Of course, China may blunder and challenge U.S. vital interests by trying to develop a blue-water navy. However, Chinese leaders are acutely aware of the costs and limited benefits of becoming a maritime power. The issue has been raised in the Chinese media for the past five years in a debate over whether China should develop aircraft carriers. Thus far, China's leadership has resisted the temptation to acquire this prestigious symbol of great power status. It apparently concurs with analysts who argue that China's geopolitical constraints and the costs of dealing with the U.S. response would be punishing. China's leaders are seemingly aware that a Chinese carrier, unlike Indian and Thai carriers, would challenge U.S. maritime interests and induce an arms race with the United States that China could not win. And Chinese naval expansion would undermine its regional diplomacy by elevating threat perception throughout East Asia. Thus, just as a war with the United States would jeopardize China's peaceful international environment and its ability to sustain its "peaceful rise", so too would a Chinese naval build-up. Just as China is deterred from using force, it has been deterred from challenging U.S. maritime superiority.

U.S. naval preponderance and dominant strategic presence in maritime East Asia both deter war and maintain a favorable balance of power. Continental powers that have tried to become naval powers by challenging maritime powers have failed throughout history. China might try to become a naval power, but it would be foolish and costly and would almost certainly end in failure. Chinese leaders seem to understand this; the United States should understand this as well and should draw confidence from it.

Moreover, the United States is strengthening its deployments in East Asia. Over the past five years the Pentagon has moved attack submarines and cruise missiles to Guam. The Air Force is building an operations center on Guam to serve the entire Pacific. It plans to form a strike force there, with six bomber aircraft and 48 fighters redeployed from continental U.S. bases, as well as twelve refueling aircraft, supplementing U.S. carrier-based aircraft and U.S. aircraft in Japan. The Air Force also plans to deploy Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft on Guam. The U.S. Navy plans to deploy to Japan an advanced aircraft carrier to replace the Kitty Hawk and has allocated funding for deployment of a second carrier in East Asia. The Navy is also converting Trident ballistic missile submarines into platforms for stealth cruise missiles to be deployed in the western Pacific. All of these measures contribute to long-term U.S. sea control throughout East Asia.

Although U.S. influence is declining in South Korea and Taiwan, Washington has never defined the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan as places vital to U.S. security. Our policy of "peaceful resolution" toward both the Korean and Taiwan conflicts acknowledges this. Indeed, Secretary Rumsfeld seems eager to move even faster to downgrade the U.S. force presence in South Korea than regional politics requires.

On the other hand, the United States has long defined U.S. dominance in maritime Southeast Asia as vital to U.S. security. So far, the rise of China does not threaten this interest. Moreover, despite the growth of Chinese economic influence, U.S. strategic partnerships in maritime East Asia are stronger than ever.

So far, the United States has responded well to the rise of China. It has maintained its deterrent and stabilized the regional order. But the greatest challenge to the status quo and the greatest contribution to the rise of China as a maritime power may well be shortcomings in U.S. defense policy. Recent attention to the Pentagon's inability to acquire planned numbers of next-generation aircraft carriers and fighter planes, and the escalating costs of these programs, is disturbing. As Secretary Rumsfeld observed, "Something's wrong with the system." In addition, deployment of U.S. forces in hostilities in peripheral areas weakens our presence in East Asia.

If the United States gives China the opportunity to displace the U.S. presence, it will grab it. The United States should be under no illusion that China will be content with the status quo should its relative power increase. But if the United States does what it can and should do--if it strengthens its regional military presence and continues to modernize its forces--it can maintain its maritime dominance, its deterrent capability, the regional balance of power and U.S. security.

Essay Types: Essay