President Obama’s frustration with criticism that he has conducted an anemic foreign policy bubbled to the surface during his recent trip to the Philippines. In a press conference in Manila on April 28, his response was that while refraining from taking immediate actions on the ground “might not always be sexy”, his job is to manage the foreign policy of the United States with an eye towards the country’s long-term interests.

The president was correct to rebut the charge that he should be more aggressive in his responses to events, particularly when it comes to the turmoil roiling the Middle East. Past interventions by the current administration, such as the strong response in Libya, and the more tepid one in Syria, have been of debatable effectiveness and could even prove counterproductive in the long run. But the president has to go further than just defending his administration against the charges of some of his most partisan critics. Both his domestic detractors and supporters alike are demanding a roadmap, and U.S. allies in the Middle East are looking for signs of American leadership.

But the president appears to be caught on the horns of a true dilemma. How is it possible for him to articulate clear policies for dealing with the political situation in Egypt and the turmoil in Syria and Iraq, when the uncertainties are so great and the risks so high? He has tried being clear about U.S. policy in the Middle East in the past, with redlines, implicit threats and ultimatums. But then when conditions on the ground later change, making it difficult or even imprudent to make good on those statements, he has gotten pummeled for making his administration and the United States appear irresolute and weak. But on the other hand, when he has demurred and been more ambiguous about U.S. intentions, his administration has appeared disengaged and even feckless.

The president can escape this dilemma if he frames the debate and his strategy within a broader regional perspective. This means not just explaining the actions he takes, or doesn’t take, in Syria, Egypt or Libya, but also providing context for those decisions by articulating a clear vision and direction for his foreign policy towards the Middle East. It also means shifting from narrow, country-specific strategies to an overarching regional strategy.

The Rationale for a Regional Strategy for the Middle East

There are three compelling reasons to adopt a regional strategy now. Indeed, unless American strategic leadership seizes the moment, the region could slip further, and even inexorably, into a political, economic and social abyss.

First, the major threats in the Middle East today are regional in scope, transcend state boundaries and defy state-specific solutions. Militant groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the al-Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s local Syrian affiliate, are crisscrossing the borders of Syria and Iraq with impunity, in effect erasing boundaries between sovereign states that have been in place since the early twentieth century. Moreover, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq could bring Lebanon and Jordan to the brink of failure due to the pressure put on already stretched governments by a crescendoing deluge of refugees. Also, the economic carnage taking place in Syria, Iraq and even Egypt affects not just these countries, but also threatens the entire region, and could create negative spillover effects for the global economy.

Second, regional trends are taking shape right now before our eyes, and therefore can be acted upon imminently, whereas trends in individual countries like Syria and Iraq are impossible to discern amidst the fog of uncertainty and instability. In fact, it is important to understand that the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, where even short-term outcomes are unknowable and highly uncertain, are already shaping far more certain and predictable long-term regional outcomes, such as profound shifts in the distribution of power between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and even Israel. In others words, while the ongoing conflicts in specific states are fluid and unpredictable, the landscape actually is more clearly defined when thinking about them using a broader regional lens. Another reason why regional trends are generally easier to forecast than state-specific trends is that the volatility created in the conflict areas gets diluted by the anchoring effect of the larger and relatively more stable powers in the region like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Third, a regional strategy matches the capabilities and interests of the United States better than do country-specific strategies. Direct U.S. interventions in specific conflicts have turned out poorly for countries like Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the economic costs, loss of life and reputational damage done to the United States. The United States has a greater capacity to positively influence the region and serve its own interests by stepping back and placing higher emphasis on the regional level, than it does by intervening at the country level. Its sprawling military footprint in the Persian Gulf, its critical role in international financial organizations, its hefty weight in global trade and finance, as well as its enormous diplomatic capabilities, gives Washington the capacity to set regional agendas, and use its convening power to bring regional and international stakeholders together on major issues—capabilities unrivaled by any other major power. Moreover, with a regional strategy, the United States would appear less intent on micromanaging, which would enhance its regional and international legitimacy and reinforce these capabilities. And a more comprehensive regional strategy could become part of the president’s narrative about how the United States will stay engaged in the Middle East, while also pivoting to Asia.

Given these imperatives, the three main pillars of a regional strategy that the president should adopt are as follows. (Since political stability and economic prosperity are closely intertwined in the Middle East, these pillars embody both political and economic recommendations.)

