Is Peace in Syria Finally Within Reach?
The proposed U.S.-Russian bargain could be our last chance.
The recent ISIS-inspired and/or contrived terror attacks in Istanbul, Baghdad, Al Qaa (Lebanon), Mecca and Dhaka graphically reflect both the bestiality and the long reach of the Salafi-jihadi organization. To many observers, ISIS, despite losing ground in Iraq and Syria, has been expanding its power across continents. True, ISIS has been diligent in expanding and projecting its terror network beyond its self-proclaimed border in the Levant; nevertheless, ISIS is facing a newly configurational development in Syria that could bring an end to its capital in Raqqa. Significantly, this new configuration has opened the horizon for a political settlement to the Syrian crisis.
Overshadowed by the terror attack on Istanbul’s international airport in late June 2016, which left forty-four people dead and dozens injured, Turkey’s policy realignment by mending ties with Russia and Israel underscored the failure of Ankara’s Syria policy. Days before the terror attack, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a letter of condolence to Russian president Vladimir Putin, in which Erdoğan formally apologized for the death of a Russian pilot whose aircraft was shot down near the Syrian border last November by Turkey. Erdoğan also offered to pay compensation to the pilot’s family.
Putin responded by moving to lift sanctions on Turkey and calling Erdoğan to convey his condolences for Istanbul’s suicide bombing. Soon thereafter, Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, met with his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in Russia’s Black Sea resort of Sochi. The two officials affirmed the readiness of the two countries to normalize their relations and to restart a working group on fighting terrorism. Significantly, Lavrov emphasized that Moscow would be discussing difficult issues with Ankara, including “the task of preventing the terrorist infiltration into Syria from abroad, the task of preventing the use of Turkish territory in support of terrorist organizations in Syria.”
This clear Turkish political volte-face was justified by Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, who stated on July 3 that “Russia is our eternal neighbor therefore the temporary deterioration in our relations is not something any of us wanted.” He added: “Our priority target is to remain friends with all the countries neighboring the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea; to use the opportunities with them instead of having crises.” Acknowledging that its foreign-policy objectives have been unsettled particularly as a result of its involvement in the Syrian civil war, Turkey is apparently reviving its “Strategic Depth Doctrine,” as devised by the country’s former prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. His doctrine aspired to transform Turkey from a central power into a global power, based on its unique geostrategic position and Ottoman legacy, while at the same time enhancing its stature by engaging regional countries so as to achieve “zero problems” with them.
On closer examination, however, Turkey’s political about-face is more the product of its recognition that its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, together with its ramifications for Ankara, has brought the county to the precipice of potential disintegration. Coming in the wake of successive terror acts committed by ISIS, the recent Istanbul suicide bombing is only a testament that Turkey’s policy of turning a blind eye to jihadi infiltration into Syria to fight the Assad regime had left behind a wide network of Salafi-jihadists, including Turks. The moment Turkey realized its strategic mistake and aligned itself with the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS by first opening Incirlik Air Base in September 2015 to American aircraft, Ankara has become the target of ISIS. It’s an open secret that during Turkey’s laissez-faire policy from 2011 to mid-2015, Salafi-jihadists established deep terror cells in the country, especially in Adıyaman, Antakya, Istanbul and Kilis, which also served as logistical conduits for foreign jihadi fighters making their way into Syria. The terrorists behind the Istanbul airport suicide bombing were foreign Syrian jihadi fighters from Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Similarly, as shown in Russian-Turkish discussions, Turkey has apparently recognized the fact that all Salafi-jihadi organizations, including ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, are terrorist organizations that can no longer be supported directly or indirectly to remove the Assad regime.
No less significant, Turkey, which played a key role in supporting the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime, has found itself at cross-purposes with the anti-Assad camp. By emerging as key players against both the Assad regime and ISIS, the Kurds of northern Syria have situated themselves at the center of American efforts to create a reliable pro-Western and effective anti-ISIS force. But the Kurdish forces of Rojava, the Kurdish name for the area in northern Syria currently controlled by the Kurdish forces, known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG), are considered as a terrorist group by Turkey for their alliance with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which the United States and Turkey have designated as a terrorist organization. Consequently, Turkey has been furious with American support of the YPG.
