II. Psyops and Propaganda Activities

PSYOPS AND propaganda activities that aim to diminish Saddam in the eyes of his supporters, exacerbate existing strains between his inner circle and the military, stir up popular discontent, and embolden opponents of the regime are a crucial component of any policy that seeks regime change in Baghdad. Such efforts could keep Saddam on the defensive and create an atmosphere of crisis and tension, forcing the regime to divert assets to deal with internal security, and leaving fewer resources available for clandestine technology procurement or trouble-making elsewhere. Such efforts could transform the psychological environment in the country; creating an atmosphere in which a coup or uprising might occur.

Saddam understands this well. He devotes enormous energy to efforts that make him appear larger than life and invest him with an aura of invincibility. This explains the huge posters and murals of Saddam found everywhere in Iraq. The importance Saddam attaches to the psychological dimension can be gauged from a speech he delivered to senior Ba'ath officials from Basra in June 1999 in which he exhorted them to "strive to defeat the enemy's plans" and to "stand firm in the face of the influence of hostile media and information", which has an "influence bigger than that of bombs."⁴ Saddam realizes that psychological domination of his subjects is the key to their physical subjugation, and that losing the propaganda and psychological warfare battle could threaten his regime.

For this reason, the United States should support opposition radio and television propaganda efforts that seek to diminish Saddam through ridicule, and by planting doubts and raising questions about the stability of his rule and the long-term prospects of his regime. Such propaganda--especially on the eve of a crisis or in tandem with U.S. military action against Saddam's internal security organizations--could help undermine his carefully cultivated image of omnipotence and erode the climate of extreme fear that paralyzes his opponents. It could help create--at least briefly--the necessary conditions for a coup or an uprising.

Relations between Saddam and the military have never been warm. Saddam distrusts the military and has consolidated his control over them by fear. Moreover, the army quietly resents his interference in military affairs, and many officers are bitter at the ruinous impact that his rule has had on the country and its armed forces. American propaganda should play on this distrust and resentment, emphasizing the risks incurred by the armed forces as a result of continued Ba'athi rule. Such propaganda, along with the adoption of more aggressive rules of engagement for coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones (e.g., allowing them to strike Iraqi ground forces, especially RG units), might encourage members of the armed forces to turn on the regime if given the opportunity to do so.

Finally, Washington needs to rebuild its credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people. In particular, it needs to convince them that it is serious about removing the Ba'athi regime. Average Iraqis are unlikely to join another uprising if they believe that the United States will once again abandon them in midstream. The way to do this is by speaking out against human rights violations by Baghdad, supporting the opposition (the INC as well as other groups), and most importantly, by using massive force against regime targets. The bombing of organizations responsible for repressing the Iraqi people and ensuring the survival of the regime would be the most effective way to convince Iraqis that the United States is serious about ridding Iraq of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

III. Intensified Economic Pressure

SANCTIONS ARE a crucial component of containment: they prevent Iraq from rebuilding its conventional military capabilities and recouping much of the political and economic clout it enjoyed before the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, Baghdad has been able to generate a stream of unsupervised income through illicit oil sales to Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran, and by manipulating the "oil for food" program. The amount earned through smuggling amounts to $ 1-2 billion a year (depending on oil prices)--sums that Saddam uses to assure the loyalty of his largely Sunni Arab power base and to insulate them from the effects of sanctions. Intensified efforts to reduce the flow of unsupervised oil income in order to reduce the amount of money Saddam can disburse to his power base might make some of them more receptive to regime change.

In modern Iraq, conflicts among members of the regime's inner circle and popular political unrest have often had an economic dimension: the 1920 nationalist revolt against the British; the tribal rebellions of 1935-36; fighting since 1994 among the two main Kurdish opposition groups; and the defection of Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamil in 1995 were all at least partly due to struggles over money, land or other material assets. The potential role of economic pressures in contributing to political unrest should not be underestimated, and should be exploited to the utmost.

It has proven difficult to stop unsupervised oil sales. America's Kurdish friends and Turkish and Jordanian allies all benefit from the illicit oil trade, and none of the Arab Gulf states is yet willing to supplant Iraq as Jordan's main source of oil (many still harbor grudges over Jordan's position during the Gulf War). U.S. efforts in the spring of 2001 to rally UN support for a new Security Council resolution that would have reduced illegal oil sales failed when they came up against the threat of a Russian veto. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the post-September 11 situation is different, though this proposition needs to be tested. Should political efforts to tighten the economic noose on the regime fail, the United States retains the option of bombing Iraqi oil pumping terminals near the border with Syria and in the south, in order to reduce Iraq's oil income and pave the way for regime change.

IV. Support for the Opposition

SUPPORT FOR opponents of the regime is one of the most tangible expressions of America's commitment to regime change in Baghdad. Such support--including tangible assistance for opposition political and military activities--could lay to rest the widespread perception in parts of the Arab world that the United States really wants Saddam to remain in power.

The external opposition also has other potentially important roles to play in achieving regime change. As noted above, they could identify and vet potential coup makers, or army officers who might commit their units in support of an uprising. Moreover, oppositionists with paramilitary training might be inserted into the country by the United States to catalyze and coordinate an uprising with the help of U.S. advisors outside of Iraq, with whom they would be in radio contact. (The lack of an ability to communicate and coordinate between different regions and cities was a key weakness of the 1991 uprising.) They could videotape images of rebellion, to be beamed around the world by satellite television in order to mobilize international support for a nascent uprising. Under certain circumstances, opposition military personnel could also be used to direct U.S. air strikes against regime forces, and perhaps to coordinate the airdrop of light arms to rebels.

Implementation of the approach to the opposition described here need not await the creation of a large, well-trained, well-equipped insurgent organization--which could take years to accomplish. Rather, the role that the external opposition might play in the event of an uprising could be filled by a relatively small number of highly motivated individuals who could be recruited and trained in a matter of weeks or a few months at most.

Ensuring an Acceptable Outcome

HOW CAN Washington be sure that a coup or an uprising will bring to power a more acceptable government in Baghdad? It can't. While it can shape the environment and help create the circumstances that might lead to a coup or an uprising, Washington will have but modest influence over the potentially messy, unpredictable, and probably violent process of regime change. Moreover, as suggested above, even under the best of conditions, a coup attempt or an uprising could prompt Baghdad to use chemical or biological weapons against its domestic enemies and those neighboring states associated with the United States. A subtle public diplomacy is required to ensure that the ultimate objective of the U.S. campaign remains ambiguous, so that Saddam does not recognize the existential threat to his regime until it is too late. But success at that cannot be guaranteed, so coalition airpower must be ready to conduct secondary strikes on nonconventional weapons stocks and associated delivery systems should they be deployed in preparation for use. This will require timely and accurate intelligence, and the ability to exploit it in real time. This is a very demanding requirement.

Such uncertainties and requirements, however, must be faced. Should Saddam or an equally vicious successor (probably one of his two sons) acquire nuclear weapons, all bets are off. The United States would likely face determined regional opposition for even a limited air campaign against a nuclear Iraq. Nor would the United States lightly incur such a risk to its troops in the region, let alone against the U.S. homeland. An Iraqi nuclear breakout would probably sound the death knell for U.S. efforts to achieve regime change in Baghdad. It is thus imperative that the United States overthrow Saddam Hussein before an Iraqi nuclear breakout renders such an option untenable.