In ancient Rome, Janus was revered as the two-faced god of beginnings and transitions. Hence comes the naming of the first month of the year, January. In modern Rome, the government of Giorgia Meloni has adopted a Janus-like stance as it encounters a new global environment. Her government’s foreign policy entails vigorous support of and closer alliance with the West. At home, illiberal, even harsh, rhetoric sets the tone on social issues and immigration. 

At the time of Meloni’s inauguration in October 2022, the world was undergoing the most comprehensive and rapid changes since the end of the Cold War. Like its NATO and EU allies, the new government did not have the luxury of sticking to the status quo. This was not only because of the severe nature of the changes, including the war in Ukraine and a global pandemic, but also because Italy was now expected to take responsibility commensurate with its heightened place of power in an EU diminished by the loss of the UK.

Since 2019, Europe, the United States, and the world have seen several significant changes affecting the policies of all states, including Italy:

The Global Pandemic. In Europe, COVID hit first and worst in Italy, the country with the most vulnerable population in Europe. The economy and foreign trade slumped. What had been dynamic trade and investment growth between EU members and China dropped sharply. COVID especially damaged Italy’s view of China as Beijing rejected responsibility for the spread of the disease. Despite touting its aid packages, China largely left richer European countries out of its COVID diplomacy. Instead, Italy received billions of euros in COVID aid from the EU, and Western countries could respond and recover quickly, while China languished under a nationwide lockdown.

A Different EU. As of 2021, Italy became the bloc’s third-largest economy and second-most powerful military. The departure of the UK also left Italy as the third leading recipient of Chinese investment inside the EU (after Germany and France), a distinction made all the more important by the EU’s implementation in 2020 of a foreign investment screening mechanism. It is also the third leading customer for Chinese goods, which account for nearly 18 percent of Italy’s non-EU imports. At home, the Chinese community in Italy is the largest in Europe, numbering more than 300,000 people. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s decision to invade his neighbor galvanized Western opposition to international aggression in a way that the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the creation of puppet states in eastern Ukraine had not. NATO was reinvigorated and enlarged. Against all expectations, the EU adopted and expanded trade and financial sanctions against Russia that have held. This led virtually all of Europe to radically reduce their imports of energy from Russia (especially natural gas) and shift to alternative suppliers like Algeria and the United States. Before the war, 40 percent of Italy’s gas imports came from Russia; a year later, this figure was less than half that percentage. Both NATO and the EU have gained stature and clout not seen since the days of the communist collapse in Eastern Europe. In contrast, Russia saw more than 1,000 multinational companies pull out, and one-half million of its most highly qualified citizens leave as a result of the country’s isolation and Vladimir Putin’s authoritarianism.

The weakening of China. In the last decade, China’s once robust growth rates have fallen, a decline reinforced by COVID-19 and its aftermath. Both inward and outward direct investment have plummeted, with Chinese investment in Europe falling by more than 40 percent since its peak in 2018. Even before COVID, Beijing’s policies, such as favoring its own state-run enterprises, heavily skewed trade balances, and unfilled growth promises, damaged China’s appeal. As Europe’s suspicion of predatory Chinese policies grew and Beijing’s relations with the United States soured, global firms grew wary and sought returns elsewhere. Chinese presence in the global market has fallen—exports were down nearly 5 percent in 2023—and shifted toward more compatible political allies, like Russia, where trade was up more than 26 percent.

Using nationalism as a substitute for weakening economic payoffs, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has reinforced Chinese military presence in the South China Sea and parroted Russia’s view of the causes of its war against Ukraine. Along with the shrinking and criticism of its centerpiece “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) China’s posture as a protector of national sovereignty has been discredited. Chinese rhetoric and actions have provoked more defensive security postures from Japan, Australia, NATO, and the EU, as well as unprecedented political and military cooperation in South Asia and the South Pacific. More directly, Beijing’s aping Moscow stimulated worries about China with a “Ukraine is the future of Taiwan” theme. In the current world of skewed multipolarity, Chinese influence and power are at their lowest point since the creation of the BRI.

U.S.-China Tensions. Confrontational trade policies, begun under the volatile administration of Donald Trump, have continued under Joseph Biden and have primarily focused on limiting Chinese access to high-end technology. U.S.-China trade in 2023 fell by more than 13 percent, and Chinese investment in the United States has “all but disappeared,” according to AEI’s Global Investment Tracker. Military maneuvers, as well as rhetoric around Taiwan and its recent elections, have increased the island’s salience to levels not seen since the Cold War. Real and proposed restrictions on Chinese investment and trade in the United States have been mirrored in Europe as the EU pursues a “de-risk” strategy to reduce its dependence on Chinese goods and money. As Xi Jinping has tightened his grip on power and continued repressive measures on groups such as the Uighurs, pressure has grown on Europeans to speak out, and members like Italy and the EU’s own institutions have done so.