Nevertheless, Washington has justified its support for the YPG on the grounds that it is part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which includes Arabs and Turkmen, fighting ISIS. This has not allayed the concerns of Turkey about a fait accompli autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria assisting and fueling the PKK-led Kurdish rebellion in Turkey. The PKK has fought intermittently for decades to establish Kurdish autonomy in Turkey. Although it had signed off on a truce with the Turkish government while its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, negotiated a peace deal with the government, the truce collapsed in July 2015. In response, the PKK has resumed its rebellion throughout Kurdish majority areas, whose strategic depth is none other than Rojava. Ultimately, for Turkey, the fight against what it considers Kurdish separatism can no longer be separated from its need to curb the potential of full Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria.
What made this situation untenable for Turkey have been the political and military ramifications of the potential outcomes of the ongoing battle over Aleppo and its countryside. Supported by the United States, the SDF has led a campaign to seize the city of Manbij from ISIS. Manbij is a strategic area west of the Euphrates river, near the Turkish border, and a bulwark for ISIS’s stronghold in Raqqa and its countryside. At the same time, Syrian opposition groups, led by Salafi-jihadi groups that Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam and al-Nusra, have been trying to prevent the Assad regime and its allies from taking over Castello Road, which constitutes the only route into rebel-held areas of Aleppo. Meanwhile, following its recent seizure of the Menagh air base and Tal Rifaat, the YPG, supported by both United States and Russia, has reinforced its presence in Aleppo’s northern countryside and around the important border town of Azaz. This has left Turkey with grim consequences should the Salafi-jihadists or the YPG win the battle for Aleppo and its countryside.
Should the Salafi-jihadists expand their power to the border of Turkey, they will surely double down their terrorism threat to that country. Should the YPG win the battle for Aleppo’s countryside, they will succeed in creating a contiguous Kurdish-controlled territory across the whole Syrian-Turkish border (connecting Qamishli, Tal Abyad and Kobani with Afrin). Moreover, Turkey would have its whole border with both Iraq and Syria controlled by the Kurds. For Turkey, this scenario is tantamount to a death sentence.
As a result, Turkey has realigned its political priorities and moved to protect its national interest. This, however, does not mean that Turkey has abandoned its policy of opposing the Assad regime. Similarly, faced by a stalemate in Yemen, fiscal problems, and internal dissent and terrorism, Saudi Arabia cannot on its own effectively lead the anti-Assad camp. Moreover, some of its important allies, such as Egypt and Jordan, have already changed their priorities in Syria. Surely enough, this means that the anti-Assad campaign to remove the Assad regime has been overtaken by other pressing priorities, leading to the failure of its Syrian policy.
However, this failure of anti-Assad policy has not been translated into a victory for the pro-Assad camp. Cracks in the pro-Assad camp have become visible, as strategic priorities among the Assad regime’s defenders, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, have cast a pall over the regime’s ambition and status. Russia has assured its allies that while its political and military involvement in Syria is about protecting the Syrian regime, it is willing neither to participate in an open-ended conflict nor to lead the way for the Assad regime to retake its lost territories. Cognizant of the shortage of fresh conscripts in the regime’s war machine, and reluctant to introduce its own troops to Syria, Russia has focused on Alawite territories and their approaches from Aleppo in the northwest to Damascus to Dara’a in the southwest, which make up Syria’s urban centers and the country’s outlet to the Mediterranean.
Moreover, Russia also has made clear to its Iranian and Hezbollah allies that it will not be party to any effort affecting Israel’s security. More specifically, Russia has thus far sanctioned Israeli actions in Syria if Jerusalem’s security has been threatened. In fact, Israel has maintained its policy of intercepting weapons smuggled to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and of assassinating operatives scheming to undermine Jerusalem’s security. For example, on December 19, Israeli jets bombed the dwelling of Hezbollah operative Samir Kuntar in a suburb of Damascus.
Obviously, Russia is now interested in a settlement securing the Assad regime and targeting Salafi-jihadists. It has recently pressed for a truce in Aleppo, which neither the Assad regime nor Hezbollah initially favored. Eventually, the truce was violated. As it turned out, in June 2016, the dynamics produced by the violated truce revealed that the key players in the pro-Assad camp had incongruent priorities and expectations. The regime’s forces came under attack in the southern countryside of Aleppo. Not only did the regime’s forces decide to withdraw from strategic areas seized by Hezbollah at a significant human cost, but they also exposed Hezbollah’s flank, leading to the murder of several Hezbollah fighters. Furious with what it considered a reckless and cowardly act by the regime’s forces, Hezbollah retaliated by gunning down the Syrian officer who gave the order for withdrawal. In response, the regime used its aircraft to fire at Hezbollah fighters.
