PROFESSIONAL ARMIES often toil in obscurity until they are needed. Absent a sense of external threat, militaries are often unappreciated and lack constituencies of their own. These professional armies, as is the case in most European and North American countries, are generally small, have little lobbying power and few friends in high places. They are vulnerable. But they are available for what often appears to be whatever task comes up. Unless they are carrying out an overseas contingency operation or domestic deployment, the perception on the part of the public is that the armed forces are not truly being fully utilized—and are thus available for these tasks.

Nearly every nation worldwide has some experience with their armed forces in a domestic capacity. Some countries, such as China, have armies that are vertically and horizontally integrated into the economy, often running major business enterprises. Other countries take the opposite view; Germany, for instance, has long viewed the employment of the Bundeswehr on German soil as anathema.

Of course, the raison d’être of any national armed force is to defend the state and carry out homeland defense. But armies are often asked to perform more mundane tasks, such as trash collection and firefighting, often to the detriment of their readiness to carry out their primary function. While there are benefits to having military forces engaged in civil support tasks, there are also opportunity costs involved. Soldiers engaged in these tasks often cannot be readily redeployed. They cannot be in two places at one time, and require significant amounts of time to extricate themselves from one civil support task in order to carry out another. Moreover, contemporary professional soldiers are expensive, particularly when compared to ordinary conscript soldiers. Using highly-trained fighters for tasks such as static guard duty or trash collection seems like a rather inefficient use of manpower.

Both North American and European states have a rich history of employing military forces in domestic contingencies. Of course, every country has its own unique national security organizational structure, as well as traditions and strategies. These are based on unique perceptions of the threats and challenges to their own domestic security. Germany takes a fundamentally different approach to this issue than France, just as Russia takes a different approach than China. Even within North America, the differences between Mexico and the United States on the subject of military cooperation with civilian law enforcement agencies are striking: American soldiers are prohibited by law from performing law enforcement functions, while Mexico’s armed forces have been deployed to combat the threat posed by drug cartels and other local criminal organizations.

Due largely to historical contexts, the European tradition is markedly different from that of the United States. The United States, with its experiences in both the Revolutionary and Civil wars, has been traditionally reluctant to employ soldiers domestically, though that is clearly changing. And the unique structure of the American armed forces, with both professional Federal and National Guard troops, has resulted in a bifurcated experience. The National Guard has often been assigned to carry out civil security tasks, while their active-duty brethren are restricted by law since 1878 from carrying out similar duties, particularly those involving law enforcement. In this regard, Canada also has a much more limited experience.

On the other hand, the European tradition of employing armed forces domestically is well established. European militaries have acted with great frequency in a broad range of functions in response to domestic crises and other events when called upon by national authorities. Whether the requirement is securing borders, supporting law enforcement authorities or providing disaster relief, European armies have responded and acquitted themselves well in nearly all instances. In doing so, they have garnered significant levels of public support in nearly all European states; indeed, even in those states that have always had significant concerns about soldiers on their streets have become largely reconciled to seeing them there.

IN THE domestic context, there are essentially two mission sets: homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense is the traditional task of defending the population, infrastructure and sovereignty of a nation from foreign threats. This may involve such tasks as border defense (as differentiated from border security), air defense and defense of maritime approaches.

Of course, most modern military forces in Europe were structured for the Cold War mission of defending the European homeland in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact—their legacy organizational structure and equipment are a testament to this. For example, Germany had a large number of armored and reserve forces; both have nearly disappeared in the post-Cold War period. What forces remain have often been restructured, for the most part, for deployments abroad in peace support operations roles. Similarly, most European countries have active force establishments that are but a fraction of their Cold War strength. This begs the question of whether homeland defense is still a core mission. And if so, can European armed forces actually carry it out if directed to? For while many European countries still retain a relatively large number of soldiers on the books, they are not necessarily organized, configured, trained and equipped for modern, conventional, high-intensity operations.

In addition to homeland defense, military forces on both sides of the Atlantic have always been heavily involved in civil support. Civil support duties are those undertaken to buttress civil authority, with responsibility and overall command remaining with that civil officialdom. Examples include assistance to local authorities in the event of disasters, both natural and otherwise, as well as support to law enforcement authorities for select tasks. These may involve actions taken by the military to restore law, order and stability in the aftermath of an insurrection or a major catastrophe. Such operations may involve both active and reserve forces as well as some specialized capabilities, such as airborne radar for border surveillance. In every event, the key distinguisher is that civilians remain in control of the operation.

