On November 21, North Korea made its third attempt of 2023 to launch a reconnaissance satellite. The North did so despite this launch violating multiple UN Security Council resolutions and despite the urging of many other countries. While the North has not explained the whole logic behind the launch, a broader view of North Korea suggests that it may well have been a desperate move by North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un.

After all, why does North Korea need reconnaissance satellites? According to a news bulletin, “The North defended the latest launch as its ‘legitimate’ right to strengthen ‘self-defensive capabilities.’” Kim further said the satellite was needed to “curb dangerous invasion moves by the hostile forces.” This is consistent with the North’s constant refrain that the United States is an inveterately hostile enemy anxious to invade—conveniently justifying the sacrifices of the North Korean people to fund huge military budgets (estimated between 20 and 30 percent of GDP). The regime also uses U.S. hostility to explain its many failures as a government. 

But why would the United States ever want to invade North Korea? The United States would have very little to gain and yet would pay an incredible price in treasure and lives by invading the North before even considering North Korean nuclear weapons. Indeed, over the years, the United States has consistently sought to de-escalate North Korean military attack provocations, fearing that retaliation in kind would risk an escalatory spiral into a major, unwanted war. 

Moreover, North Korea appears to have agents (spies) placed in the ROK and many other parts of the world who already collect many of the kinds of information that a reconnaissance satellite might seek. Of course, North Korea is in the process of recalling its personnel from foreign locations, probably concerned by their exposure to outside information that really scares Kim. 

The North has depended upon its elites to take overseas assignments, hoping their loyalty to the regime will insulate them from being “corrupted” by what they see and hear in the outside world. According to a North Korean defector, “Frankly speaking, those who have worked abroad for an extended period understand that the North Korean regime and the country are not a normal state and system.” Exposure to the outside world significantly undermines the regime’s propaganda myths, and according to North Korean escapees with whom I have spoken, some of this external information is carefully passed on to friends and family when those overseas return home. Still, other defectors claim that “months of ‘reeducation’ sessions, or even forced labor, await thousands of overseas North Koreans when they return home for the first time in over three and a half years.”

How worried is Kim? A few years ago, he claimed that even K-pop is a “vicious cancer,” degrading the morals of his younger generation. State media went on to say that unless it was stopped, it could cause the regime to “collapse like a damp wall.” And nothing is more scary to Kim than a regime collapse. Kim’s fear of outside information is so great that the regime imposes prison sentences of ten years or more of hard labor for those caught even watching a South Korean movie.

Is it possible that Kim hopes to replace his intelligence agents around the world with satellites that collect similar information but do not provide regime myth-busting information to members of the elite? Unfortunately for Kim, many of his overseas personnel are workers earning hard currency for the government. Rather than eliminate these personnel, the regime plans to replace them to retain the hard currency flow.

In addition, Kim has historically used his missile test launches and nuclear weapons to demonstrate his power to his people—one of the few areas where Kim has had relatively consistent success. To avoid questions about his accomplishments, he has tried to cover up major missile test failures, such as his ICBM launched on March 16, 2022, that exploded just north of Pyongyang, apparently sending down a shower of missile debris. It was, therefore, surprising that the North admitted its failed satellite launches in May and August this year. Is it possible that it did so because Kim recognized that sensitive outside news information was getting to at least some of the North Korean elites, who would then catch him in a deception? Is the North actually more porous to outside information despite Kim’s efforts to keep such information out of the North? If true, this would significantly undermine the North’s myths and could give the ROK-U.S. some leverage on the regime.

Of course, Kim’s prestige likely dropped once the regime admitted the failures of its first two satellite launches this year. Elites may even see him as weak—something he cannot allow. Kim had made such a big deal about launching a satellite that he needed success. When North Korean expertise and technology failed to yield that success, Kim turned to Russia for assistance, as his family has done with missiles in the past. Kim’s trip to meet Putin at Russia’s own spaceport gave him a chance to bring along North Korean scientists who could seek advice from the Russian space experts. The North has even provided space launch vehicle blueprints to Russian scientists, apparently getting their feedback. Two weeks later, “a Russian military plane flew directly from Moscow to Pyongyang,” likely delivering components and scientists needed to fix the North Korean space launch vehicle. The same plane flew from Vladivostok to Pyongyang again on November 7 and November 22, probably bringing further Russian help for the space launch and likely helping to get satellite operations working.

Of course, depending on Russian help is a far cry from the North Korean philosophy of “Juche”—roughly meaning “self-reliance.” North Korea claims to be a powerful country, at least to domestic audiences, and should, in theory, be able to accomplish almost anything independently. But now, at least some elites—and maybe many if outside information is reaching the elites—know that Kim abandoned Juche to achieve a successful space launch, making him look diminished. 

Kim Jong-un’s record of paranoia suggests he likely feels that some of his myths are unraveling. That presents not only an opportunity to influence North Korea but also a considerable danger if Kim begins fearing that he is losing control.

About the Author

Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Program.