The first decades after World War II were characterized by the bipolar world order between East and West, which had an impact on almost every aspect of international relations. The world got used to it and respected the other side’s red lines in the interest of avoiding a new major war, possibly fought also with nuclear weapons. And, especially since the late 1960s, the West sought to ensure security and stability through dialogue, cooperation, and the establishment of a sustainable military balance through arms control agreements. This was done under the impression that the confrontation between the “systems” was insurmountable. Dramatically increased armament efforts by the United States and NATO, growing economic weaknesses and overstretching on the part of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and “softening,” reformist misjudgments, and diplomatic concessions on the part of the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev finally led to the bloc confrontation being overcome. The Cold War came to an end at the beginning of the 1990s. Western values, which had already been agreed on in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process (see: Helsinki Final Act of 1975) and originally written off by the Warsaw Pact as purely rhetorical concessions of no relevance, prevailed.

The new situation in the states of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, characterized above all by chaotic conditions and disintegration, required stabilization measures to be carried out with finesse and sensitivity. This initially meant hedging the risks due to the traumatic disruption and political dissolution in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe. This was beginning in the early 1990s achieved through the negotiation and implementation of stabilizing arms control agreements such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; the Open Skies Treaty; the START I and II treaties to reduce strategic means of delivery for nuclear weapons; the pledges codified in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to reduce tactical nuclear weapons; and the expansion of confidence- and security-building measures (Vienna Documents). Ultimately, these agreements—together with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) concluded back in 1987—formed the basis for creating mutual trust and a smooth transition to a new phase in which Germany, too, saw the possibility of dramatically reducing its armed forces even unilaterally, without affecting its security.

In addition, the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe,” agreed upon as early as 1990 within the framework of the CSCE, marked the joint commitment to overcoming the division of Europe and to a new peace order based on Western values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The system of collective security that was created in this way—in which all the states of the CSCE (later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE) were to ensure peace and security among themselves jointly, equally, and inclusively—is still the key reference point whenever the security order that was destroyed by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is referred to in official speeches.

However, the CSCE/OSCE as a collective security system did not have a high political status even in the 1990s; it was increasingly marginalized after the turn of the millennium. As an outward-looking defense alliance essentially directed against Russia, NATO remained the dominant security organization for Europe. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, former Warsaw Pact states as well as some of the Soviet Union’s successor states sought to join NATO in order to protect themselves from Russia. Due to historical experience, the aversion to Russia was deep-rooted.

NATO responded to this interest with an expansion process that was initially carried out with great consideration for Russia’s sensitivities. This was reflected in the 2+4 Treaty and in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In addition to an explicit security partnership with Russia, this also involved concrete unilateral military restraint commitments (e.g., NATO refraining from stationing armed forces and nuclear weapons on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic and refraining from stationing “substantial combat forces” as well as nuclear weapons in the new NATO member states).

Boris Yeltsin had reservations about NATO expansion. However, the East-West antagonism intensified markedly when Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush took office in 2000 and 2001. Bush saw a unipolar moment in international relations; he believed that the United States was capable and qualified to dominate international relations. This went hand in hand with an arrogant disregard for the considerations often invoked by the West, especially during the Cold War: Instead of relying on military balance, Bush now proclaimed that the superiority (“full spectrum dominance”) of the American armed forces would ensure security. He also began systematically and without much ado casting off commitments that he perceived as restricting American freedom of action, especially in the area of arms control. In 2002, for example, he withdrew from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (ABM Treaty) concluded with the Soviet Union more than thirty years earlier, which formed the basis for strategic stability between the two great powers. The next phases of NATO expansion were now also being implemented without unilateral military restraint commitments that would cushion Russia. The United States also pushed for Ukraine and Georgia to rapidly join NATO, despite staunch Russian resistance. Germany and France opposed this due to the belief that such a move would provoke Russia and negatively impact European security. They reached a compromise formulation at the NATO summit in 2008 that included the general prospect of NATO membership for both countries but blocked the beginning of the accession process.

