Complicating matters further was the Navy’s decision to reduce the number of Littoral Combat Ships being procured—which among its multiple modular refits was ASW. Instead, the Navy is developing a new line of frigates which, while having an ASW role among its multiple missions, is yet to be built.  Also, the Navy retired the ASW capable S-3 Vikings from its carriers a decade ago. Finally, the fact that the Navy is now asking for seed money to develop a new attack submarine, one more capable as an ASW platform than the multi-mission Virginia-class, strongly suggests it recognizes that it faces a growing and more sophisticated underwater threat. However, given budget realities and the realities of designing a speedier and stealthier attack submarine, it will be years before that boat makes into the fleet. In the meantime, the ASW mission remains and is growing.

Numbers of ASW platforms matter. Tracking submarines can be, especially if not tracked from the moment they leave port, a “needle in a haystack” problem. As allied naval exercises have shown over the years, both “red team” nuclear and AIP-assisted diesel submarines have gotten close enough to major capital surface ships, including carriers, to take “virtual” shots that would have sunk them. And, today, because both China and Russia have submarines that deploy with longer-range missiles, they have a wider swath of ocean to hide in. There is also the problem of tracking submarines that might be a threat to shipping lanes—over which an overwhelming amount of today’s commercial trade now moves and, in times of conflict, are key to reinforcing theaters or enforcing blockades.  And, increasingly, they are seen as lurking around the undersea cables that carry the vast majority of modern communications between continents. Finally, there is, of course, the problem of submarines that carry nuclear weapons, which present an existential threat to allies and the US homeland. Those submarines will never be treated as routine and often require an “all-hands-on-deck” approach to finding and tracking. As history and exercises have shown, this can quickly eat up what ASW resources are on hand.  In fine, the ASW mission is global, and while the Navy’s ASW capabilities may be the best in the world, the strategic task now and in the future is to be the best in multiple regions at the same time.     

As a global mission, the distinction between “presence” patrolling and “warfighting” capability is misleading. The strategic purpose, after all, is to deny our adversaries the opportunity to gain advantage in our absence – a modus operandi that perfectly captures Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, Russian aggression in the Black Sea region, and Iranian activity in the Persian Gulf.  The Poseidon is especially useful for patrolling these seas and straits; judicious and expanded basing arrangements will allow for more continuous coverage and free limited number of surface combatants and attack boats for ocean-going patrols. 

In a mission context where the tyranny is distance, what the P-8 brings to the table is a considerable capability. It flies much faster, higher and stays on station longer than the venerable 1960s P-3 Orion it was intended to replace. With a suite of active and passive sensors, sonobuoys, and a weapons bay load of torpedoes, it can potentially find and track an adversary’s submarines at greater distances then surface fleet ASW assets can and, if necessary, and unlike UAVs and other ISR assets, attack it. Given its communications suite, it can also become the key networking node for the other allied and American ASW platforms in play.  

In an era, where there are more headlines about flawed and over-budget Pentagon weapons programs than not, the Poseidon program has been a welcome success. From the awarding of the contract for system development in 2004, to initial procurement in 2010, to IOC in 2013, Boeing, the Poseidon’s main contractor, has delivered on time (or earlier), reduced unit costs by 30%, and has successfully integrated system and weapon improvements along the way. The Navy says that the program has cost billions less than original estimates. Moreover, with an investment of several billion dollars to reconfigure the original 737-800 airframe and engines to fit the P-8 mission, the Pentagon now has a tested and operationally successful platform which, if it wanted, it could modify to take on other missions, such as ground surveillance, signals intelligence or even become an arsenal plane capable of launching a new generation of offensive missiles.  

It is also worth considering that the P-8 is replacing not just aging American P-3 planes, but that the Orion has been the backbone of a globally allied fleet of ASW aircraft.  More than 700 P-3 were built.  At the moment, Australia, India, Britain, Norway, New Zealand and South Korea currently fly or have ordered P-8s.  In its budget distress, the U.S. Navy appears to be counting on these overseas sales to keep the P-8 production line going until its funding picture improves.  But that’s a roll of the dice.  If new orders from international customers are not forthcoming, contractors and sub-contractors will see a hard stop for new planes as soon as January of next year.  The production line for the 737-800, the basic P-8 airframe, is already dark and it’s only the Poseidon’s modified fuselage and engines that continue to be built.  Restarting the P-8 line with other, newer versions of the 737 would require substantial reengineering of the commercial airframe and the cost for doing so would almost certainly be greater than keeping the line going with new Navy orders.  Such uncertainty is bound to impact the goal of rebuilding the allied network of ASW platforms that the Poseidon program was to be the backbone of. 

Getting a fix on the gap between defense resources and the national defense strategy is a core task of Congress. When it comes to the underwater competition, this task is made more difficult by the long-standing reluctance of the Navy to share the kind of information necessary to make reasonable assessments of whether Navy program decisions are on the mark—or not.  And while much of the oversight burden will focus on the bigger ticket items, it would be a mistake to pass over decisions that, while not headline-grabbing, nevertheless might be operationally quite critical both today and in the near future.            

Gary Schmitt is a resident scholar in strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute and Giselle Donnelly is a resident fellow in defense & national security at the American Enterprise Institute.