You can read part one here.
The initial attack on February 23, 1991, into Iraq had been anticlimactic. Intelligence had told us there would be various border outposts ready to attack us as soon as we penetrated their defenses. We fired hundreds of 155 millimeter artillery shells against their suspected locations in depth, but after we blew through the border, discovered only some goats and empty buildings. We knew the main line of defense was far to the north, so we continued moving.
From the 23rd to 25th of February we saw only sporadic fighting, lots of surrendering troops, and endless tracts of empty desert as our eyes grew red from the blazing intensity of the sun. The temperature in the Middle Eastern deserts can climb upwards of 130-degrees in the summer, but we were there in the winter and sometimes had frost on our tanks in the morning. As the sun went down on the night of February 25 we were greeted with a soaking, cold rain. Since I was the commander of my vehicle, I had to ride with the hatch open; there was nowhere to hide from the driving rain, and I was miserable.
By dawn the next morning, February 26, the rain had stopped but the clouds remained. As was our custom, we first sent our helicopters to screen about six miles in front of our lead scouts so that we would have the ability to develop the situation out of contact should we encounter major or unexpected enemy contact. But barely had we started that day when a sand storm came out of nowhere.
It was one of those storms of “biblical proportions” as they say, that was propelled by an intense wind which made the sand sting when it hit any exposed skin. The helicopters were quickly grounded, depriving us of our advanced warning and leaving our lead scouts as now the first line of defense. Because of the thickness of the sandstorm, our otherwise superior optics were rendered almost useless; we could barely see one hundred yards to our front by using goggles to protect our naked eyes. Some of the greatest advantages we held over the enemy had now been neutralized.
About 3 p.m. that afternoon, one of the scout leaders called me on the radio and said he saw something in his thermal sights but wasn’t sure what it was. Since my vehicle was just a few hundred yards from his Bradley, he asked me to take a look. I made the quick drive and jumped into his turret to look through the viewfinder. As soon as I did my eyes opened wide and I said I thought this was a line of dug-in enemy tanks. All we could see were “hot spots” on the reticles; the shapes weren’t readily identifiable. Based on how they were arrayed to the front, however, I suspected they were tanks dug into the ground so that only the turrets were visible.
I ran back to my command vehicle to radio the commander to report the sighting and request permission to engage with long range artillery. McMaster, however, had already been made aware of the “hot spots” and was in the process of giving instructions to Eagle Troop to maneuver on the spots. Initially he gave me permission to launch an artillery-fire mission (because there were no coalition forces in front of us: we were the front line of friendly troops and only enemy forces were in front of us). But cannons to the rear couldn’t process the mission fast enough and the order had to be scrapped because our own troops were advancing and might fall under our own bombs.
Because enemy contact was now likely, McMaster changed the formation and instead of leading with the lighter-skinned Bradley scouts, he moved the troop’s nine takes to move to the front. Macgregor had always told us that the safest place to be on the battlefield was in an M1 tank driving directly towards the gun tube of any enemy vehicle—the frontal armor of an M1 could defeat virtually any weapon Iraq had. McMaster knew this and put his strong armor in the lead.
Being true to his word that he would lead from the front, McMaster put his tank at the center of the formation and arrayed his two tank platoons in a “V” formation behind him in cascading rows to his right and left. Once in formation, he continued towards the suspected enemy locations and in the process his tank crested a small hill. As his tank treads hit the backside of the hill he discovered he was nearly gun tube-to-gun tube with eight Iraqi T72 tanks!
The M1A1 tank can hit a pinpoint target from over three miles away in the desert. That is the optimal engagement range because few Iraqi tanks could accurately fire to half that distance. McMaster, however, found himself within a couple hundred yards from the enemy! Immediately and simultaneously he ordered his gunner to engage the closest tank while McMaster got on the troop command net and screamed to the rest of us, “Contact! Tanks direct front!”