Putin felt challenged by the new American policy under Bush. He was ultimately concerned with the recognition and preservation of Russia’s status as a great power on an equal footing with the United States, which the latter actually rejected; they only saw Russia as a “regional power,” as even President Barack Obama still put it. Putin took a clear counter-position to the United States and complained bitterly about the disregard for Russian interests at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. After the chaotic Yeltsin years, however, he saw Russia as hardly able to assert its interests in the short term, either economically or militarily. However, he drew “red lines” for NATO expansion through military interventions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014.

It is evident that Putin has pursued his goals consistently and tenaciously. One example is his focused effort to prevent a feared loss of Russia’s second-strike capability after the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. At the beginning of the 2000s, Russia was still too weak to counter the missile defense with something effective. Yet, from the start, Putin aspired to be able to overcome the American missile defense with new means of delivery. But it took time; it was not until 2018 that Putin unveiled novel systems that would achieve this goal, including a hypersonic missile, a new and more capable heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, and a nuclear-armed underwater torpedo.

And Putin presumably also long focused on the West giving in on the NATO enlargement issue and on additional assurances and arms control agreements taking account of Russian interests and demands. The diplomatic process he initiated in 2021 and the draft agreements Russia proposed in December 2021 setting out Russian demands to the United States and NATO testify to that.

At the same time, however, he was also ultimately prepared to use military means to achieve his goals once the Russian armed forces had regained strength. Even though he miscalculated and was thoroughly mistaken—as far as the capabilities of the Russian armed forces, Ukraine’s will to defend itself, and the West’s resolute reaction are concerned—he still appears to unflinchingly stick with his goals in the Ukraine War. It is questionable whether he will succeed, but that cannot be completely ruled out. In any event, Putin still seems, despite enormous economic and human costs, to bank on prevailing in the end, unwilling to be humiliated.

The Ukraine War has once again made it clear that the world order is subject to a dynamic process of change. The Cold War bipolar world order is long over. And the unipolar moment, which the U.S. administration assumed it had and could use to impose its will in the 2000s, and at least partly during the erratic foreign policy under President Donald Trump, is also history; it only demonstrated the effects of a blatant overestimation of America’s possibilities and capabilities.

For years now, the United States has been focused on Asia and its fast-rising rival China. And it should not have come as a surprise that in view of China’s aggressive foreign policy and her determined and rapid military buildup, NATO’s new strategic concept, adopted on June 29, 2022, for the first time, contains clear passages on China’s policy, which is squarely directed against the interests of the alliance. Today, instead of the old bilateral bloc confrontation that the sides have become accustomed to and settled in for, we are faced with a deepening multipolar rivalry between the great powers.

Or is it ultimately just a new bipolarity between autocracies and democracies? In any case, Russia and China are trying to deepen relations with autocratic regimes through an active foreign policy and also to win over or neutralize the countries of the Third World. China, for example, has now decided on a “Global Security Initiative” aimed at this and is trying to strengthen its global influence and provide a kind of counterweight to Western fora and formats by inter alia maintaining and possibly expanding associations of emerging economies such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

However, there is no rigid “bloc” of authoritarian states. This applies even to Russia and China, despite the fact that at their summit on February 4, 2022, they committed to a “no limits” partnership and stated that their relationship was superior to any Cold War alliance. China is clearly pursuing selfish interests, which is also reflected in the Silk Road initiative toward the Central Asian successor states of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine did not come at a convenient time for China, as it could thwart or at least hinder China’s economic rise and efforts to overtake the United States as the strongest economy as quickly as possible. The apparent Chinese reluctance to support the Russian war of aggression—i.e., Beijing’s abstention in the vote in the UN Security Council on Russia’s declared annexations in southern and eastern Ukraine on September 30, 2022—has awakened hopes.

Still, it would be unrealistic to expect China to turn its back on Russia, which it will preserve as a geopolitical partner in the (looming) confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. For its part, Russia remains dependent on China’s goodwill and support in the current situation; however, Putin will have to be content with Russia’s position as a junior partner, which is unlikely to please him. This notwithstanding, China will not be able to stop Putin from further military escalation in the face of a Russian military defeat in Ukraine.

