Yusuf’s disciples have repudiated the sultan of Sokoto and the emirs of Kano and Zaria because of their support for Jonathan in the 2011 elections. They have also claimed responsibility for the murder of the brother of the shehu of Borno, the second-ranking Islamic traditional ruler. In addition to the UN bombing, people claiming to be Boko Haram spokesmen also took credit for a June 2011 bomb attack on the Abuja headquarters of the national police. They have never attacked schools, despite their hostility toward Western education. In the past, they attacked churches and murdered clergy, but most of their violence has been perpetrated against other Muslims. However, attacks on Christian churches appear to be escalating; a few months ago a church in an Abuja suburb was bombed on Christmas Day and similar attacks occurred elsewhere during the Christmas–New Year holiday.

Since Mohammed Yusuf’s death, his followers have had no charismatic leader. They appear to be part of a wider, highly diffuse structure composed of religious fanatics, criminals and political thugs with no politburo or other governing body. Their stated goals include punishment of Yusuf’s murderers, recompense for property destroyed by the security services and establishment of Islamic law throughout Nigeria. In the aftermath of the April 2011 elections, some may have links with parts of the traditional establishment and possibly some mid-level political figures that fear marginalization. The security services’ heavy-handed response to unrest in Maiduguri and elsewhere, resulting as it did in many deaths, doubtless swelled the ranks of Boko Haram groups.

Indeed, violence and unrest have become widespread enough in the North to look like something of a popular insurrection, but it does not seem to be centrally organized or tied to international terrorism. Yusuf’s disciples and other radical millenarian Islamic groups in northern Nigeria are inward looking. Their concerns are local, and their hostility is toward state governments, Jonathan’s secular federal government and brutish police behavior. They feed off bad government and the collapsing economy.

WITH ITS oil, ongoing peacekeeping efforts and robust population growth, Nigeria continues to be an important international player despite dangerous North-South polarization, sectarian conflict and simmering insurrections.

Given this reality, the Obama administration should continue, and perhaps even enhance, its normal diplomatic dialogue with Abuja. But the administration must recognize the reality that Nigeria is a weak state with a largely unresponsive government that faces significant domestic opposition. The result is that it has only a very limited ability to serve as a diplomatic partner.

That is why the United States must maintain good diplomatic relations with a predominately southern, Christian administration without appearing to favor one religious, regional or sectarian group over another. In Nigeria, there is the presumption that Jonathan was Washington’s candidate, which he fostered with his electoral base. He displayed a campaign billboard showing him standing next to President Obama with the slogan, “Yes We Can, Sir!” The United States should work to dispel this presumption and cease seeming to court Jonathan, who has been received twice by President Obama since becoming acting president. The White House should also drop its rhetoric about the virtues of the 2011 elections, which are often overstated. They grate on Nigerians who know better and alienate many in the North.

In addition, the Obama administration should engage in targeted outreach to Nigerian Muslims. To begin, it should treat Muhammadu Buhari, the most credible opposition leader in Nigeria, as it does the leaders of the opposition in other friendly states. He should be publicly received in Washington at an appropriately high level. Despite the costs and risks, the United States should proceed to establish a consulate in Kano, the metropolis and cultural center of the Islamic North, where it can build a stronger relationship with a region that has received too little Western attention in the past.

Affiliation with Nigerian security agencies should be treated extremely carefully. Just as al-Qaeda has fed off the resentment of many Saudis over the U.S. military presence in their country, Nigerian radicals in the North likely would do the same. The administration also should be outspoken about security-service abuses against civilians and publicly raise questions about official investigations of postelectoral violence—especially if there are signs of a cover-up. Nevertheless, support for training of the army and the police, especially improving their ability to conduct investigations and interact with the communities in which they work, could, over the long term, reduce animosity between security services and Nigerian civilians.

Nigerians often identify corruption as their nation’s greatest challenge. Many of the most notoriously corrupt have residences and other assets in the United States, and they value their ability to visit, often for long periods. The Obama administration should make greater use of the visa-sanction tool against those who use their official position for personal gain. Such an approach would be highly popular with Nigerians, most of whom are struggling to feed their families rather than shopping on Rodeo Drive.

For the first time since the 1967–70 civil war, Nigerians in all parts of the country—not only in the North—are questioning whether their country can hold together. It is very much in the U.S. interest that it does. A fragmentation of Nigeria would likely lead to ethnic and religious clashes and shifts in population that would constitute a humanitarian disaster, perhaps recalling the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan or the more recent breakup of Yugoslavia. It would be inherently destabilizing for Nigeria’s small and weak neighbors. It would certainly provide a new scope for the operations of international terrorism. In the words of the supporters of the federal government during the Nigerian civil war: “It is a task that needs to be done, to keep Nigeria one.” True, given commitments elsewhere, a weak economy and a divided government, the United States faces limits in its ability to influence events in Nigeria. But U.S. policy makers should look at the long term and cultivate close relations with those working to keep Nigeria together and on a path to democracy.

John Campbell is the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as U.S. ambassador to Nigeria from 2004 to 2007.

Image: iStockPhoto

Image: Pullquote: For the first time since the 1967–70 civil war, Nigerians in all parts of the country are questioning whether their country can hold together. It is very much in the U.S. interest that it does.Essay Types: Essay