Only then can we exploit command of the sea. That’s the fallacy of “. . . From the Sea”: it assumed America could enjoy the fruits of command without fighting for command, and would do so more or less forever. It assumed History was on our side following the Soviet collapse—and would remain on our side. That was a dangerous assumption, and we’re coping with its fallout to this day.

No victory is permanent unless we make it so. Let us resolve never again to declare a holiday from maritime history—even if we win big in our next geopolitical competition, as we did in the Cold War and World War II. Great sea powers don’t get to take holidays, especially when maritime history is just beginning for ambitious, saltwater-minded rivals like China.

PLA Navy strategists read Mahan deeply, and have premised their maritime strategy in part on his teachings. Mahan and Corbett help China think about its strategic predicament—just as they help us think about ours.

To avert or manage challenges from the likes of China, let’s constantly improve our ability to fight and win, even if the likelihood of combat appears remote. In so doing we dishearten potential challengers while reassuring allies and friends. In short, let’s heed the teachings of the masters of sea power. Let’s stay on the good side of the Gods of the Copybook Headings—lest they return seeking their revenge.

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The agenda for the Current Strategy Forum can be found here. The views voiced here are his alone. This article first appeared in June 2016.

Image: Reuters.