Pillar One: Shape Relationships Between Major Regional Powers

The first pillar is to shift the emphasis of U.S. policy towards working diplomatically with the more stable powers, like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, on conflict-mitigation solutions for the region. This approach would entail the difficult, but not insuperable, task of influencing the relationships between these more powerful and influential countries of the region, with the ultimate goal of defusing and stabilizing conflicts in Iraq and Syria and even the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Instead of trying to resolve conflicts in fragile, unstable countries directly, the United States would work indirectly through the major regional powers.

This initiative would include the United States taking the bold step of opening up a separate diplomatic track with Iran from the ongoing tenuous nuclear negotiations, involving discussions on the most dire issues facing the region, Syria being an immediate priority. The risk would be that despite efforts to keep the tracks separate, they get politically linked, making resolution on both the nuclear and Syrian issues more, not less, difficult. But the potential upside is tremendous, and it is also possible that the two different tracks, handled deftly by both sides, could be mutually reinforcing. And should the nuclear talks fail to culminate in a final agreement, this wouldn’t necessarily preclude pragmatic cooperation between the United States and Iran in areas where both parties have interests at stake, such as in Syria and Iraq.

As part of this pillar of the strategy, the United States should also use whatever traction is created in its relationship with Iran to work to defuse Iran’s tensions with Saudi Arabia, which has the potential to yield big payoffs in reducing tensions in Syria and Iraq and even with the Israeli-Palestinian issue; and these conflicts have been fed at least to some degree by the U.S.-Iranian rivalry.

Skeptics will argue that this part of the strategy is implausible, given the deep-seated schisms and hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But it is important to keep in mind that while the historic rivalries between the two countries run deep, U.S. policies have exacerbated these tensions in recent years. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein created a vacuum through which Iran almost effortlessly projected power into the Arab world—a development that directly challenged Riyadh’s regional ambitions. Then when the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia spilled over into competition for influence in Syria and Iraq, creating a proxy-war dynamic in these two countries. The United States further reinforced this tension by treating Saudi Arabia as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions. A shift away from the United States getting involved in local conflicts and any lessening of the U.S.-Iranian tensions could, with the help of effective U.S. diplomacy, have a salutary effect on the Saudi-Iranian relationship.

Another factor militating in favor of the United States being able to nudge the Saudis and Iranians to work together is the fact that the Syrian war has morphed into a nightmare scenario that undermines the interests of the two regional powers. Despite historic rivalries and the initial logics that drove each country to back opposing factions in this conflict, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia has an interest in Iraq and Syria slipping further toward failed-state status, or in the conflict spreading and further destabilizing already fragile countries like Jordan and Lebanon. Moreover, further instability in Syria and Iraq could stoke tensions inside the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Saudi Arabia, which has its own internal frailties and leadership-succession challenges. The recent high-level talks between Riyadh and Tehran regarding Syria are evidence that both Saudi Arabia and Iran realize that the conflict in Syria has gotten out of control and threatens both of their interests.

But the Saudi-Iranian relationship doesn’t exist in a regional vacuum. Turkey also aspires to play a constructive role in areas of mutual interests, possibly even reinforcing an improved Saudi-Iranian relationship. Like the other two major players, it also faces significant threats, but also opportunities in the region. With Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign and domestic policies seriously challenged, in part due to the crisis in Syria, the loss of Egypt’s former president, Mohammed Morsi, as a regional partner and his own heavy-handed tactics at home, Erdogan will be looking for alternative solutions to major problems facing the region and a renewed role for Turkey. Moreover, with the possibility of a thaw in relations between the United States and Iran, Turkey has the potential to act as a strategic bridge between the two countries. Both the United States and Iran, and even Saudi Arabia and Iran, or certain powerful players within each of these countries, might find it less politically risky to channel certain matters of mutual interest through Turkey, than to work publicly with one another.

Pillar Two: Adapt to Regional Trends

Pillar two of the strategy is subtler and requires the United States to adapt to, and not just try to shape, events in the region. Adaptation is not a sign of strategic weakness for the United States. Part of strategy involves using trends and historical forces that may be resistant to control to one’s advantage. The regional trends that U.S. policy makers should note are the rebalancing of regional power due to state weaknesses in Syria and Iraq and the prospects of a more regionally engaged Egypt over the medium term, notwithstanding the country’s current economic woes.

