Moreover, the effect that the loss of the PD-50 will have on the rest of the fleet—including surface combatants and submarines—is less certain. As the largest floating dry dock in Russia, PD-50 has been in near constant use, often servicing multiple vessels at one time. While the Northern Fleet has other dry docks, the modernization of Kirov-class battlecruisers and the submarine fleet may be affected as other facilities in the region will be forced to absorb the increased demand caused by PD-50’s loss.

While Moscow has wavered between its ambitions for a prestigious, blue-water fleet and a defensive force of smaller ships, the circumstances of the PD-50 accident may force it to accept that the prospects for Kuznetsov and, by extension, the blue-water fleet are not good.

Maybe the Kremlin will take the opportunity to reassess the wisdom of Russia’s misadventures in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere. More likely, however, the Kremlin will double down on its sunk costs and pursue expensive, time-consuming and problematic options outlined above.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication, in addition to any mistakes, are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government or its components.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring here. 

Image: Creative Commons.