Jacob Heilbrunn: What is your assessment of the state of U.S.-Russia relations?

Sergei Ryabkov: The current state of our bilateral relations is probably worse than we have experienced for decades preceding this current moment. I don’t want to compare this with Cold War times because that era was different from what we have now—in some ways, more predictable; in some ways, more dangerous. From Moscow’s perspective, the Trump era is worrying because we move from one low point to another, and as the famous Polish thinker Jerzy Lec said once, “We thought we had reached the ground, and then someone knocked from beneath.”

This is exactly how things happen today. We try hard to improve the situation through different proposals in practically all areas that pull Moscow and Washington apart. It doesn’t happen. We recognize that everything that is associated with Russia policy is now quite problematic, to put it mildly—quite toxic for the U.S. mainstream in the broader sense of the word. But the only answer to this, we believe, is to intensify dialogue and search for ways that both governments, businesses—structures that impact the general mood of the public—maintain and probably deepen their interaction and discourse so as to remove possible misunderstandings or grounds for miscalculations.

One of the most troubling areas in this very dark and dull picture is of course arms control. There we see a downward spiral that is being systematically enhanced and intensified by the U.S. government. It looks like America doesn’t believe in arms control as a concept altogether. Instead, it tries to find pretexts to depart from as many arms control treaties, agreements, and arrangements that Russia is also a party to. This is very regrettable. But make no mistake: we will not pay any price higher than the one we would pay for our own security in order to save something or keep the U.S. within this system. It’s squarely and straightforwardly the choice that the American government may or, in our view, even should make—because we still think that the maintenance of these agreements ultimately serves American national interests.

Heilbrunn: What is your view of the Trump administration’s approach to the START Treaty?

Ryabkov: I can easily say that the Trump administration’s approach to the START Treaty is quite strange. Number one: we understand the reasons why the Trump administration wants China to become a party to any future arms control talks or arrangements—although we equally understand the reasons why China doesn’t want to be part of these agreements, and thus we believe that it’s up to Washington to deal with Beijing on this issue. And in the absence of a very clear and open and considered consent from the other side—that is, from China—there would be no talks with China or with China’s participation. That’s an obvious reality that we face.

So the next element of this logic brings us to the natural conclusion that it would be in everyone’s interest just to extend what we have now—that is, a new START in the form as it was signed and subsequently ratified—and then defer contentious issues and unresolved problems, including the one that is associated with U.S. non-compliance with this treaty, to a later point. An eventual extension of the treaty for five more years would give sufficient time to both Washington and Moscow, and eventually for others, to consider the situation and make decisions not in a hurry but with due regard to all aspects and to the gravity of the challenges before us, including those associated with new military technologies. But again, we are not there to trade this approach for anything on the U.S. side, to get something from the U.S. side in return. I think it’s quite logical and natural as it stands, so we invite the U.S. to consider what we are telling them at face value.

Heilbrunn: Traditionally, Russia has worked well with Republican administrations starting with Nixon. Is that era at an end?

Ryabkov: I don’t know. It completely depends on the U.S. We do believe that irrespective of what party is in the government in the U.S., there are choices; there are opportunities; and there are possibilities that at least should be explored with Russia. I don’t know if this administration regards Russia as a party worth having a serious dialogue with. I tend to believe it’s not because of domestic political reasons, because of different approaches to matters that are quite obvious at least for us, including the international system of treaties and international law in general.

But then again, it may well be so that the current Republican administration will in effect become a line in history in which a considerable number of useful international instruments were abrogated and that America exited them in the anticipation that this approach would serve U.S. interests better. Having said that, I will never say or never suggest that it was for us—at least in the mid-2010s—better with the previous administration.

It was under the previous Obama administration that endless rounds of sanctions were imposed upon Russia. That was continued under Trump. The pretext for that policy is totally rejected by Russia as an invalid and illegal one. The previous administration, weeks before it departed, stole Russian property that was protected by diplomatic immunity, and we are still deprived of this property by the Trump administration. We have sent 350 diplomatic notes to both the Obama and the Trump administrations demanding the return of this property, only to see an endless series of rejections. It is one of the most vivid and obvious examples of where we are in our relationship.

There is no such thing as “which administration is better for Russia in the U.S.?” Both are bad, and this is our conclusion after more than a decade of talking to Washington on different topics.

Heilbrunn: Given the dire situation you portray, do you believe that America has become a rogue state?

Ryabkov: I wouldn’t say so, that’s not our conclusion. But the U.S. is clearly an entity that stands for itself, one that creates uncertainty for the world. America is a source of trouble for many international actors. They are trying to find ways to protect and defend themselves from this malign and malicious policy of America that many of the people around the world believe should come to an end, hopefully in the near future.