As for Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, likely to become the country’s president in the next election, visualizes himself more like former president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who in the 1950s and 1960s played a large regional role, than Hosni Mubarak, who was much more risk-averse and domestically focused. When Egypt starts to climb out of its current economic malaise, the United States should expect it to play a larger role on the regional political scene. And given that it is likely to surface from its political and economic troubles before Syria and Iraq stabilize, it will have the opportunity to play such a role. This could be a positive development for regional stability, and for the interests of the United States and Israel, as a more active Egypt could serve as an Arab counterweight to Iran, as it reintegrates into the region and its own economy strengthens, as well as to Turkey.

The U.S. relationship with Egypt depends on keeping this broader regional perspective in mind. Given its centrality, the United States must work as closely as possible with Egypt’s elected government to help it address the country’s serious economic woes, and even its challenges in the Sinai. This is not to suggest that the United States should resume full military ties with Egypt or form a Mubarak era-like alliance with the country. But with all of the other unstable areas in the Middle East, neither the region nor the United States can afford a destabilized or fragile Egypt or an Egypt that feels compelled to lean more heavily on an already emboldened and aggressive Russia.

The current Egyptian government’s crackdown of the Muslim Brotherhood and its other antidemocratic actions make this a politically difficult line to walk for the United States. But disengagement and withholding U.S. aid is unlikely to compel the current Egyptian government to reverse course. Engagement, on the other hand, aimed at stabilizing Egypt’s economy, has the potential to soften the government’s political positions over time.

One should not infer from a strategy of working with Egypt, or for that matter, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, that the United States should, or even could, form hard-wired, Cold War types of alliances with any of these countries. Given the lessons of the Arab Spring, none of these countries will have the appetite or domestic support for unconditional adherence to U.S. policy or interests. So there needs to be a rethinking in Washington about the types of diplomatic capabilities that will be required for this new strategic approach. The change necessary will be to develop a greater capacity for leveraging issue-specific, shorter-term, shifting coalitions, rather than leaning on more permanent relationships. On some issues, the United States may align itself with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while on other issues it may find itself on the opposing side of one or more of these countries. It will be the United States’ diplomatic capacity to pivot and use its power to form coalitions, which will determine its success or failure with these new regional strategies.

Pillar Three: A Coordinated Economic Recovery Plan

The third pillar of the strategy involves leveraging the influence the United States has regionally, as well as in international financial and political forums, to create a long-term, integrated economic-recovery plan for the region. The strategy should start with Egypt, but subsequently be extended to Syria and other countries and territories in the region at serious risk. The rationale is that without a positive economic horizon for the countries in the region, particularly those that have had their political and economic foundations shaken by the Arab Spring, no political stability can be sustainable, and no political strategy can be successful.

The Arab Spring erupted and then spread across the region because of political disenfranchisement, but the rage was fueled by economic privation, economic inequalities and the lack of economic opportunities. Drilling down deeper into the problem, one of the contributing drivers of the early protests in Tunisia and Egypt was the lack of employment opportunities for many highly educated youth, particularly women. The region’s overall unemployment remains the highest in the world. Youth unemployment has reached 28 percent, which according to International Labor Organization, is about twice the global average.

In addition to the daunting unemployment figures, another structural problem that contributes to regional instability is the widening disparity in income and wealth within countries, not to mention between the very rich countries in the Persian Gulf and the rest. And making the effect of the disparities worse, in many countries of the region, poor allocation of scarce resources crowd out much-needed expenditures in community improvements and infrastructure; gaps, which, in some areas like Lebanon and Gaza, get filled by nongovernmental organizations or armed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively, fueling a cycle of violence and economic devastation.

So what is the appropriate role for the United States to play in addressing these problems? The United States should be clear at the outset that the value it adds is not primarily its pocketbook. The United States has neither the financial capacity, nor the domestic support to launch a sizable “Marshall Plan” for spurring economic growth for the Middle East on its own. But the United States is in the unique position of having the diplomatic clout and sophistication to corral all of the stakeholders required to solve many of the region’s current and looming economic problems. And it has the ability to provide much-needed leadership, and help integrate and rationalize the various pieces of an economic package.

