Once such a pattern emerges, it risks mutual reinforcement. China will seek to push the United States as far from its borders as possible; America will attempt to assemble allies to construct a counterweight in the name of deterrence. The relationship will further emphasize its ideological property, sharpening existing differences. The Biden administration’s public efforts to create an alliance of democracies to confront an authoritarian China illustrate the trend. Such efforts will only accelerate the process of calcification and will complicate American relations in the Indo-Pacific. Asian societies are unlikely to choose between one power or the other, for they must remember that China’s presence in Asia is immutable, while America’s is conceptual. The United States may drive itself into isolation through its crusading bent just as China may achieve through its belligerence. Asia risks being ground down between two colossi in the event of a Sino-American cold war.

The dangers inherent in the alliance structure of 1908 were only magnified by the composition of war plans geared entirely to mobilization schedules. Alliances had become shaped by the obsession with mobilizing simultaneously with allies and before opponents, lest each member be defeated in detail by the side with superior mobilization potential. To hesitate was to forfeit the advantage of an alliance. The political leadership in each nation had little knowledge of these plans, which in any event were out of proportion to any of the disputes of the period. This technocratic mode of war outran diplomacy—the war began on the sole basis of mobilization tables without a single substantive diplomatic exchange between capitals. Modern weapons emphasize speed and render the enemy vulnerable. Precision fires, cyber weapons, and AI-enabled systems are all offensive in nature and each place a premium on outpacing the opponent’s decision cycle. The proliferation of these systems will resurrect impulses bred by industrial mobilization.

The question facing the United States and China is whether their historical experiences—each expressing unique notions of exceptionalism—can be reconciled into a mode of coexistence. Can America accommodate China without turning the world over to it? Can China accept limits to its ambitions? Both superpowers will have to confront painful realities. The United States must come to terms with the existence of a country of equal consequence with contradicting values. China must resign itself to dealing on a permanent basis with a country it cannot treat as a tributary. America must understand the relativity of its values to others; China, that of its eminence. Of course, whether another political doomsday machine is constructed will not be determined by the United States alone, contrary to other assertions. Regardless of whether the American and Chinese visions are compatible, the United States must always be prepared to defend the balance of power. For power and legitimacy must work in tandem to construct a peaceful order, as they did in 1815.

Brandon Patterson is a national security professional and recent graduate of the University of California, San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy. The views presented in this article are the author's alone.

Image: Reuters.