Concerning the Russian Vostok 2010 military exercise, the official newspaper of the Far East Military District said, “To suppress a large center of the separatists’ resistance and to achieve minimal losses of the attacking troops a low-yield ‘nuclear’ attack was mounted against the enemy.”[35] In the same exercise, Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that Russia used a nuclear-armed S-300 surface-to-air missile against a ground target.[36]

Despite the near hysterical reaction from Russia and U.S. arms control enthusiasts, the U.S. program for a low-yield warhead for the Trident missile is quite modest, prudent and not remotely comparable to existing Russian capabilities and programs. The weapons that the U.S. plans to install will be small in number, modest in cost, not a new type of nuclear weapon and will not require a nuclear test.[37] This clearly rules out low-collateral damage warheads, precision or near-precision accuracy, or earth penetration – all capabilities that the Russians are reported to have or are developing. Such restrictions also preclude any significant warfighting capability. The purpose of the low-yield Trident warhead is not warfighting but rather to deter Russian first use of nuclear weapons which would very likely involve precision low-yield or low-collateral damage nuclear weapons. The Russians believe they can use these without precipitating a massive nuclear exchange.

The Trident submarines have the survivability that is necessary for an effective deterrent, but they have 1980s level accuracy which is good but not precision or near precision. Their survivable capability could deter Russian first use of low-yield weapons including use against bomber bases and nuclear-capable fighter bases to eliminate U.S. retaliatory capability against low-yield attack by a preemptive attack. However, these aircraft are not on alert and, hence, unless put on alert can be eliminated by about ten ordinary nuclear weapons. A 2007 study by CSIS concluded, “In a ‘bolt from the blue’ attack, just five dedicated nuclear strikes could take out all three strategic nuclear bomber bases and the two submarine bases.”[38] Trident submarines at sea will very likely survive, but non-alert bombers present at their bases could be destroyed. A small number of B-61 nuclear bombs are reportedly deployed at five NATO air bases in Europe.[39] Again, they could be taken out by a small nuclear attack if they are not on alert or dispersed. A very good recent analysis by James R. Howe has concluded that a small number of precision low-yield nuclear weapons would eliminate the ability of these bases to retaliate for months (even assuming no follow-on Russian nuclear attacks) with very low levels of collateral damage.[40] Howe also raised concern about the possibility of a much larger Russian precision-low-yield attack (about 1,300 to 1,500 weapons) which has the potential to defeat NATO with modest collateral damage.

The NPR decision on Trident low-yield capability was recommended by the Obama administration’s Defense Science Board in December 2016.[41] It plugs a major hole in our current deterrent capability at virtually no cost.

Putin’s remarkably militant nuclear superweapons speech to the Russia Duma on March 1, 2018, should be a wake-up call regarding the need to create a more effective deterrent to counter Putin’s irresponsible policies. Make no mistake about the intended target of this speech. As Maxim Trudolyubov, a senior fellow with the Kennan Institute, observed, “…Interestingly, both state-run [Russian] news media and independent outlets agreed that the speech was mainly targeted at Washington.”[42] Putin first staked out a claim to the former Soviet states because “…Russia, which was known as the Soviet Union or Soviet Russia abroad” had lost them with the demise of the Soviet Union.[43] Then, he alternated between portraying Russia as a victim (making ridiculous claims about U.S. missile defense and the failure of the West to “listen” to Russia) and making extreme forms of standard Russian nuclear threats – nuclear superweapons and an “immediate” nuclear launch after a supposed Western attack. Pavel Felgenhauer summed up the message as, “Russia is not aggressive, according to Putin, but it demands what it believes it is due—otherwise, its doomsday nuclear superweapons are ready.”[44]

Putin does not want Russia to be listened to. He wants its imperialism and aggression accepted at the point of his nuclear superweapons. After declaring to the West, “So listen now,” Putin went into a speech which, as a noted British Russia expert Roger McDermott observed, “…offered a vision of the Russian Armed Forces more akin to a parody of Dr. Strangelove.”[45]

