The South China Sea Reveals China’s Grand Strategy

The South China Sea Reveals China’s Grand Strategy

To understand China’s grand strategy, particularly Xi’s long-term game, one needs to understand Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea.

 

Beijing’s general military philosophy is called active defense, perhaps closer to salami slicing, where China engages in the minimum provocative measures to raise a counterstrike from its adversaries, thus presenting Beijing with opportunities to strike back with a further vengeance.

Since Xi arrived, China’s coast guard, navy, and People’s Liberation Army have all adopted a sense of active defense. According to one such report, a disgruntled Chinese voice shouted over the radio as a Philippine military plane flew in the South China Sea, "Philippine military aircraft, I'm warning you again: leave immediately or you will bear responsibility for all the consequences. How long this competition remains mired in harsh rhetoric and legal battles before missiles start flying is anyone’s guess.

 

The South China Sea’s Future

So how do these tempestuous waters turn tranquil? Broadly speaking there are three likely scenarios as it stands.

First, there is what Beijing wants: where the ASEAN countries kowtow to China and understand the asymmetry of power and the importance of China’s economic needs. Much like Game of Thrones’ Lannisters, the implication is that China will not forget to pay its debts and will recompense the ASEAN countries through some form of trickle-down economics by way of investments—Beijing’s infamous debt trap diplomacy—or be their naval guardians, dislodging decades of Washington’s regional security presence.

Second, there is a scenario where China reaches a compromise between itself and the South China Sea’s other claimants. What that compromise looks like is as murky as the waters, partial pun intended.

Third, there is the scenario that everyone wants to avoid: the outbreak of regionwide warfare. While today it appears unlikely that tensions will spill over, neither China, it’s neighbors, nor the United States are backing down from their positions, which may only harden further with time.

There is also a fourth scenario, but that is least likely to happen. In this situation, China says walks away from its claims, and the other five regional players go back to enjoying the fruits of their own UNCLOS-codified EEZs unmolested by Chinese aggression.

One thing is for certain, however. To understand China’s grand strategy, particularly Xi’s long-term game, one needs to understand Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea. The region holds vast economic incentives through trade routes, supply chains, and natural resources in oil and fish that China’s Brobdingnagian population needs. Ever-interested in attaining economic hegemony, China knows it must also get weaker states to acquiesce to its economic plans that offer costly developmental loans in exchange for political or economic concessions in the future—the so-called debt-trap diplomacy. Then there is China’s military posturing through its bases in the Spratlys and Paracels, which is an extension of China’s ideological need to secure its fragile maritime and land borders after a century of humiliation. China is pursuing all of these things through its wolf-warrior diplomacy, meeting critiques with corrosive aggressive countering, and not overly concerning itself with international opprobrium. Xi Jinping has made clear that he will secure what the Chinese Communist Party believes are China’s core interests, at all costs, and the rest of the world had better take note.

Akshobh Giridharadas is based out of Washington DC and is a former broadcast reporter covering business and international relations with Channel NewsAsia in Singapore. He has regularly published with outlets such as The Diplomat, the Observer Research Foundation where he serves as a Visiting Fellow, ThePrint, The Quint, MoneyControl and FirstPost on geopolitics, business and sports. He is a two-time TEDx speaker

Image: Reuters.