China can be assumed to reject the economic “deglobalization” emerging as a result of the war. However, it remains to be seen whether, in view of the developments that have occurred in the meantime and in particular the high tensions over Taiwan, which is of paramount political importance for President Xi Jinping, a different Chinese calculus has set in.

But there are also forces in the United States that are banking on a division of the world into democracies and autocracies. However, it cannot be assumed that time works for democracy. After a continuous increase in the number of democratic states in recent decades, their number has been declining in the last few years. According to The Economist’s Democracy Index, only twenty-one states were classified as “full democracies” in 2021. And these worrying autocratic and autocratic-populist tendencies are not only found in some EU states. In the United States, the prospect of an “America First” Republican president taking power again in 2024 gives rise to particular concerns regarding the development of international relations.

There are good reasons why the West should not rely on democracies succeeding in a confrontation with autocracies. Autocratically-governed states are not necessarily less successful economically—as the example of China shows. They are integrated into the world economy, which has benefited their economic advancement and success. And they are very important suppliers not only of industrial goods but also of strategically important raw materials. There are also a number of democracies that cannot be won over to a categorical course of demarcation of ostracizing autocratic states. This applies to countries such as India, which hopes to obtain economic benefits from continued cooperation with Russia. In addition, the reserved wait-and-see attitude of important Third World countries (e.g., South Africa) should not be underestimated. These countries (rightly or wrongly) did not see themselves sufficiently recognized and respected by the developed Western world in the past; now they are called upon to take a stand against Russia and China and to sanction these states, which they resent as that would entail considerable economic disadvantages for themselves.

Why the above explanations and the extensive historical discourse? By now we should all be aware that we must adapt to a new world order or disorder, to major new threats to peace, security, and our values. But the Zeitenwende (turning point) proclaimed by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz was not a completely unforeseen turning point. The Russian war against Ukraine marks an unexpected and incisive change. But it is also part of a historical process that is now taking place with increased dynamism.

It is now more important than ever to defend our freedom and values by shaping a well-fortified democracy and pursuing proactive policies in the alliance and the EU. And despite the understandable moral outrage and righteous anger at Putin’s war realities, escalation risks, and existing political constraints must not be ignored.

In relation to Russia, we are in a new, intensified phase of confrontation, on the brink of a Cold War 2.0. In many respects, this Cold War is not comparable to the old Cold War after World War II. Nevertheless, in shaping the now critical transitional phase that should again result in a stable, predictable world order, we should draw and apply lessons from the previous Cold War. Now is not the time of arrogance that in some respects shaped the West for many years after the end of the division of Europe and especially after the turn of the millennium.

The complexity of the current international situation requires multilayered foreign policy responses. The focus must be on safeguarding our freedom and democracy as well as preventing a major war, which could imply existential dangers for all of humanity. Escalation risks must be tackled, not simply dismissed or ignored—as is often unfortunately the case in relation to the war in Ukraine. The following tasks can be identified as priorities:

1. Maintaining adequate defense and political solidarity to deter aggression and to defend the territory of all NATO member states. That is the very basis for the security policy to be pursued. This makes it particularly urgent for Germany—as for all other European NATO partners—to eliminate the significant equipment and capability deficits of the Bundeswehr. The measures taken to date—in particular the special fund of EUR 100 billion recently allocated to the Bundeswehr to close capability gaps and modernize its arms and equipment—are unlikely to be sufficient. Also, questions such as the reinstatement of compulsory national service should not be taboo.

2. Within the framework of NATO, an effective multinational forward defense on the border with Russia (possibly based on the model of the past Cold War) must be organized in order to be able effectively and sustainably deter an attack or a “spillover” onto the alliance’s territory.

3. In view of future uncertainties concerning the political course of the United States and the resulting effects on transatlantic relations, but also in view of the intensification of the multipolar great power rivalry that will characterize the world order, the EU should significantly strengthen its ability to assert itself on the global stage and also achieve strategic militarily autonomy (including through an independent nuclear deterrent).