Some observers refer to this differentiation of roles in a domestic context as the tension between traditional and non-traditional roles. Inherent in this taxonomy is the concept that homeland defense is the traditional role of the armed forces and all other undertakings are non-traditional in nature. However, this bifurcation fails to recognize that armed forces have been employed in many domestic roles, particularly domestic security roles, for centuries. The rise of professionalized armed forces is a fairly recent phenomenon which drew upon the domestic security activities that armed forces have long played. For example, many of today’s militarized police forces, such as the French National Gendarmerie, originated from the personal armed forces of a nation’s ruler, and spent decades as a part of their respective nations’ armed forces, only having returned to their largely law enforcement role in the postwar era.

Indeed, the range of tasks for which armed forces may expect to be called into action has long been broad and continues to expand. In many instances, military forces have become a resource of choice for many political leaders who are faced with intractable (often fiscal) problems, including many not related to national security or humanitarian relief.

Clearly, there are civil security tasks that armies can and must perform. The intent here is focused on identifying those domestic roles and tasks which are inherent to national armed forces, those that armed forces may be called on to support and those that are candidates for inclusion in this growing list, with particular emphasis on the role of armed forces in providing cybersecurity. But it is worth asking what tasks the military should not perform as well. There are tasks for which military forces, for a variety of reasons, are not suitable. This is not to say that armed forces are incapable of performing them, merely that they are not consistent with what we might consider to be acceptable civil support tasks. Are there red lines beyond which armed forces ought not to tread?

In the United States, there appear to be six distinct Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) mission sets for armed forces in civil security. They are:

-Defense Support to Law Enforcement

-Defense Support for Special Events

-Defense Support for Essential Services

-Defense Support for Counterinsurgency

-Defense Support for Civil Disturbances

-Defense Support for Emergencies and Disaster Relief

For example, providing cybersecurity for other governmental organizations, as well as for private providers of critical infrastructure services, would fit under the category of Defense Support for Essential Services. This mission set includes instances where the military is tasked to provide services which are deemed essential for security or other reasons, such as public health. Examples include the provision of air traffic control services in the event of a strike, or providing sanitary services in the wake of an outbreak of a pandemic disease.

Other missions, such as border security, would likely fall under Defense Support to Law Enforcement, as border security remains principally a law enforcement task.

LOGICAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD criteria are clearly required to effectively evaluate situations in which the armed forces might be used in domestic contingencies. What considerations ought to be examined in vetting requests for assistance (RFA)? What are the considerations that should be examined in determining whether the military should provide support to civil authority?

The first and foremost is legality. Each request should be evaluated in terms of compliance with the existing laws of that state and its international commitments. Is the request, and the manner in which it has been made, compliant with the laws of the land, in particular with the constitution and those laws which have been established to govern the employment of the armed forces? While many states, such as Germany and the United States, have laws restricting the domestic deployment of armed forces, others, notably France, do not have such restrictions. There may also be exceptional events though—such as major catastrophes or outbreaks of highly contagious diseases, resulting in the breakdown of law and order—which may require capabilities that only the military may be able to provide, even if that employment contravenes the legal construct.

The second criterion is that of lethality, which considers whether the military may be required, as part of the provision of support, to employ force. The issue of the use of force in domestic contingencies is fraught with danger. Lethality also considers the possibility that some other force—whether it comes from lone wolf attacks, a domestic insurgency or an armed insurrection—may be used against those military forces engaged in DSCA efforts. The potential for the employment of force may require that the military be provided with special equipment and training and be issued appropriate rules of engagement. As a general rule, military forces in support of civil authorities should always seek to avoid the use of deadly force except in extreme situations. Nevertheless, circumstances may require the use of lethal force for the purposes of self-defense or preventing greater harm to the population, as might be the case in an outbreak of a highly contagious and deadly epidemic.

Risk is the third criteria governing the employment of armed forces in DSCA operations. While similar to lethality, risk is more concerned with the safety of the soldiers on DSCA missions. In particular, it seeks to evaluate whether there is enhanced risk to the safety and health of those soldiers who, in the process of performing a task, may be exposed to harmful agents, such as biological or chemical toxins, or be required to undertake hazardous acts, such as rescuing civilian personnel or extinguishing large fires. For example, containing a bird flu epidemic may expose troops to the disease; likewise, decontaminating an area with radiation or chemical contamination poses risks to the force given this task.

Risk further seeks to determine the long-term physical and psychological effects on the force of carrying out tasks which may be disagreeable, such as the collection and disposition of large numbers of fatal casualties pursuant to a major disaster. An example of this risk is the stabbing of a French soldier that was engaging in anti-terrorist patrols under the French Opération Sentinelle at the Louvre, or the 2017 event in which an inebriated tourist attempted to wrest a submachine gun from an Italian soldier guarding the Spanish embassy in Rome. Putting soldiers on the streets in uniform may provide an increased sense of security, but it also may render them more vulnerable to attack.