Heilbrunn: If President Trump were to respond to your last point, he might say, “What’s wrong with uncertainty from the American perspective? What’s wrong with keeping your adversaries off balance? Why should the U.S. be a predictable power?” What would your response be to that?

Ryabkov: My response to this would be that we are not asking the U.S. to be a responsible and predictable partner because we don’t believe it would be possible any time soon. We are saying that this is a reality that we all face, and thus we only adjust our own reaction and our own response to it trying the best way possible to protect our own interests.

Heilbrunn: Related to that, and on the START Treaty, a Trump administration State Department official recently announced that the U.S. was ready, essentially, to bury Russia, to spend it into the ground in a new arms race just as it had in the 1980s.

Ryabkov: To bring it into oblivion.

Heilbrunn: Right. What is your response to those kinds of threats?

Ryabkov: There is no response. We just take note of it, and we draw our lessons from the past. We will never, ever allow anyone to draw us into an arms race that would exceed our own capabilities. But we will find ways how to sustain this pressure, both in terms of rhetoric and also in terms of possible action.

Heilbrunn: What does this kind of rhetoric imply for the future of an extension of the START Treaty? Doesn’t it suggest that the treaty may in fact already be doomed and that the Trump administration is using China as a poison pill to kill the treaty altogether?

Ryabkov: On China, I think the U.S. administration is obsessed with the issue, and it tries to introduce “Chinese discourse” into every single international issue at the table. So it’s not about the START Treaty. It’s much broader, deeper, and it’s by far more multifaceted than anything that relates to arms control as such. My view on this is that chances for the new START Treaty to be sustained are rapidly moving close to zero, and I think that on February 5, 2021, this treaty will just lapse, and it will end. We will have no START as of February 6, 2021.

Heilbrunn: Do you feel the American stance toward Russia is inadvertently helping to promote a Russia-China rapprochement that is actually not in Washington’s interest?

Ryabkov: We don’t think we can operate on the premise that because of some pressure or some external impact on us, something happens in terms of the evolution of priorities or approaches to China or to anyone else. We don’t believe the U.S. in its current shape is a counterpart that is reliable, so we have no confidence, no trust whatsoever. So our own calculations and conclusions are less related to what America is doing than to many, many other things. And we cherish our close and friendly relations with China. We do regard this as a comprehensive strategic partnership in different areas, and we intend to develop it further.

Heilbrunn: The U.S. is pushing very hard against China right now, at least rhetorically. China has vowed to smash any Taiwanese move toward independence and looks to be cracking down in Hong Kong as well. Do you see this as another instance where American overt bellicosity ends up boomeranging and pushing its adversaries to take more drastic measures?

Ryabkov: Of course, it’s not possible for me to judge what China will do in those cases or in those instances, but I do think that every single area where the U.S. believes there is an opportunity to pressure China is being currently used in a most energetic and most forceful manner. I think it clearly entails a further growth of uncertainty in international relations. I still hope though that at some point, the natural instinct to talk and agree and conclude deals will prevail rather than this ongoing effort to squeeze something out of others—not only China, but Russia and others who tend to follow their independent policy from America.

Heilbrunn: In this regard, when it comes to Russia—because you see the U.S. as trying to increase the pressure on Russia as well—do you draw a distinction between President Trump and his administration, or do you see them as aligned in their approach toward Russia? Because during the 2016 election campaign, Trump was explicit about trying to revive the U.S.-Russia relationship.

Ryabkov: No, I see no lines anywhere. I see no distinction, as you have described. Moreover, I see no distinction between the previous administration and this one.

Heilbrunn: Let me put it another way: what about differences between Trump and his own advisers? Do you think Trump himself is inclined to take a more diplomatic route, or do you think that U.S.-Russia policy is being driven by him?

Ryabkov: I don’t know who drives U.S. policy toward Russia. We welcome any signal from the Americans, including from the President himself in favor of improvement, in favor of going along, and we are prepared to bear our share in this. But unfortunately, it doesn’t work. And I suspect to some extent that it’s also my own fear that in my modest position, I was not able to offer anything to my bosses that may help to change things for the better.

Heilbrunn: Final question: do you think that matters, at least in the area of arms control, would change under a Biden presidency? Because the Democrats are much more sympathetic to arms control agreements than Republicans currently appear to be. What’s your take?

Ryabkov: I have no idea how things will unfold in relation to the forthcoming election in the U.S. No predictions, no expectations. I do think, though, that it would be very late in the process for any administration—including the second Trump administration if he is reelected—to deal with the issue of a new START extension after the day of elections in America. I think more broadly that the current, almost one-hundred percent watertight anti-Russian bipartisan consensus in the U.S. doesn’t promise much good for this relationship for the future, irrespective of who wins the next election. So we will see. We will continuously work hard to try to devise alternative paths forward, but we have no partner on the American side.

Sergei Ryabkov is Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

Image: Reuters.