Three reasons have often been cited to explain Kyiv’s decision to launch military operations inside Russia. 

First, to force Moscow to divert troops from other operational areas and thereby strain its ability to keep up pressure across all fronts, particularly in light of the critical situation in Donetsk.

Second, to seize territory that would then provide Kyiv with a stronger position in any potential negotiations to end the war, thus allowing for the occupied areas to be used as leverage to force more favorable concessions from Russia

Finally, it provides morale to its soldiers fighting in the east and north, as well as affirms the civilian population’s resolve to weather the costs of an increasingly painful war. 

The first has largely failed. The second and third remain to be seen. 

A fourth additional reason, that the intention was to embarrass Putin and weaken his domestic position, has been true to a certain degree; but although the operation has demonstrated a level of incompetence and even corruption among Russian command and control elements, as well as raised questions of accountability in its domestic security structure, with Putin even suffering an acute drop in his approval rating, from slightly less than eighty percent down into the low seventies, the likelihood of it threatening the Russian President’s position in the short term appears negligible.  

Ukrainian military leadership also had full knowledge of its armed forces’ precarious position in the Donbas when it decided to launch the surprise Kursk operation. Russian troops circle in around the major logistical hub of Pokrovsk and make gains in Toretsk, placing the central town of Kostyantynivka, another key logistical and operational location at risk of an impending future attack with the potential of eventually folding the front in the direction of the Kramatorsk-Slavyansk agglomerate. 

If, as seems probable, the sole intention was not to simply go all in with a bet on Russian malfeasance and incompetence, the situation therefore suggests that the Kursk offensive was at least partially motivated by other strategic considerations. 

What May be Yet to Come

The only factor that would truly change the war prospects for Ukraine is an escalation of the current conflict, defined by greater Western involvement up to, and potentially including, the point of foreign troop deployments. The use of long-range Western-provided weaponry such as U.S. Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) or British Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike targets deeper in Russian territory would not by itself change the strategic dynamic in the conflict.  

Russia’s economy is on the war footing, its population is largely united behind the war effort, and the developing geopolitical situation suggests that the country will emerge in a relatively stable, although decidedly less European, position on the world stage. 

The buffer zone argument also makes little sense, as the Russian military assets that allow for it to conduct its offensive operations are not located in the area, nor could longer-range strike capabilities change this reality, as the U.S. has acknowledged.

But such attacks and an expanded force presence on Russian territory could incite retaliatory actions by Moscow, perhaps even leading to the expansion of its “Special Military Operation” in the form of officially declaring war on Ukraine that is eventually significant enough to trigger expanded involvement on the part of the West. Ukrainian military leadership is also undoubtedly aware of this potential outcome and would likely welcome it. 

Military strategy is oriented according to political ends. If operations are undertaken in service of carrying out that strategy, then at least one operational objective in the Kursk offensive may have been the capture of the Kursk nuclear power plant (KPP), located about 100 kilometers from the border, to force a significant and immediate diversion of Russian troops from the East, as well as provide some of that sought after leverage in eventual peace negotiations. However, another was surely to buttress Ukraine’s argument in getting the West to lift all restrictions on the use of its weapons to strike deep within Russian territory.  

It does not matter if the current offensive fails to achieve any more significant territorial gains. The argument that elite units have been successful in capturing and holding ground has demonstrated that Ukraine still possesses an animated fighting force that is capable of winning and that providing the means to make the war more costly for Russia will therefore qualitatively change the situation in Kyiv’s favor, at least for those already inclined to believe such things. In reality, such a move would be but one more wrung on the escalation ladder that Ukraine needs to climb up if it is to achieve its stated political ends.   

Where is the Kremlin’s Head at?

The consideration from the Russian side is almost completely inversed. 

Its strategy is one of attrition. Its advantage lies in its ability to maintain the current dynamic and continue using its superior resources to grind down Ukraine’s war-fighting capacities. Kyiv is therefore dependent upon a provocatory strategy to compel Moscow to change its approach. As it stands, maneuver warfare will not allow Ukraine to recapture its territory in the east, nor accomplish its other political objectives. 

If we take the Ukrainian regime at its word, that still means the return to the 1991 borders buttressed by membership in NATO. Even if Kyiv is willing to negotiate on some of these points, the aforementioned strategic dynamics of the conflict ensure that Moscow has no real incentive to stop its onslaught before completely securing its political ends. 

Even if the U.S. proves unwilling to lift its restrictions on weapons use, Kyiv is still not without means of escalating the conflict. For instance, Ukrainian troops do indeed appear to be making some gains in the Kursk direction despite inevitably suffering heavy casualties and equipment loss amid the Russian counterattack. If Ukraine is willing to abandon other positions along the line of contact in the east and devote even more of its forces to the Kursk front, the possibility of making further advances, even in the direction of the KPP, shouldn’t be discounted just yet.

Although it will no longer have the element of surprise to its advantage. Something like the capture of that facility would certainly mark a high water mark in the conflict, hence ongoing discussion in the press about Moscow’s potential to deploy a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon. This seems particularly relevant given the recently announced changes to Russian nuclear doctrine. The latter may be a signal to the West, and the United States in particular, that the threshold between proxy war and open engagement has been reached. 

Conversely, that would almost certainly galvanize international support for Ukraine and put Russia in a less secure position. The Kremlin therefore has an incentive to avoid any such move and to keep the present course. As much as anyone may be loath to admit, Moscow still maintains escalation dominance in the current war. 

This means that should the Zelensky administration want to accomplish its political objectives as stated, changing that dynamic is Ukraine’s strategic imperative. And that requires a provocatory course of action that is certainly not in the U.S. national interest.  

About the Author: 

Dominick Sansone is a doctoral student studying political philosophy and a Young Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. His opinions are his own.  

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