Readiness is the fourth criterion. Armed forces exist to defend the nation against external threats; to the extent that they are engaged in DSCA tasks, they may not be available to carry out their primary missions of national defense. For those DSCA tasks which have little relationship to military functions, such as, say, trash collection, and which may be of long duration, there may be a degree of erosion of primary military skills, such as tank gunnery or artillery fire support, which will require time, effort and resources to recover. Readiness also seeks to measure the opportunity costs associated with the military’s ability to perform other military and DSCA functions. If the military, or parts of it, is engaged in DSCA tasks, it may not be available to perform other tasks in a reasonable amount of time.

The fifth consideration for evaluating an RFA is that of cost. The issue of who pays for the military’s involvement in DSCA functions is of increasing importance. Many DSCA missions and tasks can involve considerable expenditure of resources. For example, if the military provides disaster relief support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a major disaster, this would involve the expenditure of significant amounts of money for supplies and transportation, in addition to the general personnel costs involved. In Europe, these costs are, in some cases, born by the ministry of defense itself; in others, the ministry of defense can expect to be reimbursed for some or all of these costs by the ministry or agency to which assistance is being provided. These considerations should be laid out well in advance of the need for the military’s support. In the United States, the requesting agency is, at least in theory, obligated to reimburse the armed forces for their operations costs.

In those instances in which the ministry of defense is expected to pay for the support it provides, this criterion should also include an evaluation of the impact on the appropriations under which the military functions. There may also be circumstances in which the military receives reimbursement for services and materials rendered, which it may use for purposes other than reconstitution of same. In these cases, the military may well choose to use the reimbursement to acquire equipment it lacks or to provide training that is needed.

The last criterion is that of appropriateness. This criterion seeks to answer the question of whether it is right, or seen by the public to be right, for the military to carry out a DSCA task. This issue is connected to the larger issue of the image of the armed forces. Appropriateness is also concerned with the question of whether it is in the interest of the ministry of defense to conduct the task. In cases of disaster relief, the military almost always will answer in the affirmative; but there are instances, particularly those involving the potential use of lethal force against citizens, which may be viewed by the military as inappropriate and detrimental to its image. In some instances, there may be a divergence in the image that the soldiers themselves have regarding a task versus what the public sees. For example, the Italian Army’s trash collection efforts in Naples, while less than attractive for professional soldiers, were viewed in a very positive manner by the public.

While these six criteria are those which most often govern the military’s evaluation of an RFA, there may be others, such as the consideration of whether the military has the capacity, in terms of numbers of soldiers or their training, to provide assistance. The military, because of deployments or other engagements, may simply lack the surge capability to provide support. This is likely to increasingly be the case, as both active and reserve forces decline in number in many European states.

One final consideration is the issue of unique capability. As a general rule, the military should be asked to provide DSCA support only when the military has a unique capability—one that is not resident, in type or numbers, in other agencies. A typical example involves the provision of decontamination support. Most other agencies lack the military’s capability for decontaminating chemical or biological contamination; therefore, it may be appropriate to request military support in the event of such an incident, because no other agency can provide this support.

It is, for example, by no means clear that cybersecurity is a unique capability of the armed forces. Many other actors, such as contractors, can provide such services. While the military may be very good at providing cybersecurity for its own assets (because it must be), it is not evident that the armed forces should provide such capabilities to other entities. Rather, the armed forces should focus on dealing with the consequences of addressing such attacks.

Likewise, the armed forces should not, as a routine matter, provide border security. They can, and should, provide support to law enforcement entities who are principally charged with securing the border; but armed forces should be constrained to a support role only, and then only in exceptional circumstances, such as during the wave of refugees that attempted to enter Europe during the summer of 2015.

But, given the increasing requirements for security both in the cyber and border realms, as well as many other domestic contingencies, it seems obvious that senior military leaders in Europe and North America may be increasingly willing to overlook some of these considerations. This is due to their desires to maintain military capacity, and senior political leaders may be unaware or prefer not to recognize some of these criteria.

Nevertheless, it is important that a solid basis be established for those contingencies in which the military is likely to become involved, particularly with regard to legal constraints on employing soldiers at home. The criteria set forth in this article are designed to serve as guidelines for consideration by political and military leaders when contemplating if they should “just let the army do it.”

John Clarke is a senior professor at the Marshall Center in Germany. He is a retired U.S. Army officer with over two decades of operational experience. He is also an Olmsted Scholar, a Senior Research Fellow of the nato Defense College, a graduate of the French Army War College, and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Salzburg, Austria.

Image: Reuters.