However, military-technical cooperation between the two countries has not always run smoothly. In 1995, during the Russia-U.S. summit, President Boris Yeltsin gave in to pressure from President Bill Clinton and pledged not to enter into new agreements with Iran, a promise which was then formalized in a secret memorandum signed on June 30, 1995 by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Since 2000 when Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has refused to adhere to the Gore-Chernomyrdin protocol but Russian military sales to Iran have not reached their earlier volume.

Another blow to cooperation between Moscow and Tehran stems from a 2007 agreement according to which Russia pledged to sell Iran the famous Russian anti-aircraft missile system S-300 for $800 million. In June 2010, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 imposing new sanctions on Iran's nuclear program. As a result, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued an order to cancel the deal with Iran. The Kremlin made ​​this political decision in the context of the "reset" of relations with the U.S. and the signing of a new START Treaty, which resulted in Tehran seeking international arbitration and a penalty of $4.2 billion from Moscow for having violated their deal. So began a new downturn in relations between Russia and Iran, while Moscow's image as an arms trade partner suffered in the eyes of countries that import Russian weapons. Iran still demands the restoration of the S-300 agreement as a condition for the resumption of military-technical cooperation with Russia.

Future alternatives

It is clear that the hope for rapid growth of economic and military-technical cooperation between Russia and Iran depends on the collective withdrawal of UN sanctions and the unilateral sanctions of the U.S. and its allies. For this reason, Moscow remains interested in concluding a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. The economic expectations of Russian big business and government agencies outweigh their fear of widening Western influence in Iran and increased competition from American, Chinese, European and Japanese companies in the Iranian market and over Iranian hydrocarbons.

However, if worsening relations between Russia and the West over Ukraine lead to “crippling” economic sanctions against Moscow, the latter will side with Iran in its quest to ease restrictions on its nuclear program. This will particularly apply in negotiations of an agreement on the acceptable scale of Iran’s uranium enrichment program (Iran insists on the right to have 50 or even 190 thousand centrifuges - ostensibly to provide fuel for Bushehr and future reactors, although Russia is contracted to supply this fuel). It would also affect the closing of the Fordow underground enrichment facility and efforts to answer questions about Iran’s past nuclear activities, its rocket program, and other issues. In such a situation, if the U.S. does not separately reach an agreement with Iran, negotiations will hit an impasse, and a third Gulf War will be inevitable. Moreover, Russia and the West, as during the Cold War years, would be on opposing sides of the front line.

In the case of de-escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia will seek to play the role of a mediator between Iran and the West in negotiations on the nuclear issue. Counting on the growth of cooperation with Iran, Moscow will try in advance to provide itself with the most favorable political background for relations with Tehran. In the current environment, one can hardly expect from Russia (or China) a hard line in unity with the United States and its European allies to achieve the maximum concessions from Iran on the permissible quantity of centrifuges and other issues—even if it does not allow for the achievement of a comprehensive agreement by the planned date of July 20.

This goal was also apparent during Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Iran at the end of 2013, when he said "The main thing is to do is everything we’ve agreed upon, not to seek an extended or narrowed interpretation of this agreement." President Putin's upcoming visit to Iran in 2014 is likely to give new impetus to reaching an arrangement with Tehran for the period after sanctions are lifted.

For Russia, in addition to future economic benefits, the development of relations with Iran furthers a major political goal. According to Moscow’s plan, Iran (after the resolution of its "nuclear issue”) and Syria (after the restoration of peace there) shall be the two main pillars of Russian influence in the Middle East. Together with the dominance of Moscow in the post-Soviet space and the development of relations with China, this is considered essential for the revival of Russia as a global power. This is the principal strategic objective of the Kremlin’s current domestic and foreign policy.

Alexei Arbatov is a scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Image: Office of the President, Russian Federation.