4. The competition and rivalry among the great powers require skillful management and sound judgment based on realpolitik considerations. A deliberate policy of confrontation between autocracies and democracies would only intensify rivalries. It should therefore be avoided, as should the exclusion or ostracizing of individual states. Common interests and challenges such as dealing with climate change should form a key guiding principle. It will be of key importance to defend and strengthen wherever possible a rules-based international order. This is above all in the interest of smaller states, which otherwise cannot individually assert their interests vis-à-vis the great powers.

5. Despite the less-than-favorable forecasts, everything should be done to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. To that end, a balance of interests should be sought between Russia and Ukraine. However—and this will prove to be a particularly daunting challenge—the setting of false precedents must be avoided. The latter means that Russia must not be rewarded for the war of aggression it launched in contravention of international law. As it has the necessary political clout, the United States should engage Russia as an equal, and push decisively for a diplomatic solution. For such a solution, both sides will have to abandon their expectation to win the war and will have to accept bitter and sometimes face-saving compromises. The great risk of escalation, the high number of victims to be expected in a long-lasting military conflict, as well as major disruptive consequences, felt in virtually all parts of the world should not simply be accepted.

6. In view of the prospect of a largely unregulated new Cold War (following the dismissal or abandonment of the previous arms control acquis), it is necessary quickly to resume the dialogue between the great powers and to revive arms control. This is necessary not only to stabilize the military confrontation and avoid miscalculations. Arms control policy measures could also prevent a new arms race and excessive defense spending, thus freeing up necessary resources for effectively meeting jointly the challenges facing mankind as a whole (in particular, climate change, global health care, and support for sustainable livelihoods).

7. Efforts to strengthen and expand rules-based regulatory frameworks should be continued vigorously at both global and regional levels. Cooperation among the P5 states (the United States, China, Russia, France, and Great Britain), which are privileged by the UN system, must also be promoted in the interest of containing their rivalry. These five nuclear-weapon states, recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have common non-proliferation interests. In the short term, for example, it will be important to preserve the NPT regime despite the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, from which the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018.

8. In the interest of peace and stability, the major powers’ so-called “red lines” (be they declared or not) require special attention. In view of the danger of escalation, central red lines must, as was done in the last Cold War, be respected. To this end, NATO should refrain from pushing the enlargement process and accepting Ukraine and Caucasus states as members. And the EU should forgo unnecessarily provocative symbolic political gestures and refrain from prominently focusing on the prospect of Ukraine becoming a member state.

9. Globalization should not be fundamentally called into question; anyhow, this is hardly possible in view of the level of economic integration that has been reached. For countries like Germany that are dependent on functioning world trade, this would also result in as yet unforeseeable but major losses in prosperity. In addition, despite all the doomsayers, it remains true that trade and economic cooperation have an effect that promotes stability and mutual understanding. Irrespective of this, it is important to reduce one-sided dependencies in the interest of avoiding the possibility of being blackmailed (however, it is questionable whether this will succeed in all cases).

10. In view of the new great power rivalry, competition for the approval and support of important countries in the Third World will also increase. The West needs to better involve these states, intensify relations with them, and to provide economic incentives and investments.

The above list may look like an enumeration of pious wishes. In a way it is. The political agenda points listed need to be transformed into concrete policies. Their implementation may seem unrealistic in the short term; nevertheless, the list provides a guide for the foreign policy challenges to be met.

We should all become aware of the challenges posed by today’s radical changes to the world order. Certainly, the risks inherent in them are not entirely manageable. Nevertheless, they require decisive action. It is often necessary to break new ground; but the lessons of the past Cold War should not be ignored either. Bold and pithy words alone are just as insufficient as emphasizing the need for joint action. Shaping a stable world order requires political leadership. And leadership requires a strong and clear sense of realpolitik.

Rüdiger Lüdeking is a former German diplomat. He has served, inter alia, as Ambassador and Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control, Permanent Representative to the United Nations and to the other International Organizations in Vienna and as
Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Before retiring in 2018 he served as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium.

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