrying opportunity for Beijing to offset its strategic losses in the Western Pacific and still pursue its expansion throughout the greater Indo-Pacific.

In the past decade, China has increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In addition to its naval base in Djibouti, Beijing has also secured military access to ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka and invested in building terminals in Sudan, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates.

Accordingly, China has been openly pursuing its illicit and expansive territorial claims over Nepal, Bhutan, and India. Moreover, Beijing has also entered into fisheries operations agreements with various coastal African countries along the Western Indian Ocean, allowing the former to unfairly compete with local small-scale fisheries in their respective countries’ exclusive economic zones. This will inevitably lead to unsustainable fishing practices and potential ecological damages, similar to what is taking place in the South China Sea.

However, unlike the several organized security arrangements that operate to deter and push back China’s expansionism in the Pacific, no such mechanisms exist in the Indian Ocean. More importantly, the United States has yet to maximize its role as a stabilizing force in this part of the world, leading to more vacuums that continue to be exploited by an expansionist China, thus critically undermining the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Two options need to be considered by the next U.S. president. First, there is a need to reconceptualize the U.S. perspective on the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy at present fails to encompass the entire Indian Ocean, thus limiting proactive policy options. Washington’s Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)’s area of responsibility often ends with India, leaving the rest of the Indian Ocean out of the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific strategic lens. For instance, China’s naval base in the Western Indian Ocean is looked at by Washington through an Africa-centric perspective rather than an Indo-Pacific one. This leaves several stones unturned vis-à-vis Washington’s understanding of China’s expansionist activities in the Indo-Pacific, thereby exposing critical strategic vulnerabilities.

In addition, Washington’s economic ties with the smaller countries of the Indian Ocean have yet to be maximized. Similarly, Australia also shares the same limitation towards its strategic outlook of the Indian Ocean. China has already established its control in the Solomon Islands and, to a large extent, in Nauru. Strong overtures have already been made to Papua and New Guinea and other island nations in the Pacific, which is all part of Canberra’s “backyard.” A similar problem exists in the Indian Ocean. Sadly, the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) project also remains limited to the Eastern Indian Ocean. Recognizing the dangers, U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee members of the House of Representatives introduced the Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review Act in May this year, which required the White House to provide a formal and comprehensive Indian Ocean strategy. Whoever wins this year’s U.S. presidential elections will need to reorient how the United States engages in the Indo-Pacific and formally enunciate this to the House of Representatives.

Second, it will be crucial for the United States to support India’s position in the Indian Ocean more effectively. Amidst China’s expansionist and revisionist activities in the Indian Ocean Region, India has positioned itself as the only Indo-Pacific democracy with the geographic advantage, influence, and operational military heft to balance against China. Today, the Indian Army remains locked in a fierce standoff with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Himalayas. Moreover, since the 2020 Galwan incident, the Indian Army has pushed back incursion attempts by the PLA into India’s side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). For instance, in August 2020, India neutralized China’s military advantage by taking control of the Kailash Range, while in December 2022, the Indian Army repelled China’s incursions into the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector.

Moreover, from 2022–2023, the Indian Navy’s capital budget for buying new platforms and equipment rose by 45 percent from the previous year. Moreover, India has not only increased its naval deployments throughout the entire Indian Ocean but also integrated new equipment and technology into its navy and improved its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Close coordination with India would be in the United States and the Indo-Pacific region’s strategic interests.

In this regard, Washington must appreciate that while India maintains its geographical advantage, this leverage continues to decrease as China expands its military, political, and economic activities in the Indian Ocean to not only constrain India’s position but also to pursue its dominance ambitions in the sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Beijing also continues to use India’s neighbors as offshore balancers to disrupt New Delhi’s diplomatic influence—the most notorious being nuclear-armed Pakistan, which also undermines India’s security and raises sovereignty concerns. Situated in arguably the most complex geopolitical neighborhood in the Indo-Pacific—sandwiched between two nuclear-armed revisionist countries that engage in activities that undermine international law—India needs the support of like-minded democracies. This will help unleash New Delhi’s stabilizing role in the Indian Ocean.

The United States will have to become just as assertive in upholding the rules-based order in the Indian Ocean as it does in the Western Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. This will involve pushing back against China’s adventurism along the LAC, Nepal, and Bhutan, on the one hand, and keeping the maritime domain rules-based through constant coordination with India on the other. In addition, Washington needs to take a more assertive position vis-à-vis Islamabad for continuously destabilizing the region through its direct support of terror groups operating across South Asia. Gaining New Delhi’s trust by distancing those inimical to New Delhi’s interests is critical in this regard. Indeed, while enhancing coordination with India through military cooperation and capacity building, the United States must also provide smaller countries of the Indian Ocean with more transparent and sustainable economic and development options as an alternative to Beijing’s deepening commercial footprints in the region.

Because China faces less strategic risks in its adventurism in the Indian Ocean, it is able to concentrate most of its military force in the Western Pacific, where it already has a clear geographical advantage. Therefore, it will be crucial to apply more cost to China’s overtures in the Indian Ocean in order to multiply its risks throughout the greater Indo-Pacific. As China had enjoyed the strategic benefits of U.S. preoccupation away from Asia during the early 2000s, Washington must inversely apply pressure on China’s military maneuvers in the Western Pacific by more equitably engaging more proactively in the Indian Ocean, along with allies such as Japan, Australia, and European nations. Doing so will force China to recalculate its offensive posture, given the risks of losing ground in the Indian Ocean, especially since one of the major catalysts for Beijing’s increasing involvement in the Indian Ocean is to control and secure its vital energy trade routes fully.

However, for Washington, this will not be easy. The trust deficit between the West and the region is steep and with good reason. The new president and their team need to start making inroads immediately. Additionally, India’s support, because of its goodwill in the region, would be critical in this regard.

Therefore, as Robert Kaplan emphasizes, the Indian Ocean is becoming an undeniable area for global influence. If the United States fails to engage proactively with like-minded partners, the consequences towards U.S. interests and the established order will be damaging. This would be a core expectation from the new U.S. president: how the incumbent responds will determine the future of the Indo-Pacific region. 

Amit Dasgupta is a former diplomat who was India’s Ambassador to the Philippines. Follow him on X @amit_adg. 

Don McLain Gill is a geopolitical analyst and lecturer at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @DonMcLainGill95.

Image: DLeng / Shutterstock.com.