Although the fallout between Hezbollah and the regime’s forces was tactical and swiftly nursed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah has espoused a more assertive attitude vis-à-vis the regime in the pro-Assad camp’s decision-making process. It’s no secret that Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah has a considerable disdain for Assad’s security officers, on account of their corruption and depravity. Moreover, reports has circulated that Hezbollah has begun an effort not only to reinforce its military presence in Syria, but also to complement this presence with a social infrastructure in line with and serving as an extension to what the Islamist party has in Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s actions did not go unheeded. Revelations of hostility between Assad forces and Hezbollah soon appeared on social media. A pro-Assad member of parliament, Sharif Shehadeh, wrote a post on his Facebook page in which he criticized Hezbollah for violating Syria’s sovereignty. He wrote: “National sovereignty is a red line—decisions must always be made by the Syrian army. . . . My sons in Hezbollah, you came to support us and not to dominate us. I urge you to rethink your calculations.”
In the meantime, Iran has shown signs that it is shifting its policy in Syria toward a political resolution. In a joint press conference with his Norwegian counterpart on June 13, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif stated: “The Syrian crisis can be only resolved politically, and a solution to the Syrian crisis will not be achieved through military means.” This focus on a political solution came on the heels of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council announcing that its secretary, Ali Shamkhani, was appointed as Iran’s senior coordinator for political, military and security affairs with Syria and Russia. Following a meeting with Russian defense minister Sergey Shoigu in Tehran on June 10, Shamkhani stated that “it is necessary that inter-Syrian dialogue replace war and bloodletting in the country.”
Apparently these statements, and the new position obviously created to coordinate with Russia on Syria, support the view that Iran is now ready for a political settlement in Syria. This view falls in line with Iranian attempts to forge deeper relations with Russia and cut its human losses and those of its ally Hezbollah. For Iran, the main objective of securing a vital area in Syria serving to extend its influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean has been achieved. It is a matter now of planning how to protect this arc of influence from Tehran to West Beirut, an endeavor hardly possible without Russian support. Certainly, it took Russian diplomatic and military involvement in Syria to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime despite Iran and Hezbollah’s support.
Consequently, one could safely argue that the key players defending the Assad regime have plans incongruent with Assad’s outlook for Syria. Only recently in June 2016, in his first address to the newly installed parliament, Assad vowed to recapture every inch of Syria. This is clearly out of touch with the reality dawning on Syria that Hezbollah, Iran and Russia have as much say about the future of Syria as Assad. Moreover, it is hardly possible that Assad has the manpower to reconquer the territory that his regime lost. Put in strategic terms, Assad has become a pawn for Iran and Russia’s strategic vision for the Levant, where their interest overlaps in Syria.
Taking all this into consideration, it becomes clear that the Syrian crisis has undergone a new configuration, whereby the pro and anti-Assad camps have seen their both priorities change and overall Syrian policies fail. This has thrown Syria into a deadly impasse with thousands of militants hardly ready to give up their weapons and go home. But what this impasse has yielded is a realization among the key players in Syria that a political settlement is now the only option to stop the bloodletting and the consequential regional and global spillover of the Syrian crisis.
Against this background, it becomes foolhardy for the United States to engage in any military activity against the Assad regime, as proposed by a number of U.S. State Department officials. Rather, it behooves United States to take the lead and negotiate with Russia first and then with Syria’s neighbors the demarcation of red lines as cease fire lines in the country, while at the same time planning an alternative to the Assad leadership. The recent proposed American plan for a U.S.-Russian Joint Implementation Group is a significant step in the right direction.
The purpose of the JIG is “to enable expanded coordination between the United States and the Russian Federation beyond the established safety of flight procedures. The participants, through the JIG, are to work together to defeat Jabhat al Nusra and Daesh [ISIS] within the context of strengthening the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) and supporting the political transition process outlined in UNSCR 2254.” Some analysts have criticized the Terms of Reference of the JIG for its misplaced belief that Russia and the Assad regime would hold up their end of the bargain. By violating the agreement, the Assad regime, as the analysts assert, would kill the prospects of turning the cessation of hostilities into a true ceasefire.
While it is possible that the Assad regime may violate the agreement, its violation would be more tactical for, as I tried to show, the regime’s hands are tied to Iran and Russia’s strategy. The war in Syria will not end any time soon. But some dark clouds on the horizon for its settlement have been cleared.
Robert G. Rabil is a professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. He is the author most recently of Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism (2014) and the forthcoming The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: The Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host Communities (2016).
Image: Fighting between Kurdish gunmen and Jabhat al-Nusra Front in the town of Ras al-Ayn. Wikimedia Commons/Younes Mohammad