War in the Middle East. The long and tense standoff between Israel and the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip erupted into brutal violence with the terrorist attack on kibbutzniks, music festival attendees, and other civilians on October 7, 2023. That attack and Israel’s devastating response in Gaza meant that whatever “balance” had existed, allowing European states and the United States to pursue a slow and steady path toward “normalcy” in the region, was destroyed. Governments worldwide have been obliged to respond to this warfare and other regional consequences within the constraints of their alliances and complex societies.

The Rightward Election in Italy

Founded in 2012, Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) party was long on the sidelines of politics, achieving under 2 percent of the vote in the 2013 general election and under 5 percent in 2018. The fracturing in 2019 of the diverse coalition headed by the Five Star Movement led to two consecutive governments led by Giuseppe Conte, then a new coalition led by the former head of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, which lasted twenty months. Amid these shifting dynamics, Giorgia Meloni’s campaign in 2022 combined right-wing political and social positions with intensely personal postures. She promised to defend the Italian nation under the slogan “Pronti” (ready). But, she showed a moderate position on geostrategic matters and a firm commitment to the EU, NATO, and the trans-Atlantic partnership. Meloni dampened anti-EU rhetoric and offered fulsome support for Ukraine. 

Looking inward, she pledged to reverse the country’s “economic, social and cultural decline,” promoting tax cuts for Italian companies and families, protection of Italian businesses and workers, and policies to increase birth rates. During the campaign, she portrayed herself as a hard-working unmarried mother living (at the time) with the father of her child. In the 2022 election, the Brothers of Italy placed first with 26 percent of the vote. They formed a coalition that included the nationalist Lega (League) led by Matteo Salvini and the center-right Forza Italia (Go Italy) led then by Silvio Berlusconi.

A year into her premiership and following the death of Silvio Berlusconi in June 2023, Meloni remains the most popular politician in the country with 44 percent approval ratings, while her party is supported by 30 percent. Though Meloni’s government represents the most right-leaning coalition in Italian republican history, fears that Meloni would take Italy down a radical-right path with disastrous consequences for the Western alliance have not materialized. At the same time, the government has followed a script of calculated attacks on cultural movements (e.g. gay rights) deemed dangerous for the country and its people. It promises to limit migration, especially from Africa. Utilizing executive decrees much more than her predecessors, Meloni’s numerous initiatives are more for show than impact, with proposals like the decree on selective acceptance of migrants and a ban on adult male migrants struck down as unconstitutional or watered-down in Parliament.

A Newly Muscular Partner

Domestic rhetoric notwithstanding, Meloni’s external policies and commitments to activism have been heartening to its Atlantic allies. Italy is now the most capable naval power in the Mediterranean. It is increasingly seen as the preferred partner there, as NATO ally Turkey clashes with Greece and appears unwilling to cut economic ties to Russia. While Ankara has been denied the sale of the most advanced F-35 fighters because it purchased a Russian anti-missile system, Italy’s highly skilled engineering sector plays a crucial role in producing and selling this fighter. 

More broadly, Rome has taken firm stances against challenges to Western hegemony—whether from Russia or China. In response to the Russian invasion, Italy has been one of the most vigorous supporters of Ukraine, both in rhetoric and material, including anti-tank systems, rockets, and surface-to-air missiles. Rome strongly supports Kyiv’s path to EU membership and its reconstruction. In November 2023, the Meloni government began discussing a long-term defense agreement with Ukraine. The country sharply cut imports from Russia in support of sanctions. Purchases of Russian natural gas fell by two-thirds after the invasion and were replaced with gas from Northern Europe and LNG from Qatar and the United States. To adjust, Italy imposed nationwide gas rationing that cut heating levels to both public and private buildings. 

Relations with China have cooled sharply, a process begun under the previous government. Like Mario Draghi, Prime Minister Meloni invoked Italy’s “golden powers” to block prerogatives by China’s Sinochem in the Pirelli Tire company despite its more than one-third share of ownership. Unlike Germany or France, Italy did not try to parse or water down the EU’s initiative to “de-risk” political and economic ties with China. Europe’s leaders have produced strong criticism of China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, its threats to Taiwan, and its suppression of human rights. Economic measures under consideration involve export controls, strengthening of scrutiny of Chinese investments into the EU, and, for the first time, vetting those of EU firms in China. 

In an unprecedented move in the spring of 2023, Italy confirmed that it plans to send the aircraft carrier Cavour and its accompanying flotilla to the South Pacific, an unmistakable show of closer alignment with the U.S. stance on Chinese claim to hegemony in the region. The carrier will head to Japan to brandish strong ties (including joint production of the F-35 fighter) with an alarmed—and rearming—Japan. In 2023, Italy upgraded its relations with Japan to the “strategic” level during a visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Rome. It did the same with India during an exchange of high-level visits. In October, a second representative office of the Taiwan government opened in Milan in a ceremony attended by the Taiwanese Foreign Minister.

