Worst Idea Ever: Selling the F-35 Fighter to Taiwan
Selling F-35 Lightning II jets to Taiwan would escalate tensions with China and could provoke a conflict that Taiwan is unprepared to handle independently. Instead of relying on U.S. military intervention, Taiwan should focus on self-sufficiency in defense by enhancing civilian militia training, developing drone fleets, and deploying extensive minefields.
Summary and Key Points: Selling F-35 Lightning II jets to Taiwan would escalate tensions with China and could provoke a conflict that Taiwan is unprepared to handle independently. Instead of relying on U.S. military intervention, Taiwan should focus on self-sufficiency in defense by enhancing civilian militia training, developing drone fleets, and deploying extensive minefields.
-Diplomatically, reaffirming the One China policy could buy crucial time for Taiwan and the U.S. to bolster their defense capabilities.
-Investing in a strategy that makes Taiwan a formidable "porcupine" is more practical and less provocative than acquiring high-tech F-35s, which could become liabilities if supply chains are disrupted.
Do Not Sell F-35 Lighting IIs to Taiwan
There’s been a lot of talk about Taiwan lately.
Will it be invaded by China? Can it depend on assistance from the United States and its allies? How should Taiwan best prepare for a conflict?
The questions are legitimate and the answers sometimes uncomfortable. But the one problem this author has is the way American strategists talk about Taiwan, and the way most Taiwanese leaders behave when it comes to their national defense.
F-35 and Fundamental Lack of Understanding
The goal of Taiwan’s national defense must be one of self-sufficiency. Instead, it would appear that the main aim of Taiwan’s national defense is to wait for the Americans and their allies to come rolling in when, and if, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan commences. Taiwanese leaders need to know how unlikely this reality is.
The very last thing that any sane Taiwanese leader should want at this juncture is for Taipei to get a little too aggressive with China, assuming the Americans will have their backs, and then discover, after the fact, that Washington will not have. Worse, America might wish to respond, but because of weaknesses in the U.S. defense industrial base and the overstretching of the U.S. military, the United States might be unable to come to Taiwan’s aid.
Right now, the conversation makes Taiwan out to be less of a sovereign state in need of help, and more a vassal state to America. This is not to say that Washington should abandon Taiwan to China. It should not. It is to point out that Taiwan’s leaders need to make new calculations when it comes to defending their liberty from a larger autocratic neighbor, like China.
For this reason alone, Taipei needs to abandon any notion of being allowed to purchase America’s F-35 Lightning II warplane. Beijing would view that move as escalatory and perhaps even use it as a pretext to attack and/or blockade the island.
Is a warplane worth provoking the very conflict that Taiwan is desperately trying to defend itself against?
And what happens if the island is blockaded by China and the F-35 maintenance supply chain is cut off from the island?
Those wildly expensive, complex warbirds suddenly become wasting assets. The money that was blown on purchasing a handful of F-35s could have been much better spent on defense programs and equipment that would actually help defend Taiwan – or better yet, deter China from invading altogether.
If it is true that China is planning to take action against Taiwan at some point in the next year or so, having a handful of F-35s won’t make the difference that Taipei believes it will.
What Should Be Done Instead…
Here’s where the resources of Taiwan should be dedicated: toward making the island a porcupine that is too unpalatable for China to swallow. That is not done with complex systems like the F-35. It is done by arming as many civilians as possible and requiring them to receive a basic level of firearms training.
This goal is accomplished by building fleets of drones that can swarm the area surrounding the island, both in the sky and at sea, to harass and confuse any Chinese invasion force. Such a goal is accomplished by the greatest minelaying operation in history, both along Taiwan’s beaches and ports and in the ocean surrounding the island.
Meanwhile, vigorous diplomacy is required in conjunction with diplomatic assistance from the Americans, Japanese, and all other powers concerned about China’s aggressive rise. Beijing is keen to be seen as the victim rather than the aggressor. To remove this particular pillar of their pending assault on Taiwan, it will be necessary for the Western allies – including Taiwan – to reaffirm its commitment to the One China agreement as embodied by the Shanghai Communique of 1979.
This is not ideal for Taiwan.
Sadly, it is the only viable option diplomatically available to them for the precise reason that the United States is otherwise engaged and cannot be relied upon to militarily respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Buying time and getting Beijing to defer their planned invasion and/or blockade on Taiwan is the key play for a Western alliance whose strategic cards right now are nowhere near as good as China’s.
Buying Time is a Worthwhile Investment
Buying time gives both the United States and Taiwan the time the two countries need to get their own defense industrial bases in order, as well as to figure out better strategies for the future. Once the inherent problems within America’s system are resolved, and once Taiwan has time to truly reimagine what an effective national defense looks like, a greater discussion can be had about a more confrontational approach with China.
Selling Taiwan F-35s does nothing to further Taiwan’s defense. It actually makes Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese aggression in the near term and should thus be avoided at all costs. In fact, most escalatory moves against China should be resisted for at least the next five years by both the United States and Taiwan.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
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