Let’s be clear. It isn’t a shortage of aid to the region that is the missing piece of the economic puzzle, but rather the lack of an integrated strategy that seriously addresses the economic woes, strengthens the economic fundamentals in individual countries, and leverages the international community’s leadership and resources to improve regional outcomes. In fact, transfer payments to countries most in need, like Egypt, have been flowing. Since President Mohammed Morsi was deposed last year, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have transferred over $12 billion to Egypt’s coffers, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have been active in the country as well. But much of the money transferred to Egypt from the GCC countries went to funding subsidies, rather than being invested in areas that would create long-term sustainable growth.

Leadership and coordination of effort is where the United States can provide the most help and develop the greatest traction. While specific economic policies and intricacies are beyond the scope of this article, and when outlined, would have to include country-specific elements, but possess a distinctive and compelling regional economic framework, we can identify several core priorities of a visionary, comprehensive, regional economic strategy.

First, the United States needs to use its convening power to bring together the wealthier countries of the region, namely Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, to lay out the outlines of an economic plan. Such a plan should include a commitment to coordinate a high-level economic commission involving the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations and other relevant international and regional development agencies, which can work with the governments in the Persian Gulf countries in a coordinated and collaborative manner to put together a multi-year, regional development agenda.

Second, such a plan would present the framework for an economic fund to support regional as well as country-specific development projects. The United States could facilitate development of such a vehicle with regional and international bodies through its leading role in them. The fund would focus on economic measures for opening up employment opportunities, as well as address decaying infrastructure, such as deficiencies in roads, electricity, water and sanitation. But while these measures are important, to make a real dent in unemployment numbers, the private sector in many countries of the region, Egypt in particular, needs to be revitalized. Instruments like the “catalyst fund”, recently created by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, with participation of governments of advanced economies and emerging economies as well as strategic investments on the part of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries should be integrated into this strategy.

Third, action should be taken to support one or more of the specific economies. Given the massive economic needs, resource constraints, and the fact that political unrest and civil wars in Syria and Iraq must first be quieted before economic remedies can realistically be acted upon, it will be important to set priorities. Egypt should clearly be a priority, as mentioned in pillar two of the strategy. While it is divided politically between secularists and Islamists, compared to other countries with economic problems, like Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Egypt appears to be less unstable. And as the most populous country in the Arab world with nearly a quarter of the world’s Arab population, grounding its political recovery in deep economic reforms is essential. The quicker Egypt recovers, the more constructive a political role it can play in the region.

Conclusion

There is plenty at stake in correctly calibrating a U.S. strategy for the Middle East. Perceptions of Washington as weak, disengaged and confused abound in many parts of the Middle East. Part of this comes from murky messaging and unfortunately timed missteps on the part of the current administration. But part of the problem comes from the fact that the United States is operating with a tired, anachronistic strategy cast at the wrong strategic level. By engaging on the ground in individual conflicts, it is trying to manage the unmanageable.

Of course, the United States cannot, and should not, completely disengage from these individual conflicts. However, a shift towards a higher-level regional strategy, which includes using both political and economic instruments of power, would serve the United States and the region well. It would play to U.S. strengths and focus its efforts on exercising its strategic levers to share the onus for solving the region’s most dangerous problems with the region’s major powers. For while the major powers are divided on many issues, they are also bound by powerful common interests, including the need to have a politically stable and economically prosperous region. And to create regional economic sustainability, the United States could work with regional actors and global financial institutions to ground political stability and security in economic prosperity. The stakes for the United States, the region, and the international community are too high to do otherwise.

Ross Harrison is on the faculty of the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he teaches strategy. He also teaches Middle East politics at the University of Pittsburgh, and is a frequent contributor of articles on strategic issues facing the Middle East. He is the author of Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide for National Security, Foreign policy and Business Professionals (Potomac Books: 2013)

Shahrokh Fardoust is a senior economic consultant with 30 years’ experience in development, having worked with the World Bank, the United Nations, as well as private international firms and foundations. From 2008 to 2011, he was Director, Strategy and Operations, in Development Economics Vice Presidency, at the World Bank, where he contributed to the research and policy priorities of the Chief Economist, and the G20’s development agenda. He is co-editor of Towards a Better Global Economy: Policy Implications for Global Citizens Worldwide in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2014).