After signaling for months that it would not renew its agreement to be part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, Rome officially withdrew in December 2023. Expected gains in trade and investment within this framework had not materialized. As the only G-7 country to have joined, Italy’s position was discordant with both the United States and the EU. Instead, the Meloni government has indicated that it will work to “revitalize” its longstanding strategic partnership with China.

When war broke out in the Middle East, the Meloni government made clear its condemnation of the Hamas terrorist attack and support of Israel. At the end of November, Rome abstained on a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire because the declaration did not condemn Hamas or support Israel’s right to defend itself. Its stance has generally hewed closely to that of the United States and its major EU partners—calling for sanctions against Hamas, for example. The Meloni government has engaged in both its own and multilateral diplomacy to end the fighting and support a two-state solution. At the same time, when attacks by Houthi rebels on shipping in the region began, the Defense Ministry sent a second frigate to help boost the ongoing EU anti-piracy operation.

Italy’s dance with the EU itself has been complex, owing to earlier policies imposed on Rome when Italy found its national debt level untenable. But with some €70 billion in Recovery Funds smoothing the way, widespread fears that the Meloni government would derail the EU’s actions were not realized. In any case, budget policies have turned out not to be the most prominent bone of contention in new Italy-EU relations.

Migration and Gay Rights: Janus Faces Inward

No policy area better illustrates the Janus-like nature of Rome’s policies than its attempt to deal with tens of thousands of African, Middle Eastern, and Asian immigrants in a way that satisfies key domestic constituencies while not alienating EU allies.

Both Prime Minister Meloni and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini have promised to stop the hazardous journeys of overfilled boats across the Mediterranean. A controversial decree was made a law by Parliament in May 2023, authorizing the detention of migrants in so-called Repatriation Detention Centers where conditions resemble prisons. The law was met with an outcry by magistrates, including a judge from Catania who refused to enforce the law and liberated on at least two occasions detained migrants, resulting in a major scandal, accusations, and defamation by members of the governing coalition. Another decree approved at the end of 2022 mandated that rescue ships can only carry out one rescue at a time and must dock and unload migrants before going out again. The decree puts significant limitations on rescue efforts and has been repeatedly violated by Italy’s own Coastal Guard. Most dramatically, the government produced an agreement with Albania that envisioned opening two centers for migrants there with costs to be covered by Italy. In December 2023, the Albanian Constitutional Court blocked the agreement’s ratification, making its future uncertain. 

Despite these and other harsh measures, the number of migrants in 2023 more than doubled compared to 2021, surpassing 150,000. Meanwhile, Meloni has also turned to the EU for help, hoping Brussels will conclude an agreement with Tunisia that mirrors the Libyan “naval blockade” that targets boats with migrants, a practice that has drawn much criticism.

In domestic policy, Meloni has led a vigorous charge aimed at restricting gay rights. In July 2023, Parliament passed a law that criminalizes parents who use surrogates to produce and adopt children, even if the process was legally carried out overseas. The law resulted in outrage among the LGBTQ+ community. All the while, Meloni has insisted that a child needs a father and a mother. However, the prime minister herself recently separated from the father of her child, whom she never married.

Tests Ahead

For Giorgia Meloni and her coalition partners, the choices for Italy in the new dangerous world are both civilizational and pragmatic, symbolic and instrumental. The practical consequences of leaving the BRI, for example, are few. High levels of Chinese investment in the UK, France, and Germany demonstrate that a BRI framework is unnecessary. However, reversing this policy has enormous symbolic significance as a demonstration of strong allied ties. Perhaps serendipitously, restricting Chinese investment in Sinochem also paved the way for an increased stake by an Italian company. 

Globally, closer cooperation with the EU and tighter alliance with the United States—for example, in the Indo-Pacific—not only secure concrete gains, e.g., for the Italian defense industry, but also provide Rome with the structure and platform on which the Meloni government can take its stance as a critical ally.

The challenge for Rome will come as that allied superstructure weakens. The level of new Western material support for Ukraine, for example, has fallen to its lowest level since the start of the war. Europe’s unity in condemning Hamas’ attack on Israel is being tested by the horrific humanitarian crisis the war has produced and by political divisions at home. Most directly—and most emblematic of the pressure on Rome’s contemporary Janus—the Meloni government needs to find a way to effectively respond to people’s desperate search for a better life that lands them on its shores—which are also those of the EU.

Ronald H. Linden is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and former Director of European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. During the spring of 2023, he was a Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science of Sapienza University, Rome. Recent publications include Is the Chinese Dream Turning into a Chinese Nightmare for Beijing?

Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Dean of Temple University Rome. Recent publications include The Impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, with Gilles Ivaldi and A Delicate Balancing Act: Turkish-Bulgarian Relations within the Context of Foreign and Domestic Politics.

Correction: A previous version of this article mistakenly stated that the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour had been sent to the South Pacific in 2023. Although the voyage is still planned, as of February 6, 2024, it has not yet made the journey.

Image: Shutterstock.com.