Derek Williams and Adam B. Lowther attribute Russian confidence that Russia can start a nuclear conflict, control it and win it to the fact that, “…Vladimir Putin believes the United States lacks the will and the weapons to respond not only to limited nuclear war but the cohesive use of nuclear deterrence for political gain.”[46] We need nuclear deterrent programs that would convince Putin that his theory of victory is foolhardy and if he tries aggression it will be resisted and defeated and that Russian nuclear weapons first use will not assure his victory. We must assure that any U.S. President has the broadest possible range of credible nuclear options to convince any potential aggressor to desist from attacking us or our allies with nuclear or WMD weapons.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy including Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions.  He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

Notes:

[1] Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, (Washington D.C., US, Department of Defense, February 2018), pp. XI-XII, available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

[2] “Remarks by Secretary Carter to troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota,” (Washington D.C., U.S. department of Defense, Sept. 26, 2016), available at http://www.defense.gov/News/ Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/957408/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-troops-at-kirtland-afb-new-mexico.

[3] Jamie McIntyre, “Jim Mattis: Low-yield nukes mean US won't have to choose between ‘surrender’ and ‘suicide’,” The Examiner, February 6, 2018, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/docview/ 1999173890? accountid=155509.

[4] Federation of American Scientists, “Trident-II D-5,” Federation of American Scientists, December 4, 2006, http://fas.org/nuke/guide/uk/slbm/d-5.htm.: David S. Yost, “France’s New Nuclear Doctrine,” International Affairs, Vo. 82, No. 4 (2006), p. 704, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006. 00564.x /abstract.

[5] Pavel Felgenhauer, “Bomber Makers Trade Union,” The Moscow Times, March 14, 2002, available at http://www. themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/bomb-makers-trade-union/247805 html.

[6] “Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear Warheads [Redacted],” Intelligence Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, August 30, 2000, approved for release October 2005, pp. 6, 10, available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001260463.pdf.

[7] William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, America’s Strategic Posture - The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 12, available at http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf.

[8] Ilya Kramnik, “Nevsky and Novomoskovsk: Two Submarines for Putin,” Sputnik News, December 12, 2010, available at http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20101215/161784522.htmlz.: Andrey Kislyakov, “Does Russia Need a ‘Wet’ Missile and One More Tank?,” Ria Novosti, January 19, 2008. (Translated by World News Connection).; “Russian pundit Litovkin argues case of Bulava,” Ekho Moskvy Radio, July 17, 2009. (Translated by World News Connection).

[9] “Russia to use same warheads on land, sea,” UPI News Track, April 24, 2006. (Transcribed by World News Connection).

[10] “Russian TV shows howitzer capable of firing low-yield nuclear warheads,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, April 11, 2004, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/docview/460568620?Accounted =155509.

[11] Академик Евгений Николаевич Аврорин: «Наука — это то, что можно сделать, а техническая наука — это то, что нужно сделать»,” atomicenergy.ru, April 10, 2013, available at http://www.atomic-energy.ru/interviews/ 2013/04/10/41068. (In Russian).

[12] “RF To Build 6 Nuclear Subs With Long-range Cruise Missiles,” ITAR-TASS, March 27, 2009. No longer available on the TASS webs-site, but Western press stories citing the ITAR-TASS report remain on the internet. “Russia to build 6 nuke subs with Cruise Missiles,” CNN, March 28, 2009, available at https://army.ca/forums/ index.php?topic = 85048.0 World/.

[13] A video of Karber’s presentation is available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/podcasts/karber.

[14] National Institute for Public Policy, “Section II Minimum Deterrence: Fragile Hope for Constant and Benign Threat Environment,” (Fairfax Va.: National Institute for Public Policy, September 2014,), p. 22, available at http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/ FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20-%20Section%20II%20Minimum%20Deterrence 20 Fragile%20Hope.pdf.

[15] Office of Russian and European Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency “Russia: [Deleted],” June 22, 2000, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB200/20000622.pdf.

[16] “About Snezhinsk,” CNCP.ru, April 2013, available at http://www.cncp.ru/new_site/ng/participants/snezhinsk/ snezinsk1.shtml.

[17] Vice Admiral (ret.) Robert Monroe, “Facing the grave nuclear risk,” The Washington Times, January 27, 2017, available at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26/america-must-resume-underground-nuclear-testing/.

[18] Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty on the US by Developing BMD,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 7, No. 136 (July 16, 2010), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ Ttnews[tt_news]=36624.