Aside from the practical dimensions, there remain hindrances to a complete rapprochement between the two sides. Central to this is the question of ideology. Though Assad’s Syria is not the same as the one ruled by his father, it retains strong political convictions that it is unlikely to abandon easily. The state in its current political form traces its origins to the 1963 coup d’état and the Corrective Movement of 1970, which established and strengthened the role of the Ba’ath Party. Even the modified 2012 constitution, which loosened the party’s exclusive grip on power, begins with a preamble speaking of “Arab civilization” with the first article affirming that the country is located within “the Arab homeland” and that “the people of Syria are part of the Arab nation.”

On the other hand, the Syrian Democratic Council advocates for an explicitly multiethnic state and seeks to fundamentally reorganize the country’s political institutions. The council officially calls for a decentralized state that would empower regional governments while simultaneously highlighting minority interests. Though this prospect has not been embraced by Damascus, it has not been fully rejected either. Salih Muslim, former co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council’s leading Democratic Union Party, met with senior government officials in 2018 in order to “to get to know each other and establish confidence, develop reciprocal relations”—with Damascus having “accepted to discuss the notion of a decentralized system.”

While ethnic federalization has presented itself as a potential political settlement to the Syrian civil war, the government has reason to be wary. Attempts at secession in neighboring Iraq by the Kurdistan Regional Government, rising ethnic tensions in Ethiopia, and a number of other examples have all provided warning lessons to governments about the risks that weakened central governments face. Not wanting to embolden polities that are likely to demand more power down the line, and with even Lebanese political winds moving away from decades-old sectarian-based politics, the Syrian government has few reasons to feel pressured into accepting a governing structure put forward by the Syrian Democratic Council.

The political viability of a competitor to the Syrian state is to some extent a question of patience and willpower, not between Damascus and Rojava but rather between Damascus and the backers of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Having nowhere to run, the Syrian government will, by its very nature, be able to wait out any foreign actor when it comes to reestablishing control over the country. The failed logic of American military thinking as seen in Vietnam and Iraq, whereby another offensive or limited period of time (say six months, as Thomas Friedman often suggested) will somehow miraculously change the fundamental dynamic, will only set up the Syrian Democratic Forces to fail.

It is precisely at the current moment that the opportunity remains for the Syrian Kurdish forces to push for reincorporation instead of negotiating from a position of weakness or being coerced. With the majority of the country under government or joint government/Kurdish control, the window is slowly closing before self-declared regional rule expires.

Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom is the Senior Vice President of the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum, managing editor of Manara Magazine, and a writer with a focus on security policy and international affairs.

Image: Reuters.